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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Introducing Climate Change and Aid 
Anthropogenic climate change is possibly one of the most serious threats the 
world is facing today. From rising sea levels, to increasing frequency of 
extreme weather events, the perils of climate change pose a fundamental 
danger to all life on earth. Dealing with climate change requires a two-pronged 
approach. Firstly, we need to mitigate our greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
that are responsible for climate change (mitigation). Secondly, climate change 
is creating problems that require adapting to its anticipated negative effects or 
taking action to minimize the damages caused by it (adaptation).  
Unfortunately, the brunt of climate change is borne largely by 
developing countries. They face what is often referred to as a double injustice 
(Betzold & Weiler, 2017). Despite being the least responsible for causing 
climate change, they are not only disproportionately affected by the 
unfavorable effects of climate change but also have much fewer resources to 
deal with it (Gough, 2011). Keeping in view this double injustice, developed 
countries are expected to support developing countries to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change.  
Among others, one of the most important forms of support developing 
countries need is climate finance. Climate finance is basically financial flows 
aimed at helping developing countries reduce their GHG emissions (via 
mitigation finance) and adapt (via adaptation finance) to climate change. 
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That developed countries shall help developing countries with climate finance 
was already agreed to in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. However, till the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 15) held in Copenhagen in 2009, no concrete amount of 
financial resources that was to be transferred to the developing countries was 
settled upon. After years of negotiations, finally in Copenhagen, developed 
countries pledged to provide climate finance to the amount of 10 billion US$ 
per year from 2010-2012 with the promise to increase it to 100 billion US$ 
starting in 2020 (UNFCCC 2009, para. 8; UNFCCC 2010: Decision 1/CP.16, 
para. 98). These commitments were further reaffirmed in the Cancun COP in 
2010 and more recently, in the Paris Agreement of 2015. The Paris Agreement 
states that developed countries ‘need to take the lead in mobilizing climate 
finance from a wide variety of sources’ (UNFCCC, 2015 Art. 9.3). The text of 
the Paris Agreement gives developed countries significant leeway over how 
much they will contribute out of their own budgets and how much they will 
leverage from private sources. Currently, although the levels of climate finance 
provision is increasing over time, there is a considerable gap between the 
amount of financing required and the amount available to the developing 
countries (Betzold & Weiler, 2016). This means that there will likely never be 
enough to cover all the costs of financing the responses to climate change and 
the available resources need to be used efficiently.  
Most of the climate finance comes from developed country 
governments’ Official Development Assistance (ODA), i.e., development aid 
budgets, and is hence called “climate aid”. Furthermore, climate aid is the 
only relatively undisputed source of data available on climate finance. 
Nonetheless, climate aid is riddled with problems that need a thorough 
conceptual and empirical reconsideration, which is the focus of this thesis. 
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These problems are briefly discussed in the next section before exploring the 
research gap and research questions addressed. 
1.2 Rethinking Climate Aid 
There are several issues revolving climate aid that need to be dealt with in a 
comprehensive manner. Some of them have already been debated heavily. 
First and foremost, climate aid is supposed to be new and additional as 
established in the negotiations (UNFCCC, 2009). Although additionality has 
never been properly defined, according to Ballesteros & Moncel (2010), it 
implies that financial flows addressing the objective of climate change should 
not replace or substitute funding for other important development objectives. 
To what extent climate aid is additional to existing development aid 
commitments needs further scrutiny. 
Second, climate finance is fundamentally different from aid although at 
present it is subsumed within that category. While the term development aid 
suggests a charitable support of developing countries, climate finance is 
considered as compensation for the damages caused by developed countries, 
i.e., as payments developing countries can rightfully claim under the
normative principle of polluters pay. This issue has already given rise to 
heated debates in the context of the negotiations within the UNFCCC. 
Third and not considered so far within this debate, funding for climate 
change mitigation addresses a global public good. Mitigation is a global public 
good since its benefits are not contained locally, but are global in nature 
(Kaul, 2014; Kaul, et al., 1999). This means that developing countries that 
receive such aid do not get any exclusive benefits. Can we talk of aid when 
there are no specific benefits for the country that receives it?  
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That mitigation aid addresses a global public good has far-reaching 
implications for how it should be allocated. Those countries most vulnerable 
to climate change and thus, most in need of mitigation are generally not 
served best by implementing mitigation activities there. They often do not 
have high levels of GHG emissions and consequently, low emission reduction 
potentials. From a public choice perspective, mitigation aid should be 
allocated to places with maximum emission reduction potential (on the basis 
of cost-effectiveness), which often happen to be emerging economies. This goes 
against the traditional logic of aid allocation according to which aid should 
always go to those countries most in need. Things are different with respect to 
adaptation. Adaptation aid usually addresses private or a local public good 
where the benefits are exclusive to the beneficiary of the aid. Adaptation aid 
and other development aid should, therefore, be allocated to needy countries, 
which are vulnerable to the effects of climate change.  
This thesis will investigate in more detail to what extent funding 
related to climate change mitigation and adaptation should be used like aid 
and is used like aid in practice. By doing so, this thesis will not only uncover 
conceptual inconsistencies, but also inefficient practices and rather puzzling 
strategic choices of the use of climate finance by donor countries.  
1.3 Methodological Remarks 
The thesis uses a mixed methods approach by combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Historically, a gulf exists between qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives with each adhering to different standards (Layder, 
1988). Both of these methods ultimately have the same objective, irrespective 
of the fact that each has diverse strengths as well as logic (Maxwell, 2004). 
The main difference between the two types of methodologies comes from the 
way they deal with data. While a qualitative researcher looks for patterns or 
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relationships between unspecified concepts in a fairly unrestricted way, 
quantitative researchers adopt a narrower view by looking at a specific set of 
variables (Brannen, 2017). This means that quantitative research is limited to 
what can be measured while qualitative research aims to provide an in-depth 
and descriptive account of the social aspects of the world (Winter, 2000). 
Chapter 3 attempts to understand how donors’ behave in their 
allocation of climate aid and what factors influence their behavior. Here, the 
subject of enquiry was the human being, i.e. the donor himself/herself. 
Adopting a qualitative approach, through the use of semi-structured 
interviews was necessary because one cannot know human behavior in the 
absence of understanding the structure in which the subjects interpret their 
‘thoughts, feelings, and actions’ (Atieno, 2009, p. 14). Chapter 3 is therefore, 
rather exploratory. The rest of the chapters, i.e. 4-6 explore more concrete 
hypotheses based on open questions raised in chapter 3 using large panel 
datasets. The next section presents the plan of the dissertation where each 
chapter is summarized. 
1.4 Plan of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 sets the stage by providing some empirical numbers about the 
relevance of climate aid. It further provides the conceptual backbone of this 
thesis by clarifying the concept of “climate aid” and deepening the 
understanding of the problems associated with the current use of this term. 
This will explain, in particular, why the allocation criteria for mitigation aid 
addressing a global public good should be clearly distinct from the allocation 
criteria for adaptation or other aid. Otherwise, there is a high risk that the 
former is spent in a very inefficient way. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on the empirical question of whether donors are 
aware of the fact that the allocation criteria of mitigation aid should be 
different. If yes, do they face any political barriers to actually apply such a 
different set of criteria? The chapter identifies such barriers and reflects on 
how they reduce donors’ allocation efficiency. The analysis relies on expert 
interviews and secondary sources of data. The findings indicate that 
sometimes despite adopting concrete criteria for allocating mitigation aid, only 
a few donors follow a cost-effective strategy. They also face several 
impediments in their quest for efficient allocation such as conflicts between 
different ministries, their own strategic priorities, and their cherished image as 
poverty- and need-oriented donors, as well as related public expectations.  
Chapter 4-5 presents a quantitative approach to understand climate aid 
allocation. In the previous chapter, individual donors could not be identified 
owing to confidentiality reasons. In a quantitative approach there are no such 
restrictions. In addition, by using quantitative data the statements of donors 
examined in the previous chapter can be compared to the empirical reality, 
thus providing an idea of the extent of potential inefficiencies in aid allocation. 
The quantitative analysis proceeds in two steps – first with aggregated donors 
and then with individual donors. To do so, panel data are used – initially with 
variation only over the dimensions recipient and year, later adding variation 
across different donors as a third dimension.  
In chapter 4, the determinants of climate aid allocation for both 
mitigation and adaptation aid are analyzed to understand whether their 
drivers are different. In other words, this analysis focuses on whether 
mitigation aid (which addresses a global public good) is driven by efficiency of 
being able to produce maximum emission reductions while adaptation aid is 
driven by the neediness/climate related vulnerability of the recipient.  
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One important issue is, since cost-effective emission reduction 
opportunities are mostly available in middle-income countries, the current aid 
allocation literature will misinterpret the efficiency of donors and claim that 
they are pursuing selfish interests (since such middle-income countries are also 
important to donors from an economic and geopolitical point of view). 
Therefore, it is essential to control for mitigation potential to prevent such a 
misinterpretation. The findings of this analysis show that donors, overall, have 
not yet implemented the efficiency aspect in their aid allocation.  
As long as donors are aggregated in the analysis, it is not possible to 
distinguish between them. In fact, the average may hide important differences 
between donors. Therefore, chapter 5 presents a more fine-grained analysis of 
individual donors in a three-dimensional panel data with donor-recipient-year 
dimensions. Here, the focus is only on mitigation aid since in this case, the 
imperative is to go beyond the usually assumed objectives of development aid 
allocation. Using seemingly unrelated regressions, differences between each 
donor are examined to reveal insights into which donor is efficient and which 
donor, careless in their allocation. As mentioned above, often donors’ 
efficiency will be misinterpreted in the traditional framework of the aid 
allocation literature unless controls for mitigation efficiency are included. This 
chapter will investigate and rank the different donors on the basis of how 
misinterpreted they are when they are actually efficient. 
Chapter 6 explores the strategic use of climate aid within the 
international negotiations. For development aid as a whole, its use as a carrot 
(or stick) with respect to voting in the context of the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been 
widely demonstrated. Is climate aid used in a similar way within the 
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UNFCCC negotiations? Again, one would expect that the conceptual 
difference between mitigation aid, which addresses a global public good, and 
adaptation aid, which addresses a local public good, might be relevant. The 
former may be less suitable as a reward since each recipient will only enjoy a 
small part of the benefits. Using the three-dimensional panel data from the 
previous chapter, augmented by data on statements within the negotiations, 
yields several unexpected results. Mitigation aid is used as much as adaptation 
aid for strategic purposes. In addition, while friendly statements are rewarded 
as expected, climate aid is also used to contain opposition. Surprisingly, 
donors thereby behave in a way that appears very shortsighted and 
inconsistent with a long-term equilibrium strategy. Chapter 7 concludes and 
discusses possibilities for future research.  
Some of the work in this thesis builds on joint papers with Paula 
Castro and Katharina Michaelowa (Bagchi et al., 2016; Bagchi et al., 2017). 
This is true notably for Chapters 4-6, and the general conceptual discussion of 
mitigation aid as a global public good. In this thesis, the work is restructured 
around the central topic of climate aid and additional empirical evidence. 
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Chapter 2 
Role and Relevance of Climate 
Aid 
This chapter starts with a brief overview of climate finance and discusses its 
architecture. It also presents the various sources of climate finance and some 
descriptive statistics. Then, it goes on to discuss the conceptual issues 
surrounding climate aid in more detail. 
2.1 Introduction to Climate Finance 
The scientific community is unequivocal in their claim that climate change is 
happening, and anthropogenic activities are largely responsible for it. Over the 
past years, there has been a substantial rise in the atmospheric concentration 
of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) leading to changes in the earth’s 
temperature. Projections of recent emission trends, assuming a business-as-
usual scenario indicate that potential temperature increases between 1.1 – 
6.3˚C will occur by the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2014). Addressing 
climate change through the reduction of anthropogenic GHGs (mitigation) is 
one of the most pressing challenges of our time. However, mitigation alone is 
not a sufficient response to climate change anymore since the adverse impacts 
of climate change are already visible in different parts of the world. This 
means that we also need to adapt to the effects of climate change 
(adaptation). Some such effects of climate change are sea level rise, melting of 
glaciers, extreme weather events, changes in precipitation patterns, etc. 
(NASA, 2018).  
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Irrespective of the fact that climate change is an intrinsically global 
issue, its impacts will vary in both, magnitude and rate of change in different 
continents, countries, and regions (US EPA, 2018). Climate change will 
especially impact developing countries in a cataclysmic way. A temperature 
increase by 1°C in a country with an average annual temperature of 25°C like 
Bangladesh or Haiti, will lead to a reduction of per capita output by up to 
1.5% (UNFCCC, 2017b). Climate-related disasters adversely affect poverty, 
with more than 325 million poor people across 49 most affected countries 
becoming more vulnerable by 2030 (Shepherd et al., 2013). Moreover, 
significant proportions of the population in developing countries (especially 
low-income ones) are often unable to access adaptation measures such as air 
conditioning or disaster insurance, which makes them especially vulnerable to 
climate change (IPCC, 2014). Adaptation costs for developing countries alone 
could be $70–$100 billion per year between 2010 and 2050 (ibid: 2014). Lack 
of resources to cope with climate change implies that developing countries 
need financial support from the developed countries.  
Despite the existence of various definitions of climate finance, no 
official definition of climate finance has been agreed upon by all relevant 
stakeholders (Buchner et al., 2011, p.1; Haites, 2011; Stadelmann, et al., 
2011). Very broadly, however, the term climate finance refers to financial 
resources mobilized to help developing countries mitigate GHGs and adapt to 
the impacts of climate change (Nakhooda et al., 2014, p. 1). It includes both 
international public climate finance (bi and multilateral aid, other official 
flows, etc.) and private flows (carbon markets, FDI, etc.) (Buchner et al., 
2011). 
Debates on climate finance have been controversial since the beginning 
of the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The UNFCCC regime has emphasized 
on the necessity that climate finance flows be new and additional to existing 
international and private financial flows, as well as development aid (Tanner 
and Phathanothai, 2014) but what exactly constituted new and additional was 
never clearly defined. Finally, at the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 
15), industrialized countries pledged to provide 100 billion US$ to developing 
countries starting in 2020 (UNFCCC 2009, para. 8). To prevent the 
weakening of industrialized countries’ financial commitments, several 
developing countries demanded that there be strict requirements for 
measurement, reporting and verification of financial flows (ibid: 2017). 
Consequently, negotiations on how to concretely define climate finance, what 
amount is needed and who is responsible to provide how much also became 
important (Skovgaard, 2017). The next section presents an overview of the 
climate finance architecture before discussing the conceptual foundation of this 
thesis. 
2.2 Climate Finance Architecture 
Over the years, the climate finance architecture has become increasingly 
convoluted owing to the proliferation of various national, international and 
regional channels involved in delivering climate finance. Such a complex 
system poses significant problems. Firstly, it makes it difficult for the recipient 
countries to navigate the various channels to access financial flows (Thwaites 
& Amerasinghe, 2017). Secondly, it creates problems relating to monitoring, 
verifying and reporting such financial flows (Nakhooda et al., 2014). Figure 2-
1 offers a simplified presentation of the climate finance architecture. 
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Figure 2-1  Climate finance architecture (adapted from Atteridge et al., 
2009). 
Figure 2-1 shows the existing multilateral, bilateral and private 
channels fed by government budgets and capital markets. The different 
private, bi- and multilateral organizations contribute to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation activities, complemented by direct contributions of 
industrialized countries’ governments. The broadest definition of climate 
finance includes all these funds, i.e. funding through climate-related 
development aid (Official Development Assistance, ODA), and through carbon 
markets. However, both of these existed already when developed countries 
committed to new and additional funding at Copenhagen. Hence, Atteridge et 
al. (2009) introduce a new box in the figure to demonstrate this required 
additionality. The overlap with ODA shows that in practice, the new funding 
also qualifies as ODA. This raises the crucial question: Does the overlap 
suggest that the newly promised money can be (fully or partially) part of 
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ODA? While ODA is supposed to address development related issues in poor 
countries, such as poverty, healthcare, etc., climate finance is supposed to 
cater exclusively to climate-change related issues, i.e. mitigation and 
adaptation. Since most of the current climate finance from developed 
countries is incorporated within ODA there are now problems relating to 
understanding whether these flows are just traditional ODA or “new and 
additional climate finance” (Atteridge et al., 2009).  
Generally, given the diverse interpretations of the climate finance 
architecture, there are different ways in which the figure could have been 
represented. For instance, the figure 2-1 seems to depict that ODA is a small 
source of climate finance within this architecture, but reality is otherwise. 
ODA (and not “new and additional climate finance”) is currently the main 
source of public climate finance and deserves a much larger representation in 
the figure above, which was perhaps not envisioned by the authors. There 
may be additional private funding contributing to “new and additional” 
climate finance although this is not foreseen in the illustration. Moreover, 
there could have been arrows from the capital markets to government 
budgets, indicating that capital markets can feed into the government’s 
budgets. The figure also ignores the evolution of various regional and national 
funds that have emerged to deal with climate change.   
2.3 Public Sources of Climate Finance 
Government budgets of developed countries (consisting of revenues from 
taxes, levies or capital market) are one of the main sources of international 
climate finance. They are also the central source of ODA or ‘climate aid’, 
which can be provided to developing countries as grants and concessional 
loans (Buchner et al., 2017). Such climate aid can be further subdivided into 
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mitigation aid (used to reduce GHG emissions) and adaptation aid (used to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change).  
The sources of climate aid can be both, multilateral or bilateral. To 
give an idea about the magnitude of flows of climate aid from these two 
sources, figure 2-2 shows the shares of multilateral and bilateral climate aid 
for mitigation and adaptation. Significant levels of climate aid from both 
multilateral and bilateral sources address climate change mitigation, while 
comparatively smaller percentages are allocated to adaptation. Some aid 
activities can also address adaptation and mitigation at the same time. Their 
effects can either be complementary (e.g., when flood resistant and hence, 
safer infrastructure is at the same time more energy efficient) or conflicting 
(e.g., when adaptation focuses on cooling for perishable food items that, at the 
same time, requires more energy). These types of cross-cutting activities are 
financed more by bilateral sources (21%) in comparison to multilateral sources 
(3%).  
Figure 2-2  Multilateral and bilateral climate aid commitments for 2014-15, 
Source: (OECD, 2016). 
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Multilateral sources of finance include flows from multilateral 
development banks (MDBs), special international agencies created by these 
MDBs in collaboration with various national governments, and multilateral 
climate/environment funds. For quite some time now, MDBs have integrated 
climate change related considerations in their lending activities and administer 
various climate finance initiatives (Nakhooda & Watson, 2014). Examples of 
such MDBs active in climate change financing include the World Bank, 
African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB).   
In addition to flows from the MDBs, a financial mechanism of the 
UNFCCC was set up to provide financial resources to developing countries 
and is served by international entities, as stipulated by Article 11 of the 
Convention (UNFCCC, 2017a). One such entity is the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). The GEF has been serving as an operating entity of the 
financial mechanism since the Convention’s entry into force in 1994 
(UNFCCC, 2018). Although the fund caters to various areas of environmental 
funding, it is active in financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF), both managed by the GEF address mainly 
adaptation development plans and implementation (Nakhooda & Watson, 
2014). The Green Climate Fund (GCF), which became operational in 2015, 
has also been instituted to serve as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC 
along with the GEF. It is expected to become one of the primary channels of 
climate finance (Schalatek et al., 2015). Another fund active in adaptation is 
the Adaptation Fund. Despite being formally associated with the UNFCCC, it 
is financed through a 2% levy on the sale of certified emission reduction 
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credits from the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e., by 
a tax on private business related to emission reductions. Only after the 
collapse of the carbon markets due to the economic crises in 2008 when carbon 
prices fell to zero, the Adaptation Fund has begun to rely on voluntary 
contributions from developed countries (Trujillo & Nakhooda, 2013).  
Outside of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, there are also 
special climate change funds, which have been set up in partnership with 
national governments and MDBs. Out of these funds, the Climate Investment 
Funds (CIFs) are the most important ones. The World Bank has established 
and administers these funds in coordination with AfDB, ADB, EBRD and 
IADB since 2008 (Amerasinghe et al., 2017). The CIFs are further subdivided 
into the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund 
(SCF). The SCF incorporates three other funds: The Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience (PPCR), the Forest Investment Program (FIP) and the 
Scaling-Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries Program (SREP) 
(Amerasinghe et al., 2017). Figure 2-3 depicts the discussions about these 
funds operating within and outside of the UNFCCC in a distinct manner. 
Figure 2-3  Climate funds within and outside the UNFCCC (Adapted from 
Amerasinghe, et al., 2016). 
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Bilateral climate aid, as administered by existing development aid 
agencies, contributes to a large share of public money addressing climate 
change (Nakhooda et al., 2014, p. 2). It can be further subdivided into 
‘mitigation aid’ and ‘adaptation aid’ differentiated through the ‘Rio markers’. 
The Rio markers were introduced in 1998 for mitigation aid, and in 2010 for 
adaptation aid. However, this does not mean that ODA did not address 
climate change related concerns before the introduction of the Rio Markers. 
According to Michaelowa (2012, p. 255) ODA supporting renewable energy 
and energy efficiency projects (i.e. addressing GHG mitigation) already 
existing in the early 1950s. In the past few years, these flows of bilateral 
climate aid have increased both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total 
bilateral ODA (Buchner et al., 2017). Figure 2-4 shows the share of bilateral 
climate aid as a percentage of total ODA. 
Figure 2-4  Share of climate aid within total ODA (commitment data, in percent 
and constant 2015 prices), Source: Author’s own calculation based data 
from OECD (2018). 
The figure only includes data for climate aid flows that have been 
assigned the Rio marker. Despite the Rio marker being introduced in 1998, 
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the data available from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) for 
mitigation aid on the basis of this marker only starts from 2002 and for 
adaptation aid, from 2010. It can be clearly observed how climate aid as a 
percentage of ODA has grown substantially over time while adaptation aid 
remained comparatively small. 
This thesis will use climate aid as a general proxy for overall climate 
finance. This is because there is relatively undisputed data for climate aid and 
there are various associated conceptual problems relating to it. It will focus on 
the conceptual issues relating to climate aid, providing insights and empirical 
evidence relating to its efficient allocation as well as strategic use. At the 
outset, it must be clarified that by using the term aid and using the data on 
aid this thesis does not endorse the fact that the normative differentiation 
between aid and climate finance, as discussed in detail in the next section, 
should be disregarded. In fact, despite using the term aid, this study aims to 
strengthen the understanding that it may not make sense to consider it as aid 
conceptually – at least as far as mitigation finance is concerned. However, 
despite the current debates surrounding the issue of ODA and climate finance, 
the reality is that substantial climate finance flows are financed through ODA. 
2.4 Conceptual Issues Surrounding Climate Aid 
Including climate aid as ODA is a problematic issue. Firstly, climate aid and 
ODA are normatively different. Secondly, counting climate aid as ODA 
creates problems relating to additionality of such flows. And thirdly, within 
climate aid, mitigation aid addresses a global public good, which is at odds 
with the way we usually conceive aid, namely as the support of a specific 
partner country. While all three problems will be discussed below, this thesis 
will focus mostly on the third point – which is its main conceptual 
contribution to the overall climate finance debate. While the first two 
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problems have been comprehensively examined; the third one has not received 
any attention so far.  
2.4.1 Charity or Compensation? 
The existing climate finance architecture has transpired against the backdrop 
of long-lasting debates between developed and developing countries over the 
definition of climate finance and its relationship to ODA. The injustice of 
climate change, as repeatedly referred to by the developing countries in the 
UNFCCC negotiations is that the countries least responsible for climate 
change suffer more than those actually responsible for it. This raises the 
question of why they should have to pay for the damages occurring on 
account of climate change. Developing countries argue that climate finance 
should be separate from ODA based on developed countries’ historical 
responsibility for climate change (Klein, 2010). That is, developed countries 
should pay the developing countries compensation on the basis of the 
normative principle of polluters pay. The developing countries would also 
prefer that climate finance be “delivered in a way that reflects developing 
countries’ entitlement to funds” (Pickering et al., 2015, p. 151). As a result, 
they would like to see all climate finance being dispensed through multilateral 
channels “under the UNFCCC” – meaning the climate funds like GEF, AF 
and GCF (ibid: 2015). This was a way they tried to ensure that the funds for 
climate change are not assimilated within the existing ODA flows.  
ODA allocated to developing countries does not have the same 
motivation as climate finance. The former operates principally on the 
responsibility of the wealthy countries to help poor ones address their needs, 
such as the lack of resources, health or education, limited access to markets, 
poor infrastructure and the like (Roberts, 2009). In contrast, the latter 
addresses need relating to climate change. Another important distinction 
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between the two is that the ODA is usually financed by donor countries 
government budgets whereas climate finance can come from a variety of 
sources, including private ones (Bird & Glennie, 2011). Developed countries, 
however, emphasize that there are existing complementarities between 
addressing climate change and promoting development, which is why they 
finance mitigation and adaptation through ODA. Besides, they consider 
climate aid to be a bargain between developed and developing countries to 
help the latter enhance their mitigation efforts (Betzold and Weiler, 2017). 
2.4.2 New and Additional? 
Despite several internationally negotiated documents such as the Copenhagen 
Accord (2009) stating that climate finance should be new and additional, it is 
still not clear what this means. This is problematic since each country has 
distinct interpretations of the term new and additional’ (Brown et al., 2010; 
Stadelmann et al., 2010). There is some basic agreement about the general 
meaning of the term new and additional, but it has not been concretely 
defined yet. The general interpretation is that the term new may be 
understood as that the current climate finance flows have increased in 
comparison to past and existing climate related funds (Ballesteros & Moncel, 
2010). To ensure that climate aid is additional to existing aid commitments 
and that development aid is not compromised; climate aid needs to generate 
revenues ‘over and above existing and committed volumes of ODA’ (Parker et 
al., 2009, p. 27). However, determining whether climate finance is new and 
additional is inherently difficult since there is no counterfactual: what would 
donors have given to countries as ODA under business-as-usual (BAU) in the 
absence of climate finance? (Ballesteros & Moncel, 2010). Countries 
negotiating at the UNFCCC discuss a wide range of options for defining 
additionality. Before agreeing on what constitutes as additional finance, 
countries need to settle upon a common baseline against which additionality 
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could be assessed. Figure 2-5 shows what options exist for establishing 
baselines against which increases in climate finance can be assessed. 
Figure 2-5  Options for establishing a baseline to assess climate finance 
additionality (Adapted from Weikmans et al., 2016, p. 27). 
Figure 2-5 displays some of the existing options out of which some are 
more preferable to the developing country recipients (those closer to the right 
of the big arrow in the middle) while others offer more discretion to the 
donors (those closer towards the left of the big arrow in the middle). For 
instance, the most preferred option to developing countries is that climate 
finance be above 0.7% of the donor’s GNI. This option is based on the 
understanding that donors in the past had accepted the target to contribute 
0.7% of their GNI as ODA, first mentioned in the Report of the Commission 
International Development in 1968 (Pearson, 1969). However, during that 
time developing countries’ needs relating to climate change were not yet 
recognized and therefore, this target did not acknowledge the additional 
finance needed to deal with climate change (Brown et al., 2010). Based on this 
argument, developing countries demand that climate finance be over and 
above the 0.7% of GNI targets that donors have committed to as ODA. 
Option 8 in the figure reflects developing countries’ preference that climate 
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finance be contributed through new sources only, while option 4 is that ODA 
should not be contributing to climate finance. Options to the left are vague 
and often preferred by donor countries. Lack of an agreed baseline as shown in 
option 2, for instance, will perpetuate this absence of clarity on what 
constitutes as new and additional. 
Each of the options presented in the table above come with a range of 
advantages and disadvantages, discussing which in detail is outside the scope 
of this thesis. However, before concluding, seen from a normative perspective, 
it is important to not only ensure that countries agree on a common baseline 
to define new and additional financial flows, but also that the agreement is 
fair to the developing countries’ rights to compensation.  
2.4.3 Local to Global? 
Climate aid addresses both local and global aspects of climate change via 
adaptation and mitigation aid, respectively. Reducing climate change by 
mitigating GHG emissions is a global public good while adaptation to its 
effects is more of a private/local/regional public good. Discussing the nature 
of these different types of goods addressed with the same instrument – climate 
aid, is important because ultimately this consideration will have an impact on 
the way it is allocated. 
By definition, public goods are characterized by two properties: (1) 
Non-rivalry, which means different individuals can consume the good without 
diminishing its value for any one of them, (2) Non-excludability, which implies 
that it is impossible to exclude others from enjoying the good. When these 
two properties hold, and the externalities accrue only locally or within 
national boundaries, we speak of local or national public goods; when the 
externalities cross national boundaries we consider such goods to be 
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transnational public goods; and when the externalities are of global relevance, 
these goods are known as global public goods. Examples of global public goods 
(or similarly, global public bads) include environmental commons, 
containment of communicable diseases, international security, etc. Whenever 
we have non-excludability across the borders of individual countries recording 
the benefits only for the country in which the good is produced is misleading. 
In fact, a neighboring country or countries located in other regions may 
benefit even more. 
Effective mitigation of climate change is a public good that is truly 
global in nature. A given amount of emission reductions will have the same 
effect on, say, agricultural production in Uganda, no matter where in the 
world the mitigation takes place. It even can take place in countries like 
Australia or Switzerland instead of developing countries, yielding the same 
results (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012). It will still benefit climate 
vulnerable countries such as Bangladesh or Uganda even if mitigation of 
GHGs is not taking place within its borders. Different countries benefit to 
different extents, depending on their vulnerability, which is in turn related to 
topographical (e.g., the elevation above sea level) as well as economic 
characteristics (e.g., dependency on agricultural production). But these 
benefits do not depend on where the actual mitigation takes place (Bagchi et 
al., 2016). Yet, taking location into account is important to efficiently produce 
the global public good of mitigation - this is because the volume of mitigation 
of GHGs that can be achieved at a given cost varies substantially between 
localities. An efficient donor should, hence, pick a location that maximizes the 
amount of emission reductions at given cost. Only in rare cases this locality 
will correspond to the one that will also reap the greatest benefits. As a 
consequence, efficient donors should not be judged by whether the aid flows to 
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those recipients who are in greatest need but by whether they allocate aid to 
the places where maximum emissions can be reduced at a given cost.  
Efficiency in terms of climate change mitigation is negatively, rather than 
positively correlated to poverty in developing countries. Very poor countries 
usually have few emissions as they do not have much industry or emission-
intensive consumption patterns. Hence, there are little opportunities for large-
scale reductions. In fact, the greatest potential for relatively low-cost emission 
reductions lies in emerging economies. According to Michaelowa & 
Michaelowa (2009) there are two main reasons for this: increases in 
industrialization in emerging economies imply an increase in wages, with a 
rapidly growing middle class which moves to cities and adopts emission 
intensive lifestyles. In addition, there are large infrastructure development 
projects, and transportation in private cars becomes an issue. However, at the 
same time, industrial production and energy provision are still not very 
efficient (see Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2009 for a more detailed discussion of 
such emissions paths). This provides ample opportunities for cost-effective 
emission reduction projects. Based on these considerations, efficiency oriented 
donors should indeed prefer to direct mitigation aid to, for example, China, 
rather than to Bangladesh, because the opportunities for efficient emissions 
reductions are much greater in the former (see Jayaraman & Kanbur, 1999, p. 
429). For a given volume of aid, the investment in China will lead to higher 
emission reductions and hence, eventually, to greater benefits for Bangladesh – 
one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change (Bagchi et al., 2016). It 
should be noted, however, that even if mitigation (i.e., the provision of a 
global public good) is the main purpose of an aid project, there are usually 
some local co-benefits. A country receiving financial flows from mitigation aid 
may benefit, for example, through the creation of additional jobs, reduction of 
local pollutants, or increased energy efficiency that will make its industries 
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more competitive. 
In contrast to mitigation, adaptation to climate change happens on a 
more local level. While in some cases, adaptation can reduce poverty within a 
given country, the benefits accruing to a country on account of adaptation 
measures, seldom lead to substantial cross-border benefits (Michaelowa & 
Michaelowa, 2012). As mentioned before, adaptation can be a 
private/local/regional or a transnational public good. For instance, using air-
conditioning to combat the rising temperatures is usually a measure restricted 
to individuals or family members of the individual and is an example of a 
private good. Building new rainwater harvesting systems to deal with water 
shortages accruing on account of climate change can be an example of the 
provisioning a local public good since it will benefit the locality where such 
systems are put in place. Similarly, take the example of developing early 
warning systems to warn residents in a flood prone country like Bangladesh. 
Such early warning systems may also benefit several countries adjacent to the 
same river or seashore. But it will not benefit the world globally. What does 
this discussion mean for adaptation aid?  
Climate change causes particularly acute problems where people are 
unable to adjust to its impacts properly (due to lack of knowledge and 
resources, or because they depend on subsistence agriculture and have no 
other income opportunities). Specific vulnerabilities to climate change faced by 
countries such as low-lying island nations or flood prone countries should be 
taken into account for financing adaptation. In other words, it makes more 
sense to tackle adaptation in poor countries by allocating them more 
adaptation aid. Given that adaptation aid addresses a rather local public 
good, the country receiving it will be the exclusive and distinct beneficiary of 
such aid.  
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Due to the global public good characteristic of mitigation, aid for 
mitigation has attributes that make it distinct from the traditional 
development aid or adaptation aid. The neediness of the recipient is not 
relevant anymore for the efficient allocation of resources unless co-benefits are 
really substantial (Bagchi et al., 2016). In fact, does it even make sense to 
speak of aid for mitigation when the poor and climate vulnerable countries 
would benefit even if mitigation takes place in rich countries like Switzerland? 
This thesis argues that nobody really needs mitigation aid locally, in contrast 
to other development or adaptation aid (which is defined by where it goes, 
namely to developing countries). Of course, many need mitigation somewhere 
in the world. When the country undertaking mitigation is no more of a 
distinct beneficiary of this aid, than any another country due to the non-
excludability condition and non-rivalry, should this even be called aid 
(Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012)? The drivers of mitigation aid and 
adaptation aid are different and speaking normatively, should be allocated to 
distinctive places depending on where it will generate maximum benefits. Only 
in very few cases (although theoretically possible), both should be given to the 
same country. These considerations have obvious consequences for the 
allocation of climate aid. Therefore, this thesis raises and aims to address the 
critical question - Are donors aware of the differences in the allocation criteria 
for adaptation and mitigation aid? If they are aware, are they allocating their 
climate aid efficiently? If despite being aware, donors are not allocating their 
climate aid efficiently, what barriers are they facing preventing or reducing 
efficiency? Such questions will be explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3
Climate Aid: Exploring Donor
Decisions 
Based on the conceptual foundations laid down in the previous chapter, this 
chapter investigates some key issues relating to the allocation decisions driving 
climate aid. Initially, the chapter discusses which criteria should drive climate 
aid. Then, it explores whether donors have or use separate and well-defined 
criteria for allocating mitigation aid. Using insights from the political economy 
literature, this chapter also identifies and analyses the barriers that donors 
may face when they attempt to allocate their climate aid in an efficient way. 
3.1 Introduction 
From a normative perspective, development aid should be allocated to poor 
countries, given that they need such finance the most and the most common 
rationale for such aid is to increase growth rates in these countries. A similar 
rationale can be applied to the case of adaptation aid, which is needed by 
climate vulnerable countries who also often happen to be the poor ones. 
However, the same logic does not apply to mitigation aid. Mitigation aid aims 
to maximize the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per unit of 
mitigation aid disbursed (cost-effectiveness). To do so, it needs to target 
countries with a high (and low-cost) emission reduction potential, which are 
often middle-income/emerging countries rather than poor countries (see 
Chapter 2; Bagchi et al. 2016). However, donors may not follow this cost-
effectiveness strategy or allocate mitigation aid to countries with high 
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abatement potential for different reasons. Firstly, they may be unaware of the 
fundamental differences between traditional development aid and mitigation 
aid, so that they may not have adjusted their allocation criteria. Secondly, 
they may face barriers emanating from their polities, reducing their allocation 
efficiency. This may be on account of their vested interests, conflicts arising 
between different ministries dealing with climate aid and due to public 
expectations, that aid needs to be allocated only to poor countries.  
To sum up, since efficient mitigation aid requires allocation criteria 
that are quite different from traditional criteria for need-oriented aid 
allocation (Bagchi et al. 2016) the target of this chapter is to understand to 
what extent individual donors 1) are aware of these differences, 2) establish 
and apply a different list of criteria, and/or 3) face specific political barriers 
that impede an efficient allocation of mitigation aid.  
This chapter adopts an exploratory approach to achieve its aims. The 
first step of the analysis is to discuss what criteria donors could potentially 
use in order to allocate their climate aid. The identification of the criteria is 
grounded on the conceptual considerations explored in chapter 2. Then, the 
political economy literature is used as a basis to formulate preliminary 
expectations about the factors that can explain inefficiencies in the allocation 
of mitigation aid. Using semi-structured interviews, attempts were made to 
investigate whether donors adopted specific allocation criteria for mitigation 
aid and to identify to what extent barriers emanating from the donors’ own 
polities, impede or reduce efficient allocation. Furthermore, insights gathered 
from the interviews have been complemented with a thorough review of a 
number of secondary sources such as web articles, policy documents and donor 
mandates. The next section provides a brief overview of the literature on 
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climate finance, followed by a discussion on the efficiency criteria for climate 
aid allocation.  
3.2 Brief Review of Literature on Climate Finance 
As already discussed in the previous chapter, a substantial amount of 
literature on climate finance explores the architecture of climate finance 
channels (Caravani, Nakhooda, Watson, Schalatek, & Stiftung, 2012; 
Nakhooda & Watson, 2013). Studies are also dedicated to understanding how 
power, responsibility and accountability arrangements influence the legitimacy 
of international climate finance institutions (Ballesteros, et al., 2010), and to 
examining what amount of climate finance is required for burden sharing in a 
fair way (Dellink et al., 2009). Some studies focus on issues such as 
additionality of climate finance to existing aid commitments (Stadelmann, et 
al., 2011; Brown, et al., 2010); coding errors in reporting climate finance 
(Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2011) and the tracking of climate finance flows 
(Clapp et al., 2012; Tirpak, et al., 2014).  
While donors have broadly agreed on the amount of climate finance 
that needs to be provided, discussions now center on how to deliver, mobilize 
and allocate it (Curran 2016). A handful of scholars also econometrically 
analyze the allocation of mitigation aid (Bagchi, et al., 2016; Michaelowa & 
Michaelowa, 2011) as well as adaptation aid (Betzold & Weiler, 2016; Betzold 
& Weiler, 2017; Persson & Remling, 2014; Remling & Persson, 2015; 
Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012).  
None of the studies, however, assessed what criteria donors themselves 
claim to actually use for allocating mitigation aid and to what extent they can 
be considered to be efficient. Moreover, the extant research on climate aid has 
also not investigated the domestic constraints of donors that could cause 
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reduced allocation efficiencies. The next section presents what criteria donors 
should actually use for allocating their climate aid, before identifying what 
factors can lead to a reduced efficiency in allocation. 
3.3 Allocation Criteria of Climate Aid 
An important condition for a financial mechanism to be cost-effective or 
efficient is to set up clear eligibility or prioritization criteria (Karousakis & 
Corfee-Morlot, 2007, Kim, et al., 2009). This may include establishing criteria 
to support the allocation of aid to and within regions as well as sectors or 
activities (Kim et al., 2009). Efficiency in the allocation of public climate aid 
can be defined as ‘‘allocation of public resources such that net social benefits 
are maximized’’ (Persson & Remling 2014, p. 489). To be effective, mitigation 
aid and adaptation aid should follow different allocation criteria since both 
have distinct objectives.  
Adaptation aid aims to ‘reduce the vulnerability of human or natural 
systems to the impacts of climate change and climate related risks’ (OECD, 
2011). This implies that the allocation of adaptation aid needs to take into 
consideration specific vulnerability related criteria of a country. For instance, 
low lying countries or countries more prone to extreme weather events such as 
floods or droughts need higher amounts of adaptation aid. These climate 
vulnerable countries are unable to finance the measures required for 
adaptation and are poor. In other words, a country’s ability to adapt to the 
effects of climate change is directly related to its income resources and the 
poorer it is, the less it is able to adapt to the effects of climate change without 
external financial help. Therefore, from a development standpoint, it makes 
sense to allocate adaptation aid as donors would allocate other development 
aid, i.e. on the basis of need. 
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In contrast to the drivers of adaptation aid or other development aid, 
using neediness as a criterion to allocate mitigation aid would be quite 
misleading. In fact, if a donor allocates mitigation aid to needy (or poor) 
countries, the aid will be rather inefficient, because these countries do not 
generally offer cost-effective emission reduction opportunities. Since mitigation 
aid is a form of global public good aid, funding should go where a given 
amount of aid can produce the greatest emission reductions (independently of 
the locations that benefit most from the reductions since they will benefit 
anyway, no matter where the reduction takes place) (Bagchi et al., 2016). To 
prioritize mitigation actions, cost-effectiveness is the most important criterion 
(Tanner and Phathanothai, 2014). Efficiency of mitigation aid allocation can 
be measured in mitigation outcome per monetary unit, i.e. t CO2 equivalent 
mitigated per dollar of mitigation finance spent. It is negatively, rather than 
positively correlated to poverty in developing countries. Several studies have 
already established that there is a close correlation between GDP growth and 
emissions (see for e.g. Heil & Selden, 2001; Schmalensee, et al., 1998). This is 
especially true for rich industrialized nations, which continue to grow and 
produce high levels of emissions. But the potential for relatively low-cost 
emission reductions usually lies in growing, emerging economies (Chapter 2, 
Bagchi et al., 2016). This claim is supported by the analysis of marginal 
abatement costs (MAC) of different countries. 
The marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve is an important 
representation of the size of various abatement measures according to cost and 
each country’s MAC curves vary depending on factors such as endowments of 
fossil fuels, emission patterns etc. Analysis of MAC curves show that middle 
income countries have higher proportions of emissions and more abatement 
opportunities which come from sectors such as energy, industry and transport 
(Tanner and Phathanothai, 2014). That middle-income countries provide high 
32 
mitigation opportunities also became apparent from the development of the 
market for tradable ‘certified emission reductions’ (CERs) under the ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism’ (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. This market allowed 
project developers in developing countries to sell emission reduction credits to 
firms and governments of developed countries who could then make use of 
these CERs to comply with their commitments in the framework of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Figure 3-1 provides a snapshot of the distribution of these CDM 
projects. It clearly confirms that the most efficient locations for emission 
reductions have been in the more advanced developing or emerging economies, 
notably in China, India and Brazil, rather than in the poorest countries. If we 
base our understanding on the fact that the private sector always has a profit 
maximization motive (thus cost-effectiveness), then an efficient donor should 
allocate their mitigation aid to China, rather than Bangladesh, which will 
eventually benefit the latter more. 
Figure 3-1  Distribution of registered CDM projects (Source: UNFCCC, 
2016) 
These discussions demonstrate that mitigation aid has attributes that 
make it distinct from the traditional development aid (or even adaptation 
33 
aid), and the needs of the recipient are not relevant anymore (Bagchi et al., 
2016). Since the allocation criteria of mitigation aid should be very different 
from that of adaptation aid or general development aid, it is not only 
interesting but also important to study them. Here, we clearly need to go 
beyond the normally assumed objectives of development aid. An important 
caveat however is that mitigation measures may be constrained by other 
political as well as institutional factors, which will in turn influence where aid 
addressing mitigation is allocated. It can very well be that cost-effectiveness is 
not the only parameter influencing donor’s decision making. Such political and 
institutional factors, which may also have an impact on how donors decide to 
allocate their mitigation aid, is discussed in the theoretical section 
3.4 Theoretical Framework: Drivers of inefficiency in Climate 
Aid Allocation 
This section will try to shed light on how aware donors are of the criteria that 
should drive mitigation aid. This should be reflected in their choice of criteria 
on the basis of which they decide on their mitigation aid allocation, namely 
cost-effectiveness of GHG emissions. Secondly, being adopting the criteria to 
reflect on efficient allocation of mitigation aid, donors’ efficiency may get 
affected by various political and institutional factors, reducing their allocation 
efficiency. Such factors are identified and discussed below. 
3.4.1 Within Country Dynamics and Inter-Institutional 
Differences in Priorities 
Public policy scholars have often pointed out that organizational culture has a 
significant influence on how officials from different institution view a policy 
problem and influence policy processes (Kingdon, 2003). This view propagates 
hence, that each ministry wishes to pursue own imperatives. The objectives of 
all of these ministries/institutions/development aid agencies in the donor 
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countries may vary and might even be in conflict with each other. 
A few studies suggest that amongst the different ministries, some 
ministries (such as finance ministries) are more protective or guarded against 
spending public revenue (Wildavsky, 1986) while others, which support 
specific objectives (such development aid) are keener on spending more money 
to reduce poverty poor countries (t’Hart, & Wille, 2012, p. 317). What will 
drive efficient allocation of development assistance will vary significantly 
depending on how the power is shared among different ministries as well as 
the ways in which each ministry comprehend the missions they support 
(Pickering et al, 2015). Such insights can also be applied to the specific case of 
climate aid. 
A substantial amount of climate finance is spent bilaterally, mainly 
through existing development agencies (Nakhooda, et al., 2016). According to 
Skovgaard (2012), aid agencies have usually played an important role in 
implementation but in the recent years, other ministries such as finance 
ministries have also started getting involved in implementation leading to an 
increasing complexity of the climate aid architecture. This might lead to 
differences in allocation efficiency based on which ministry deals with climate 
aid and how they interpret their mandates. Knowing this is essential because 
ultimately these differences will influence the types of programs and projects 
that are supported. Another complication that can arise when development 
aid under the development ministry/aid agency addresses climate change or 
environmental issues are that there may be conflicts regarding which objective 
to care about more– development or climate and environment. Funds that can 
actually address poverty might be deployed for emission reduction (Bagchi et 
al., 2016). In fact, according to Michaelowa & Michaelowa (2012, p. 41), the 
magnitude of mitigation activities has to be huge for mitigation aid to have 
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any significant impact on poverty reduction. 
A poverty-based allocation discussed in Chapter 2, can also be made on 
the basis of co-benefits of mitigation aid such as, generation of employment, 
reduction of pollution and so on. Development ministries/aid agencies may 
argue for a poverty-based criterion for mitigation aid on the basis of such co-
benefits. Understandably, the development ministries/aid agencies will care 
more about poverty reduction related issues and be more inclined to allocate 
mitigation aid to poor countries. In contrast, environment ministries might 
have more knowledge/concern for climate and environment. They may be 
more aware of the fact that poor developing countries will benefit more, if 
mitigation aid is allocated on the basis of cost-effectiveness, namely to 
emerging economies with higher emission potential. Overlaps in jurisdiction of 
climate funds between these two types of ministries may lead to incoherent 
policy making and therefore, reduced efficiency in allocation. In addition, each 
department will have different priorities guiding their fund allocation. This 
leads to two expectations: 
I. Development ministries/aid agencies are more concerned about 
addressing poverty with mitigation aid and will not base their decisions 
on cost-effectiveness while environment ministries will be more 
concerned with cost-effective allocation. 
II. When development ministries/aid agencies and environment ministries
both deal with climate aid in a donor country, allocation inefficiencies
can arise since the former may care more about poverty while the
latter, about climate and environment.
In contrast to development ministries/aid agencies that are usually 
willing to spend more in poor countries, guardians of the public state budget 
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such as finance or economic ministries will try to minimize costs to their 
states’ budget (Müller, 2009) and may be more concerned about efficient 
spending. In fact, such ministries are known for their “budget-oriented” 
disposition. This leads to the expectation that: 
III. Ministries such as finance or foreign affairs dealing with climate aid
will be more concerned about the efficient allocation of their financial
resources and will prefer to allocate their mitigation aid on the basis of
cost-effectiveness rather than poverty.
While efficiency of mitigation aid allocation can be affected by the 
involvement of different ministries, lack of coordination across the different 
ministries involved in climate aid allocation can also be important. This 
chapter will assess to what extent these within country dynamics and conflicts 
or lack of coordination may affect the efficiency of mitigation aid allocation. 
3.4.2 Strategic Priorities of Donor Institutions 
The political economy literature suggests that in addition to recipient need, 
selfish interests of donors drive development aid allocation. Selfish interests 
can be geopolitical and economic or commercial in nature (Kuziemko & 
Werker 2006; Faye & Niehaus 2012; Berthélemy, 2006; Berthélemy & Tichit, 
2004). These strategic priorities may also hold for the case of mitigation aid 
allocation. Some such strategic priorities relevant for mitigation aid allocation 
are identified and discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Partner Countries 
Aid selectivity, i.e. the selection of countries and the allocation of resources 
following specific criteria is indispensable for aid to reach its developmental 
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goals. Baydag, et al., (2018)  claim that the criteria determining partner 
country selection is important to understand the objective of development aid 
allocation and implementation. So far, research on the choice of partner 
countries show that it can be done on the basis of need (the countries are poor 
and do not have sufficient financial resources) (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007; 
Berthélemy, 2006); performance (countries with good economic and political 
governance which spends the received development aid money in an effective 
way) and strategic interests (such as favoring ex-colonies, establish good trade 
relations, geopolitical considerations) (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Lancaster, 
2008). According to OECD (2006), choosing a partner country to spend 
development aid resources reflects inherent preferences and political choices of 
the donors, which is a strategic dimension of an aid program. Germany, for 
instance declares that its partner countries have been revised to cater to 
German interests, such as strategic partnerships and global environmental 
goods (Betzold & Weiler, 2017). Faust (2011, p. 5) notes that when it comes 
to partner countries of donors, “Ministers and top aid managers often have 
their own personal preferences which may be shaped by their personal 
experience or the influence of important lobby groups.” To ensure that the aid 
spent is effective, global agreements on aid effectiveness also encourage donors 
to focus on a particular set of so-called ‘partner’ countries following the global 
agreements on aid effectiveness (see OECD DAC, 2011). 
The choice of partner countries is very important for the allocation 
efficiency of mitigation aid. If the partner countries of donors are not places 
with substantial mitigation opportunities, it may not lead to an efficient 
allocation from a cost-effectiveness point of view.  
Take the example of energy related issues in developing countries. 
Inability of developing countries to address mitigation concerns at an early 
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stage in their energy policy may create lock-in to inefficient and dirty energy 
infrastructure, which may make future mitigation efforts difficult and 
expensive (Phathanothai and Tanner, 2014). Therefore, mitigation aid can 
contribute to renewable energy transition and improving energy efficiency in 
developing countries. In this regard, two considerations become relevant. 
First, there is the issue of suppressed demand for electricity, which needs to be 
addressed. That is, people in low-income countries often have demands for 
access to electricity, which is often not met due to reasons such as poor 
infrastructure, for example, inaccessible grids. In this case, the demand to 
consume electricity remains suppressed till people get access to electricity. In 
such low-income countries, donors may therefore, finance large-scale 
infrastructure projects through their mitigation aid. By the time the poor 
people get connected to the grid; the infrastructure built may not be the most 
efficient anymore due to technological advancements, therefore, resulting in a 
somewhat inefficient allocation of mitigation aid. Eventually, this may not 
even lead to substantial emission reductions. Second, bringing cleaner 
renewable and clean energy technologies to poor people can also be somewhat 
complicated. Providing rural areas in poor countries with renewable energy 
solutions will lead to some small-scale development benefits but also very 
small emission reductions owing to low energy consumption by poor people 
(Tanner & Horn-Phathanothai, 2014). This means that donors often have to 
decide between reducing emissions cost-effectively and caring more about 
providing energy access to poor people (therefore, development). This 
discussion reveals that donors might have distinct priorities that they wish to 
address through their mitigation aid.  
If donors may prioritize the development first approach over cost-
effectiveness this will be evident by their choice of partner countries. The 
related expectation then would be that: 
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IV. Donors that choose to work with poor countries for mitigation rather
than emerging economies with high mitigation potential care less about
cost-effective allocation.
If donors are driven by cost-effectiveness related concerns then a 
preference to work in middle-income economies with ample mitigation 
opportunities can serve as a somewhat rough proxy. The expectation in this 
case is: 
V. Donors that choose their partner countries for mitigation on the basis 
of abatement potential care more about cost-effective emission 
reductions. 
The choice of partner countries may also be driven by other efficiency 
gains which donors may accrue from working with reliable implementation 
partners. Donors may have a path dependency in the sense that they choose 
to work with the same countries they have worked with in the past and be 
unwilling to change partners. The theoretical literature also discusses the 
positive effects of working with recipient governments that are reliable 
implementation partners (Hefeker & Michaelowa, 2005). It can be lower 
administrative costs, economies of scale arising from country expertise, etc. 
When you know a partner very well, you may be able to work with that 
partner more efficiently, and this may circumvent some questionable subject-
specific targeting priorities. According to Betzold and Weiler (2018), donors 
are more willing to work with partners where past projects have seen success. 
This leads to the expectation that: 
VI. Donors often prioritize existing working relations with recipients over
cost-effective mitigation aid allocation on account of path dependency.
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Promotion of Business Interests and Leveraging Private Climate 
Finance 
Donors often have economic motives driving their aid allocation. These 
economic motives may be related to donors promoting their own business 
interests using development aid. For instance, according to Takagi (1995), 
Japanese development aid was used to gather sources of raw materials for its 
industries in Japan. The UK aid strategy released by the Department for 
International Development (2015), claims that UK not only meets its 
responsibilities to the world’s poorest but also serves and protects its own 
interests. It aims to generate international business prospects, also for UK 
companies (ibid: 2015). However, there is very little evidence to support the 
achievements of positive results, in terms of reducing poverty or creating jobs, 
from the programs and partnerships involving the private sector (GPEDC, 
2017; IDEV & AfDB, 2016). Such motivations may also exist in the case of 
mitigation aid and will be explored in this analysis. 
Donors may also be concerned about leveraging climate finance with 
their mitigation aid money. According to Brown and Jacobs (2011, p. 1) 
“leveraging refers to the process by which private sector capital is mobilized as 
a consequence of the use of public sector finance and financial instruments.” 
Several studies analyze the way in which public finance leverages private 
sector investments (LSE 2009; te Velde 2011; Ward 2010). As mentioned 
before, donors agreed to jointly mobilize US$100 billion per year by 2020 
(UNFCCC, 2009 Decision 2/CP.15, para. 8). Out of this amount agreed, it 
was expected that the private sector would contribute a substantial portion 
(Stadelmann et al., 2013). Therefore, donors may prioritize leveraging private 
climate finance to reduce their own financial burdens instead of caring for 
efficient allocation. In fact, there is a widespread interest among donor 
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countries to use climate aid to scale up private sector leveraged funds (Reyes, 
2012). However, leveraging private sector funds through climate aid comes 
with several problems. First one relates to the wrong assumption that high 
leveraging ratios are good. For instance, if the World Bank claims that, for 
every US$1 it contributes to a particular investment, private companies 
invested US$10, this would be a 1:10 leverage ratio. This does not necessarily 
mean that the high leverage ratio has been a good use of mitigation aid 
resources in terms of reducing emissions. In fact, often there is an inverse 
relationship between leveraging and reducing GHGs. One of the reasons is 
that low-cost emission reduction options do not need much additional 
investment to be efficient (Sierra, 2011; Nakhooda, 2013). In fact, leveraging 
huge amounts of finance might not even set the right incentive to spend that 
money in the most cost-effective mitigation options. For example, leveraging 
can affect mitigation allocation efficiency, through notably, a different country 
choice. For instance, a donor wants to allocate mitigation aid to country A, 
which has a high emission reduction potential. However, this donor is faced 
with the problem that due to, say regulatory requirements, private investment 
required for leveraging climate finance is hard to attract. Private investors, 
instead, want to invest in country B, which may have a lower mitigation 
potential than country A but a friendlier regulatory setup. Since donors are 
always keen to show that they have mobilized a large amount of finance with 
their aid money (through leveraged finance in this particular case), they might 
decide to invest in B and not A.  
The take away message from this discussion is to remember that while 
public aid flows are supposed to have a social welfare maximization objective, 
the private sector generally operates on the basis of profit maximization. So, 
mitigation projects might not be geared clearly towards maximum mitigation 
if private sector firms also contribute to a project, even if this might be the 
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primary objective of the donor country.  This clash of objectives can lead to 
significant inefficiencies in allocation. Therefore, the expectation that can be 
derived from this discussion is as follows: 
VII. Donors often prioritize maximizing business interests and leveraged
finance, rather than caring about cost-effective mitigation.
3.4.3 Public Expectations 
Public expectations can play an important role in the allocation of ODA. 
Countries with greater public support for development finance are inclined to 
raise the level as well as quality of spending on it (Lumsdaine, 1993, p. 63). 
Depending on the country, expectations from the public can also be that 
foreign aid be spent in poor countries Faust (2011, p. 4) or be spent 
domestically within their own borders. For example, Oliver (2014) conducted 
a poll in Australia which revealed that 75% of the population say ‘helping 
reduce poverty in poor countries’ is the most important objective of aid. 
Whatever be the opinions of the public on the issue of aid, it is also 
important to keep in mind that the public is often not aware of the issues 
addressed by aid. Glennie et al., (2012) find that the public had limited grasps 
over issues relating to development aid. This finding is especially relevant for 
the case of mitigation aid. Since the public in donor countries often have 
constrained understanding of how development aid works, they may not 
support the allocation of mitigation aid to middle-income countries or want 
the money to be spent domestically. Their limited understanding of the 
concept of mitigation as a global public good, which will benefit poor countries 
more or even themselves if done efficiently (in other cost-effective locations), 
may lead them to pressurize the government into poverty-based allocation of 
mitigation aid or cut back on aid flows. In other words, this pressure to 
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finance poor countries could come from the public due to a lack of 
understanding of the characteristics of global public goods or from the moral 
obligation to support poor countries without knowing what the best way is.  
Influence from the public can therefore, lead to three different 
outcomes. Donors may either give in to the pressure and finance mitigation 
projects only in poor countries or continue to allocate mitigation aid on the 
basis of efficiency consideration or cut back on aid support to address climate 
change. 
In trying to understand how public expectations can influence aid 
allocation, it is also imperative to delineate how such influences can vary 
depending on the actors. Each actor may have different roles to play. These 
actors usually are the general electorate of the donor country, NGOs, religious 
organizations, business lobbies, etc. There is an extensive influence on 
policymakers by NGOs, church and other civil society organizations through 
lobbying, use of petitions and consultations (Zimmerman, 2007). While their 
influence varies by country, many of these organizations are a conduit for the 
aggregation of public opinion through which policymakers are often influenced 
(ibid: 2007). For instance, business groups will try to influence the aid policy 
of donor countries to open up new markets for their products. Based on the 
findings of this literature on aid and public opinion, in the case of mitigation 
aid the expectation is that: 
VIII. The public in donor countries wishes for mitigation aid to be allocated
to poor countries, which may lead to inefficient allocation and their
influence on the government’s decision, varies by different actors.
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3.5 Research Design 
This chapter adopts a qualitative methodological approach to analyse the 
theoretical propositions. Semi-structured expert interviews with 
representatives of the donor countries were first conducted. The advantage of 
the semi-structured interviews was that it enabled enquiring further with 
follow-up questions, while at the same time, preventing interviewees from 
diverging from the questions essential to this study. This format allowed the 
interview to evolve in a conversational manner allowing the participants the 
chance to talk about issues they felt were important. To be able to make the 
process comparable though, an interview guide was used (King & Horrocks, 
2010, p. 163) (see Liebold & Trinczek, 2009 for more information on this type 
of interview technique). 
The interview guide was structured as follows: Preliminary questions were 
aimed at determining the role of the interviewees within the organization, and 
whether they were involved in the climate aid allocation process or, if not, 
whether they could observe the processes. The interview was continued only if 
either of the two questions was answered in the affirmative. The second part 
of the guide was aimed at finding out what criteria donors apply to fund 
mitigation projects, how the criteria were derived and whether they see room 
for improvement of these criteria. Third, questions were asked about whether 
expectations from the public had any influence on their decisions to allocate 
climate aid. The last question was about how governments justify the use of 
development aid money for the purpose of financing mitigation. Since asking 
about donors’ business interests, motivation for leveraging and conflicts 
between departments was a somewhat sensitive issue, it was examined in the 
course of a casual conversation. This was possible since the interviews were 
semi-structured and there was no need to strictly adhere specifically only to 
these questions or the order in which they were asked. See appendix A.1 for 
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the interview guide. 
In order to gather the different perspectives from various donors, it was 
essential to have some variation within the sample. Therefore, the choice of 
initial few interviewees were made on the basis of three different 
considerations. 
A) Regional variation - The sample represented some members of OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors with regional variation. 
For example, it included donors from Nordic countries, Western European 
countries, and non-European countries. However, the sample did not include 
any of the southern or Eastern European countries because they are mostly 
relatively new donors with little amounts of funding and less experience within 
the DAC. The lack of experience within the DAC might be a reason for them 
to not have very well-defined criteria for allocating their mitigation aid. 
B) M inisterial representation - The aim was not only to interview the
representatives of development ministries or aid agencies but also from other 
ministries such as environment, finance or foreign affairs. This would inform 
the analysis of various perspectives that donors can have based on which 
ministry/ministries in their country deals with climate aid.  
C) Donor type - The type of donor- whether multilateral or bilateral donor,
was taken into consideration in this analysis to ensure that views from both 
types of donors were integrated in this analysis. 
Choosing the first few interviewees on the considerations discussed 
above was important, otherwise the risk of collecting evidence from just one 
perspective would have been high (since people tend to refer to likeminded 
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people who would reinforce their opinions). After the first few interviews, the 
process of snowballing helped identify other potential interviewees. Snowball 
sampling is a non-probability sampling technique, where a few people are 
interviewed and then they provide connections to other potential interviewees. 
This technique was important because for most people working on climate aid, 
publicly available information is sparse and such people are often difficult to 
identify within an organization. Overall, the group of interviewees remains 
rather small. However, the richness of information gathered from these few 
interviews was sufficient for this analysis.  
An important caveat in this analysis is that almost without exception, 
all interviewees requested strict anonymity. They will hence, not be named 
individually when we use information directly from the interviews itself. This 
refusal by donors to be named indicates that climate aid allocation is a 
somewhat sensitive issue and donors may not be comfortable with others 
knowing what criteria drive their allocation. However, to allow for some 
identification and comparability between the donors, the following monikers 
are assigned: Nordic donors (ND), Western European donors (WED), non-
European donors (NEU), and multilateral donors (MD). Additionally, the 
type of ministry or agency they represent will also be named. 
A total of 15 interviews were conducted where the interviewees 
represented 12 bilateral donors (consisting of representatives from finance 
ministries, development and environment ministries and an aid implementing 
agency) and 3 multilaterals (consisting of development banks and a 
multilateral climate fund). Out of these 15, 10 interviews were conducted face-
to-face at the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)/Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) meeting of the UNFCCC in 
May 2017 as well as at the Conference of the Parties (COP 23) in November 
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2017. Both the events were held in Bonn, Germany. Additional interviews 
with donors that were not available for face-to-face interviews were completed 
over the telephone and Skype in the same time period. On average, each 
interview lasted for 40 minutes. They were recorded with the permission of 
the interviewees and later transcribed for this analysis. The data was analyzed 
after assembling all the information, which included synthesizing information 
from the transcripts of the interviews. Complementing these interviews were 
an extensive review of secondary sources such as existing public documents, 
(for e.g. reports, and charters), official documents and peer reviews of the 
DAC donors. The findings of this analysis are presented in the next section. 
3.6 Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings are discussed in this section keeping with the way the 
theoretical section was structured. The first part of the results in each sub-
section presented uses publicly available information and therefore, the donors 
will be named by their actual names (not monikers).  
Before, focusing on the theoretical drivers of inefficient aid allocation 
results from the research on whether donors had specific criteria for allocating 
their mitigation aid is presented. The bilateral donors presented in table 3-1 
are the traditional OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. 
Among the multilateral donors and climate funds, only those already 
discussed in chapter 2 have been presented. N/A indicates the columns for 
donors whose mitigation aid allocation criteria were not found upon extensive 
web searches. Donors may have several other eligibility or prioritization 
criteria unrelated to mitigation per se. These were not included in the table 
below since the focus of this analysis is only on mitigation aid allocation. The 
findings of the table are synthesized and described after the table is presented. 
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Tab. 3-1:  Donor criterion for mitigation of aid allocation 
Donor 
Bi-or multilateral 
donor 
Specific indicator 
for mitigation 
project selection? 
Description of indicator Source 
United Kingdom Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Germany Bilateral Yes 
Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety (BMU): GHG emissions reduced or 
avoided annually and GHG sequestration (as tCO2 eq)
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ): Make 
large-scale use of low-cost options for GHG reduction 
BMUB, 2015; BMZ, 
2014 
France 
Bilateral Yes 
Agence Franç ise de Développement (AfD): Intervention 
that avoids more GHGs emissions than it generates during 
its lifetim
Smallridge et al., 
2013 
Italy Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Ireland Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Japan Bilateral Yes GHG emissions reduced or avoided annually JICA, 2011 
Austria Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Belgium Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
The Netherlands Bilateral Yes GHG emissions reduced or avoided annually 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2016 
Spain Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Portugal Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Switzerland Bilateral Yes GHG emissions reduced or avoided annually SDC, 2017 
United States Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Canada Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
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Donor 
Bi-or multilateral 
donor 
Specific indicator 
for mitigation 
project selection? 
Description of indicator Source 
Denmark Bilateral Yes Cost-effectiveness DANIDA, 2016 
Norway Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Sweden Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Finland Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Australia Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
New Zealand Bilateral 
No specific mitigation 
criteria found 
N/A N/A 
Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) 
Multilateral Yes 
Impact potential: expected t CO2 eq to be reduced or 
avoided/cost-effectiveness 
GCF, n.d. 
NAMA Facility Multilateral Yes 
t CO2 eq reduced in the previous calendar year compared to 
the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, which is set at zero at 
the start of project implementation). 
NAMA Facility, 2015 
Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) Trust 
Fund-Climate Change 
Multilateral Yes Cost-effectiveness Kim et al., 2009 
African Developme t 
Bank (AfDB) 
Multilateral Yes 
(a) Potential for GHG emissions savings 
(b) Cost-effectiveness   
N/A 
Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Multilateral Yes 
(a) Potential for GHG emissions savings 
(b) Cost-effectiveness   
N/A 
World Bank Multilateral Yes 
GHG emissions reduced or avoided annually and GHG 
sequestration 
World Bank, 2015 
Forest Investment 
Program (FIP) 
Multilateral Yes 
GHG emissions reduced or avoided annually and GHG 
sequestration 
Climate Investment 
Funds, 2009 
Scaling-up renewable 
energy programme for 
low incomecountries
(SREP)
Multilateral Yes Renewable energy potential in low income countries Kim et al., 2009 
Climate T hnology 
Fund (CTF) 
Inter American 
Development Bank
(IADB)
Multilateral 
Multilateral
 Yes 
No
(a) Potential for GHG emissions savings 
(b) Cost-effectiveness  
N/A
Climate Investment 
Funds, 2009 
N/A
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Table 3-1 shows that some donors have publicly available information on 
the criteria used to allocate mitigation aid while others do not, at least during 
the time of analysis. Out of the 29 donors presented above, 16 have specific 
mitigation criteria. Among those bilateral donors who do have specific 
mitigation project/program selection criteria, few have a cost-effectiveness 
perspective while others have a GHG reduced or avoided annually criterion. 
For the multilateral funds, the UNREDD, FIP and the CTF allocate 
mitigation aid to countries with high mitigation potential, indicated by long-
term GHG emissions savings (Kim et al., 2009). Other multilateral 
development banks, such as the AfDB, ADB, etc. as presented in the table 
jointly assess the criteria for investments, based on the CTF eligibility criteria  
(World Bank, 2008).   
Bilateral donors sometimes institute dedicated funds to climate finance 
and these funds/funding instruments often have specific mitigation project 
selection criteria and this varies across donors. For instance, Germany’s 
climate aid funding instrument known as International Climate Initiative 
(IKI) financed by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) judges mitigation project 
proposals on the basis of the Action Mitigation Indicator. This is a 
quantitative indicator measuring the reduction in GHG emissions and 
increases in carbon storage (measured in t CO2 equivalent) in the 
project/program area. The UK government also has a flagship fund known as 
the International Climate Fund (ICF). The Department for International 
Development (DfID), the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
jointly manage this fund. For mitigation projects, they consider only the GHG 
emissions reduced or avoided, as a performance indicator (Pearce & Hickman, 
2017). Unlike IKI, the ICF does not take into account increases in carbon 
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storage. 
The information gathered from the interviews more or less conforms to 
the findings from the publicly available information. There is a significant 
variation in how donors engage with the recipients for financing mitigation. 
Some of donor-funded climate funds have a project-based approach while 
other donors have a program-based approach. For project-based approaches, 
donors usually finance particular projects with a climate related objective. For 
instance, if Switzerland finances one solar power plant in Tanzania to help 
mitigate GHGs, it would be considered to be project-based aid. For program-
based aid, the approach is different. According to the OECD (2008), a 
program-based approach is engaging in development cooperation supporting 
locally owned program of development. For instance, say, India would like to 
overhaul its electricity sector by moving away from coal-fired plants to 
renewable sources of energy. India would then engage with donors to gather 
financial support for such an endeavor, perhaps targeting the electricity sector 
all over India. For donors, who have a program-based approach, the 
interviews revealed they often did not have any specific mitigation related 
criteria for allocating their aid.  
Among the western donors, the results regarding awareness were 
somewhat mixed. WED 4 (environment ministry) claimed that they 
prioritized least developed countries (LDCs) and small land developing states 
(SIDS) and allocated both adaptation as well as mitigation aid to them. There 
are no specific criteria for allocating such aid. WED 5 (environment ministry) 
said that most of their partners for bilateral cooperation were LDCs and 
former colonies. Hence, most of their climate aid went to these countries. 
Often, they addressed development and climate concerns within the same 
project. If they finance a school in their partner country and the school had 
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solar panels installed, they will consider such a project as a mitigation project. 
For these two donors, the findings were not in line with what was expected. 
Environment ministries actually prioritized poverty based allocation rather 
than cost-effective mitigation. In contrast, one interviewee said that in 
addition to their own criteria, they also follow the criteria developed by GCF 
(WED1a, environment ministry) (see Appendix A.2 for a list of GCF criteria). 
One of the GCF indicators is that of cost-effectiveness indicating that the 
environment ministry of WED1 did take this into account in their allocation 
decision. 
For the Nordic donors, there was a significant variation in how they dealt 
with climate aid and which recipient they engaged with. One respondent 
maintained that mitigation aid required large-scale investments, which is 
difficult to achieve on a bilateral basis (ND1, ministry of foreign affairs). For 
bilateral cooperation, ND1’s focus was mainly on LDCs and African countries 
for which adaptation finance was more relevant. This focus on poor countries 
is based on their development aid principles, which prioritize poor and needy 
people and they preferred to channel their mitigation aid through multilateral 
channels. Respondent from ND2 (environment ministry) had a clear focus of 
working with middle-income economies (which are often good locations for 
cheap emission reduction opportunities) for financing mitigation. They also 
have specific GHG reduction criteria for choosing mitigation projects. Overall, 
it seemed that the Nordic donors were actually efficient in their approach to 
mitigation aid allocation. While ND1 handed over the allocation of mitigation 
aid to multilateral channels, ND2 was actually focusing on middle-income 
countries for mitigation. 
Among the non-European donors, NEU1 (ministry of foreign affairs) 
and NEU2 (ministry of foreign affairs) both focus on their existing 
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partnerships with some island nations and does not have separate criteria for 
funding climate projects. For such donors, who do not have a specific criterion 
for climate aid allocation we can observe a tendency toward path dependency 
– they did not see the importance of adapting their allocation practices to
cater to mitigation efficiency but rather chose to continue allocating it in the 
same way as they do other development aid.  Moreover, it seemed that they 
prioritized maintaining regional influence over cost-effective mitigation aid 
allocation. 
For the multilateral donors, one respondent declared that for 
mitigation, the agency took into consideration the emission intensity of a 
country, i.e. emissions per unit of GDP (MD1, Multilateral Development 
Bank). This donor was, however, constrained to work in a given region of 
operations and could not choose to invest elsewhere. A second donor stated 
that they followed the joint multilateral development bank (JMDB) 
methodology and emission reductions to be achieved in selecting projects 
(MD2, Multilateral Development Bank). This information from the interview 
confirms the findings presented in table 3-1. According to the JMDB, 
mitigation aid should be allocated on the basis of a list of activities that are 
considered to be compatible with low-emission pathways and reduce GHGs 
(EIB, 2016). These activities are, for instance, electricity generation from 
renewable sources, energy efficiency improvements in existing thermal power 
plants, reduction of energy use in agriculture, etc. (see Joint MDB report 2017 
for an exhaustive list of such mitigation activities). However, not all activities 
that reduce GHGs are financed. For example, some hydropower plants, which 
emit high levels of methane from reservoirs exceeding GHG reductions 
associated with the plant’s use of renewable energy, are not considered for 
financing. More importantly, the JMDB (2017, p. 8) clearly recognizes that ‘a 
one-ton reduction of CO2 emissions has the same impact regardless of where 
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the activities are located. [...] adaptation activities are project- and location-
specific, and they respond to specific climate vulnerabilities.’ This 
demonstrates that at least the multilateral development banks are aware of 
the fundamental difference between the two different objectives (one global 
and one local) of climate aid. Of course, one cannot preclude with certainty 
whether these banks also have other strategic priorities that may prevent a 
cost-effective allocation of mitigation aid. 
Summing up, the analysis reveals that some donors are clear about 
where mitigation projects should go, i.e. to those countries with the highest 
mitigation potential. A few donors did not have separate criteria for allocating 
their mitigation aid and allocated it the same way they do other mitigation 
aid. Some donors often prioritized LDCs/former colonies/SIDs that are often 
places with low mitigation potential. 
In the context of efficiently allocating mitigation aid, the discussions 
point to the need for using different frameworks for mitigation aid and for 
development aid. In other words, donors may use their existing frameworks for 
allocating development aid (even adaptation aid) but could potentially follow 
a different approach (based on abatement potential of recipients), for 
allocating their mitigation aid. Given that there are different paradigms of 
efficiency, if donors can replace one determinant of efficiency with another 
(say donors are not reducing maximum emissions cost-effectively, but reduce 
leakages of aid money due to corruption) their choices may, however, still be 
justified. 
3.6.1 Within Country Dynamics and Inter-Agency Differences 
in Priorities 
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As outlined in the theoretical section, it is expected that differences in 
priorities between different ministries dealing with climate change issues cause 
inefficiencies in allocation in some cases; while for others it provides 
opportunities for a more efficient allocation. From the review of donor 
mandates, it was evident that sometimes development ministries of the 
government focuses on poverty-oriented finance allocation while others such as 
foreign affairs or economic ministries focus on middle income countries which 
are often important locations for dealing with transnational or global 
problems. Germany explains their objectives of development cooperation in a 
very clear manner. Their development cooperation is based on the dual 
objective of moral responsibility or as they put it ‘because prosperity comes 
with obligations’ and solving global problems which affect them as well – 
‘because everyone benefits’ (BMZ, 2018). To achieve this dual objective 
through their development cooperation, Germany’s Federal Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has a clear division of 
priorities. Emerging economics such as Brazil, Indonesia, India, Mexico and 
South Africa, are prioritized for the protection of global public goods (e.g. 
reducing CO2-emissions, or protecting rainforests) (Baydag, et al., 2018). 
Germany’s IKI is focused on allocating climate mitigation finance to newly 
industrializing economies with a high level of potential for reducing greenhouse 
gases as a result of their emerging economy status. For Switzerland, the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) works with low-income 
countries while the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) focuses on 
middle-income countries. 
This separation in objectives might come with its own unique problems. 
Take the example of Belgium. The federated entities of Flanders, Wallonia-
Brussels International and Brussels-Capital all have their own legislation and 
policy frameworks, which have often led to conflicts owing to a lack of 
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transparency over how the responsibilities for development cooperation would 
be shared across these different entities (OECD, 2015). While these findings 
mainly relate to ODA, they may also hold in the case of mitigation aid. 
As mentioned in the theoretical section, there may be problems when 
development and environment ministries, both deal with climate change 
financing. An important case of conflict in objectives between development 
ministry and environment ministries is that of Norway’s International Climate 
and Forest Initiative (NICFI). Launched in 2007, NICFI aims to reduce 
deforestation. Initially, NICFI was set up under the Ministry of Environment, 
led by the Erik Solheim, who was simultaneously the Minister of 
Development. However, when he stepped down from his post, the institutional 
set became complicated because both, development and environment 
ministries had authority over NICFI (Asselt, 2015). While the former was 
more concerned with poverty reduction, the latter was more concerned about 
the climate and environment. This division in objectives may have led to 
bureaucratic problems and incoherent decision-making with the NICFI 
(Mcneill, 2015).  
Conflicts between different ministries may also arise in the absence of a 
comprehensive climate aid strategy. Studying the case of Germany, Enting & 
Harmeling (2011), claim that there was an absence of a unifying climate aid 
strategy, which led to competition and suspicion amongst BMUB and BMZ 
when the IKI was set up in 2008. On the other end of the spectrum, is the 
case of UK. The OECD DAC’s (2014) peer review of UK found that the UK 
has a consistent cross-government approach, in their management of the 
International Climate Fund (ICF) fund, which is run by three different 
government entities. Funding decisions were taken in a consistent way with 
broad agreement across the different departments (ibid: 2014).  
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From the interviews, the findings from the secondary sources were 
somewhat confirmed although only for a handful of western donors. WED5 
(environment ministry) admitted that there could be some allocation 
inefficiencies arising from the federal structure of their government, wherein 
regional governments had priorities that were often not in line with the 
central ones. Different ministries within the donor country often dealt with 
climate aid and there are no feedback loops between the different departments 
leading to administrative inefficiencies. WED2 (environment ministry) 
revealed that in their country there is an ongoing atmosphere of secrecy 
between the different departments. Another department dealing with climate 
aid did not even share internally with other departments, what criteria they 
use for their financing decisions. Therefore, from the interviews, it became 
somewhat apparent that differences in priorities across different ministries 
dealing with climate aid often created conflicts within the donor. 
The issue is not just differences in objectives like poverty reduction or 
geostrategic considerations between the different ministries but also about 
ministries that work with relevant countries. To be efficient, it would make 
sense entrust the task to allocate mitigation aid via the ministry or agency 
that works with the relevant countries for mitigation (such as emerging 
economies). If donors do not have a clear separation on such a basis and all 
the ministries are engaged in the same type of activities (as we see in the case 
of climate change) but in different countries (some of which may not be good 
locations for mitigation), then there is little room for efficiency gains since 
they are constrained to work with those particular set of countries. 
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3.6.2 Strategic Priorities of Donor Institutions 
Partner countries 
While a proper targeting criterion for measuring cost-effective mitigation 
opportunities is essential, in some cases, when donors partner with middle-
income countries, it can be seen as a rough indicator of whether donors are 
concerned about reducing emissions cost-effectively (Bagchi et al., 2016). 
However, some donors are actually withdrawing their aid from middle-income 
or transitioning to new kinds of cooperation with them. In past few years, the 
UK for instance, has withdrawn most of its aid from emerging economies like 
India, China, South Africa, Indonesia, etc. Notwithstanding this move, to 
meet its strategic priorities, UK continues to cooperate with Indonesia on 
climate change related issues by focusing their aid program only on climate 
change, which is an area of mutual interest (ICAI, 2016). Then there are 
countries like Sweden which choose to focus on bilaterally helping poor 
countries in places like Africa to adapt to the effects of climate change 
(Government of Sweden, 2009). Similarly, for development cooperation, 
countries like Canada, Ireland, Belgium, have a focus on poorer countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Canada says that its climate 
aid will be used to support climate change adaptation and mitigation 
programs, prioritizing the most vulnerable countries, such as small island 
developing states, Africa, and the least developed countries (Government of 
Canada, 2016). Countries like New Zealand and Australia prioritize their ties 
to the Pacific Islands. A recent Oxfam report was actually critical of New 
Zealand’s mitigation aid to the Pacific nations. Taking a normative viewpoint, 
the report claimed that the New Zealand needs to spend less on solar projects 
to lower emissions in the Pacific Islands because ironically these are the 
countries with least responsibility for climate change and need more money for 
adaptation rather than mitigation (OXFAM, 2016). 
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Some countries however, have an explicit focus on working with emerging 
countries for climate change mitigation. An example is that of Denmark, 
which states: 
“Mitigation activities will mainly be focused in the emerging economies 
where mitigation purposes are most cost efficient and potentially most 
impactful. Interventions mainly targeting adaptation purposes will be 
focused in poor countries - mainly in Africa - which are most vulnerable 
to consequences of climate change.” (DANIDA, 2016 p.5) 
Germany also has an explicit focus on emerging economies for its 
development cooperation in climate change related issues. Its development 
cooperation ministry, BMZ (2018a) states that economically and politically 
rising G-20 members Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South 
Africa, are important partners for German development cooperation, 
especially for the protection of global public goods. The BMZ is working with 
these partners to help expand their renewable energy capacities owing to their 
significant mitigation potential (BMZ, 2018c). These findings are actually 
contrary to the previously set expectation that development ministries only 
focus on poor countries. 
The interviews revealed interesting variations. Among the western 
donors for instance, the middle-income focus was relevant for WED1. 
According to them, their priority was financing the big emitters. In the words 
of WED1: 
“Basically, it is the big emitters and sometimes the countries that play a 
central role in the negotiations and so on.” (WED1b, Aid Implementing 
Agency 2017) 
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 WED5 (environment ministry) however, acknowledged that they 
financed 14 of their ex-colonies out of which 13 were LDCs.  
Among the non-European donors, cost-effectiveness of mitigation was 
not driving their aid allocation decisions. For instance, NEU1 (ministry of 
foreign affairs) and NEU2 (ministry of foreign affairs) are financing renewable 
energy projects in partner countries, which are mostly islands with very little 
current emission reduction opportunity. Both donors claimed that they chose 
to partner with countries that are close to them geographically as well as with 
whom they had existing partnerships.  
Existing partnerships were relevant for Nordic donors as well. For 
instance, ND1 (ministry of foreign affairs) claimed that they were restricted to 
work with only a few countries because they were a small country that did not 
have embassies worldwide. This prevented them from setting up new 
mitigation projects where they did not have any prior engagements. 
Furthermore, they also phased-out middle-income countries as their 
development cooperation partners since they wanted to focus specifically on 
poor countries to help with their bilateral assistance and as part of a political 
decision on account of shortage of staff to work in these countries. ND1 also 
said that since emerging economies like India and China are going through 
rapid changes, aid might not even help anymore.  
The findings from the interviews reveal that apart from cost-
effectiveness, several considerations drive donors’ choice of partner countries. 
These were driven by either path dependency (donors were unwilling to 
change existing and reliable aid implementation partners) or by other strategic 
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considerations such as maintaining influence over a certain region or trying to 
realize efficiency gains unrelated to the abatement potential of a country. 
Promotion of Business Interests and Leveraging Private Climate 
Finance 
The role of business interests in affecting mitigation aid allocation varied 
across donors. Most donors clearly accept that one of the objectives of their 
mitigation aid is promoting their business interests as well as leveraging 
climate finance. According to Whitley (2013), a significant amount of public 
climate aid is supporting investment by industries based in donor countries to 
developing countries. All public climate aid from Japan, which supports the 
private enterprises in developing countries, use Japanese technology and 
hence, directly benefits Japanese firms (ibid: 2013). Countries like the UK had 
pledged that they would provide $2.4 billion in climate finance after COP15 
with a special focus on creating new partnerships with the private sector 
(Government of UK, 2012). An Oxfam report also states that most of the 
benefits from New Zealand’s aid are actually profiting their domestic 
companies (Oxfam, 2016). 
Among the Nordic donors, ND2 (environment ministry, 2017) claimed 
while they do not directly link their business interests and mitigation aid, 
some synergies happen, nonetheless. More specifically, ND2 said: 
“We focus on how we are most effective in what we do, because we are a 
tiny country. That as I said, we are focusing on the areas of expertise we 
have but that also coincides with national business interests. Let’s talk 
about an example - If we are doing district heating in Mexico, then you 
know, often, we would be asked - you know we are interested in doing 
this, do you also know anyone who would have the hardware and then we 
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give them the information…. Although we don’t make a link specifically, 
we also know there will be a business interest.” (ND2, environment 
ministry) 
Leveraging and mobilizing climate finance with aid money is an 
important motivation for most donors. Pauw (2017) studied such donor 
motivations and came to the following findings: For Canada, EU, Japan, US, 
New Zealand and Norway, the primary motivation to mobilizing and 
leveraging private sector financing was meeting the 100 billion dollar target 
promised in Copenhagen in 2009. Japan had the additional motivation of 
financing scale projects through private investments while EU, New Zealand 
and Norway wanted to limit temperature rise to 2 degrees centigrade. 
Australia claims that it focuses on using public funds to leverage far greater 
private sector flows to assist developing countries to undertake mitigation and 
adaptation action (Biennial Report, 2015). Leveraging private finance is also 
crucial for the UK government. Take the example of the UK government’s 
mitigation project on “Capital Markets Climate Initiative.” In their ICF 
business case, they clearly assert that:  
“In order to support low carbon, climate resilient development; it is vital 
that we use public resources to leverage private investment” (Government 
of UK, 2013). 
Evidence from the interviews revealed that leveraging private climate 
finance was a common motivation for almost all donors with one or two 
exceptions. WED4 (environment ministry) said that while leveraging climate 
finance was not one of its objectives yet, governmental talks were revolving 
around making it one. Another WED donor answered that the most 
important criterion is to see if it is taking up a role that is already being done 
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by the private sector and also whether it can harness the interest of the 
private sector to invest more. In the words of WED1, 
“Creating leverage is important – i.e. how much private climate finance 
is being mobilized from the requested project” (WED1b, aid agency). 
Promoting business interests and leveraging on its own may not be the 
main problem leading to inefficient allocation. But if it encourages donors to 
invest in countries to invest in places where there are not many mitigation 
opportunities or in project types that are profitable but not efficient simply on 
the basis of business interests or leveraging, it may lead to the wastage of 
valuable financial resources. Moreover, promoting business interests and 
leveraging finance often clashes with the social welfare maximisation objective 
of development aid, since the former is driven by a profit maximisation 
motive. Reconciling these two objectives with one instrument – aid – may lead 
to the situation where neither objective is met or both objectives met only 
halfway. 
3.6.3 Public Expectations 
As discussed in the theoretical section, expectations from the public may be 
relevant for the efficient allocation of mitigation aid mainly because they 
might not be aware of how an efficient allocation of climate aid should be and 
pressurize the governments to prioritize allocation to poor countries or they 
may want the money to be spent domestically. When questioned by the public 
in the UK about why the government is spending on climate change when 
there are so many domestic difficulties and where the aid money can be used, 
the Secretary of State for International Development said that it is UK’s 
interest to finance mitigation in emerging economies where emissions are 
expected to grow the fastest, and most efficient to tackle global problems such 
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as deforestation and carbon emissions (Gray, 2012). ICAI (2014) reveals that 
UK’s ICF allocates mitigation aid mainly to middle-income countries, on the 
basis of efficiency considerations. In fact, they found ICF’s targeting of 
countries with its funds to be rather appropriate, showing consistency between 
government rhetoric and deeds. 
With regard to reacting to public pressure, in the interviews most 
donors said that they were resistant to such pressure. Some of them do try to 
engage with the public to explain their decisions on funding climate change. 
They do so by either holding annual meetings with the general public or 
including representatives from NGOs in their delegations to the UNFCCC 
negotiations. They try proactively engaging with all stakeholders to explain 
what they do with their aid flows, what results they achieve and what is the 
future outlook of their aid strategies (WED1a, ND1, NEU2). 
3.7 Discussions and Conclusion 
This chapter’s main aim was to understand what criteria donors use to 
allocate their mitigation aid and whether they correspond to the notion of 
cost-effectiveness. It further identified the causes of inefficiencies in donors’ 
mitigation aid allocation on the basis of which a theoretical framework was 
built. The framework was empirically analyzed using secondary sources of 
information and semi-structured interviews.  
The findings show that some donors have explicit cost-effectiveness 
criteria. A few bilateral donors also prioritize allocating mitigation aid to 
middle-income countries that are often good locations for cost-effective 
mitigation of GHGs. However, they still face certain constraints reducing 
efficient allocation of mitigation aid. Firstly, internal coordination issues and 
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differences in priorities may hamper efficient allocation. Secondly, donors may 
have certain strategic priorities, which often led to reduction in allocation 
efficiency. Such priorities may be related to donors directing aid to partner 
countries with low abatement potential simply on the basis of existing ties or 
prioritize business interests and leveraging of climate finance over choosing 
cost-effective project types or locations. Lastly, contrary to expectations, 
public pressure to allocate mitigation aid to poor countries do not 
substantially affect donors’ allocation efficiency.  
Apart from trying to understand whether cost-effectiveness contributes 
to mitigation aid allocation decisions, this analysis also introspects a bit 
deeper into the issue of financing the global public good of mitigation (which 
benefits everyone, irrespective of who the recipient is) using development aid 
money (whose original purpose is to cater exclusively to the needs of the 
recipient). To this end, information from the interviews was used again. Three 
main perspectives came up in this regard: 1) Some donors considered 
mitigation aid to be “help” for the developing countries, irrespective of the fact 
that it was addressing a global public good. They insisted that developing 
countries “needed” mitigation aid to either draw in more FDI or build clean 
energy infrastructure (i.e. for the co-benefits associated with mitigation aid). 
2) Only one out 15 donors interviewed said that need was more relevant for
adaptation than mitigation; 3) Some donors, especially Nordic ones were 
concerned that efforts to mitigate within their own borders will not be 
sufficient to reduce climate change. Another donor further opined that climate 
change was going to harm developing countries more than the developed 
countries so it makes sense for them to mitigate it now with the help of 
mitigation aid.  
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Future research could study the criteria used for adaptation aid, or 
recipient political economies that may affect the efficiency of climate aid 
disbursements. Studies can also concentrate on how to improve the ex-post 
results of climate finance, i.e. how effectively the resources have been used 
after allocation.  
As with most qualitative studies, there are some limitations in this 
study. Non-generalizability of these results owing to a small sample size and a 
somewhat selective representation of the results are admittedly important 
constraints.  The most important constraint in this study, however, was that 
owing to strict confidentiality requirements, it was not possible to identify or 
name the donors. Neither was it possible to understand whether donors’ who 
claim to use the cost-effectiveness criteria to allocate mitigation aid, actually 
use them? Moreover, what are the other drivers of mitigation aid and are 
these drivers different from other development aid or adaptation aid? 
Answering such open questions is possible using a quantitative approach and 
the next two chapters aim to do precisely that. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Interview guide: Do donors allocate climate related aid cost-
effectively? – An empirical analysis of donor behavior 
Interview Type: Semi-structured individual interviews (face-to-face, phone 
- telephone and Skype - and email interviews) 
Interview subjects: Aid officials and representatives of major donor 
governments and agencies as well as experts on climate related aid. 
Introduction 
This interview is for a research project on climate related aid at the 
University of Zurich. We are interested in how climate related development 
assistance could be allocated most effectively. For this reason, we collect 
information on what criteria donors follow when they decide about climate 
change mitigation and/or adaptation projects.  
If you have any questions or concerns regarding the interview of the project, 
please do not hesitate to contact me (Chandreyee Bagchi) at 
chandreyee.bagchi@pw.uzh.ch. 
0. Question about confidentiality
I do not think that any of my questions will be politically sensitive in any 
way. But just in case, please let me know whenever there is any of your 
answers that you would prefer to remain confidential between us, or not put 
in context with your name or institution. 
Would you agree to me recording this interview, so that I can transcribe it 
later? 
1. General questions
1.1 Are you involved in the decision-making processes on climate related aid? 
1.2 If yes, what is your role in the decision-making processes? 
1.2. If no, how did you observe these processes? 
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2. Questions on the selection criteria for climate related projects
(both adaptation and mitigation) 
2.1 When you receive a proposal for funding a mitigation project, how do you 
decide whether or not to fund it? 
2.2 Do you have any specific considerations when you decide whether to or 
not fund adaptation projects? 
2.3 Is there any documentation for the criteria your institution uses for 
funding:  
i) General development aid projects?
ii) Climate change adaptation projects?
iii) Climate change mitigation projects?
2.4 Could you kindly send me the documentation? 
3. Questions on the derivation of the different selection criterion
3.1 How were these criteria for allocating funds for different mitigation and 
adaptation projects derived?  
3.2 Do you see room for improvement of the criteria that are currently 
applied, or room for improvement in the way such criteria are derived? 
3.3 If yes, what kind of improvements would you suggest? 
4. Questions on public expectation and institutional incentives
4.1 Do you face any constraints on your decisions if you do decide to allocate 
climate aid differently in comparison to other development aid? 
4.2 If yes, what are they? 
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4.3 Do expectations about the usage of climate related aid from the public or 
from NGOs have an influence on your aid allocation decisions? 
5. Questions on differences among donors (multilateral and
bilateral) 
5.1 Do you perceive any differences between the different bilateral donors in 
terms of criteria? Or between multilateral and bilateral donors? 
5.2. Do you have an opinion on whether either of them have any comparative 
merits?  
6. Justification for the use of development aid for the purpose of
mitigation 
 6.1 Given that climate change mitigation is a global public good and the 
benefits accruing from it are often more global than local, how do you view 
the use of development aid for this purpose? 
6.2 What incentives do developing countries have for accepting aid for a 
global public like climate change mitigation?  
7. Other potential experts
7.1 Could you recommend to me other experts with experience of working on 
the issue of climate related aid who could also provide me with their views 
and recollections on these issues? 
Thank you very much for your time. I will send you a copy of my notes from 
this interview, so that you have the opportunity to make corrections or 
comment on them if you wish.  
A.2: GCF Project Selection Criteria 
1. Impact Potential - Potential of the programme/project to contribute to
the achievement of the Fund's objectives and result areas. 
70 
2. Paradigm shift potential - Degree to which the proposed activity can
catalyze impact beyond a one-off project or programme investment. 
3. Sustainable development potential - Wider benefits and priorities,
including environmental, social, and economic co-benefits as well as gender-
sensitive development impact. 
4. Responsive to recipients’ needs - Vulnerability and financing needs of
the beneficiary country and population in the targeted group. 
5. Promote country ownership - Beneficiary country ownership of and
capacity to implement a funded project or programme (policies, climate 
strategies and institutions). 
6. Efficiency & effectiveness - Economic and, if appropriate, financial
soundness of the programme/project, and for mitigation-specific 
programmes/projects, cost-effectiveness and co-financing. 
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Chapter 4 
Does Efficiency Matter in
Climate Aid Allocation? A
Political Economic Analysis 
In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to understand whether donors 
are adopt specific criteria to allocate mitigation aid and identify the various 
political factors impeding the efficiency of allocation. However, in a qualitative 
setting, it was not possible to identify whether donors who claim to use 
efficiency criteria to allocate their mitigation aid on the basis of cost-
effectiveness are actually using them in practice. The purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to examine the extent of potential inefficiencies in climate aid 
allocation using a quantitative approach. It is based on collaborative work 
with Katharina Michaelowa and Paula Castro (see Bagchi et al. 2016).
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, information on donor’s allocation criteria gathered from the 
interviews and secondary sources, is linked to empirical reality by adopting a 
quantitative perspective of donors’ climate aid allocation. This is done 
comparing the correlates of mitigation aid and adaptation aid to see if their 
drivers are indeed different, i.e. is the former allocated on the basis of a 
recipient country’s abatement potential and the latter on the basis of 
neediness. 
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As already discussed in the previous chapter, the fact that mitigation aid 
addresses a global public good and adaptation aid, a more local public good, 
has consequences for how both types of aid should be allocated. When donors 
allocate their mitigation aid to places where it can be used most efficiently, 
they could be misunderstood as lacking an orientation towards recipient needs 
if one does not account for the global public good characteristic of mitigation. 
This chapter aims to expand our understanding of how the current aid 
allocation literature is insufficient to analyze aid flows for mitigation, which is 
a global public good. Moreover, it also investigates and compares the drivers 
of both, adaptation and mitigation aid. The rest of the chapter is structured 
as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the extant aid allocation 
literature. Section 4.3 presents the empirical evidence on the basis of 
conceptual considerations and the allocation criteria discussed in chapters 2 
and 3, respectively. Section 4.4 draws the conclusions. 
4.2 The Aid Allocation Literature 
The aid allocation literature has been a vast field of research questioning 
and assessing the motives of donors’ contributions since the early 1970s (e.g., 
Abbott, 1970, p. 1216). Holding donors accountable for their motives is 
relevant since ultimately, such motives are crucial for the effectiveness of aid. 
When aid is allocated on the basis of donor interest (e.g., for geopolitical or 
commercial reasons), rather recipient need, it reduces the effect aid could 
otherwise have on its generally supposed primary goal, namely economic 
development and the reduction of poverty in the world. Kilby & Dreher 
(2010) as well as Dreher et al., (2013) provide clear empirical evidence that 
indeed, aid allocated on the basis of donor interest is less effective. Mckinlay 
(1978) and Mckinlay & Little (1977, 1979) were the first to establish the 
theoretical distinction between a donor interest and a recipient need model of 
aid allocation, and to econometrically assess bilateral donors’ aid allocation 
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along these lines. A comprehensive review of the aid allocation literature until 
the mid-2000s is provided by Doucouliagos & Paldam (2009) who find that 
across the different studies they assess, notably GDP per capita (the central 
indicator of recipient need) has a very robust effect, but this effect is small 
leaving ample room for a variety of other motives. Generally, most studies 
find evidence for both donor interest and recipient need, to varying extents 
depending on the donor and on the period observed (less geopolitical motives 
after the end of the Cold War). Maizels & Nissanke (1984), Frey & Schneider 
(1986), Grilli & Riess (1992) and Neumayer (2003) extended the analysis to 
multilateral donors.  
More recent studies have confirmed the earlier findings using improved 
econometric estimation techniques that reflect the two-or even three-
dimensional panel structure of the data as well as censoring (no negative aid 
can be observed) and selection effects (e.g., Gang & Lehman, 1990; Trumbull 
& Wall, 1994; Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 2006).  
Since the mid-2000s, a special strand of the literature has focused on 
aid allocation to reward or encourage donor-friendly voting in the United 
Nations General Assembly (Carter & Stone, 2015) or during temporary 
membership in the United Nations Security Council (Voeten, 2001; Lai & 
Morey, 2006; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; Eldar, 2008; Dreher et al., 2008, 
Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher & Sturm, 2012). Other scholars also examined how 
multilateral donors’ aid allocation was influenced by important member 
countries, notably board members (Barnebeck et al., 2006; Fleck & Kilby, 
2006a; Kilby, 2006; Kaja & Werker, 2010). Moreover, donors were accused of 
allocating more aid to multilateral organizations when domestic groups 
benefited from it (McLean, 2015). Some studies also focus on the influence of 
domestic politics and lobbying in the donor country (Anwar & Michaelowa, 
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2006; Fleck & Kilby, 2006b; Tingley, 2010; Dreher, et al., 2015b; Dietrich, 
2016, and another strand of the literature analyzes the so-called “new donors” 
like China or India and examine how their aid allocation differs from the more 
traditional donors (Dreher et al., 2011; Fuchs & Vadlamannati, 2013; Dreher 
et al., 2015, Dreher & Fuchs, 2016). 
Among the various developments of the aid allocation literature over 
time, the conceptual addition of recipient merit as a third category providing 
an additional motive in line with ‘good donorship’ is the most important one 
in the context of this analysis. Just as for aid allocated in response to recipient 
merit, donors’ intention to invest aid where it can be used most efficiently 
could be misunderstood as a lack of orientation towards recipient needs if 
characteristics depict cost-effectiveness is not taken into account by the 
literature. What does this discussion imply for the different donors?  
4.3 Exploring Average Donor Behavior 
The findings in chapter 3 indicate that some donors have started considering 
different efficiency criteria for allocating their mitigation aid. These findings 
are in line with Buchner et al. (2012) who describe donors’ different 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks that frequently include considerations 
of projects’ emissions reduction potential and cost-effectiveness. However, are 
they actually implementing the criteria they claim to use? 
Based on the discussions in chapter 2, a purely development-oriented 
donor should provide mitigation aid and adaptation aid to quite different 
places. Since mitigation aid should be allocated to emerging economies, in the 
traditional framework of the aid allocation literature, all aid flows to better-off 
countries tend to be interpreted as an expression of donor interest. To avoid 
this premature conclusion, it is necessary to find appropriate indicators to 
75 
control for the effectiveness of the mitigation aid allocation. Such indicators 
could reflect CO2 emissions, the predominance of dirty industries, and the like. 
Alternatively, it is possible to follow the argument made in the previous 
chapter that the private market tends to find the efficient opportunities most 
easily so that the CERs issued in the context of the CDM (or other CDM-
related variables) could provide us with a measure for countries with a high 
emission reduction potential.  
In the following section, to what extent donors actually differentiate 
between mitigation and adaptation aid when they make their allocation 
decisions is examined. Separate models were estimated for mitigation aid, 
adaptation aid, and overall aid. Then comparisons between donors’ allocation 
behavior have been made, both from the perspective of the traditional aid 
allocation literature and from a perspective that takes into account the 
specificities of mitigation aid, addressing a global public good. Readers should 
be reminded, however, that even if mitigation (i.e., the provision of a global 
public good) is the main purpose of a project, there are usually some local co-
benefits. A country receiving financial flows from mitigation aid may benefit, 
for example through the creation of additional jobs, or through increased 
energy efficiency that will make its industries more competitive. In fact, as 
revealed in the previous chapter, donors actually argue that developing 
countries need such mitigation aid for the co-benefits. This consideration may 
dilute the analysis to some extent.  
In this chapter, the intention is not to analyze individual donors (which 
is rather the focus of the next chapter) but investigate average donor 
behavior. The motives of each donor are not mutually exclusive. If we observe 
donors being more motivated by their own interests rather than efficiency, 
there will be a positive correlation between mitigation aid and donor interest 
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variables, which will change once mitigation efficiency is controlled for. If 
donors do not differentiate their aid allocation according to its purpose, their 
aid allocation should hence, follow very similar criteria no matter whether we 
look at mitigation, adaptation, or overall aid. In other words, controlling for 
mitigation efficiency will not change the positive correlation between 
mitigation aid and donor interest variables. 
4.4 Data 
This analysis uses the available OECD/DAC data on official development 
assistance (ODA) for the dependent variables. In line with the aid allocation 
literature in general, commitments rather than disbursements are used 
because commitments better reflect the donors’ intent (while eventual 
disbursements can depend, e.g., on absorption problems on the recipient side). 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the data on climate aid is based on the Rio 
markers, which allows us to differentiate between mitigation aid and 
adaptation aid. The data is in the form of a two-dimensional panel with 
recipient and year dimensions over a period of 12 years (from 2002 to 2013) 
for mitigation and 4 years for adaptation aid. Only aid for projects that were 
coded as having mitigation or adaptation as their main focus were selected in 
order not to enhance the difficulties that arise due to local co-benefits of 
mitigation that dilute the global public good character of the project. 
The explanatory variables can be divided in three categories. All of 
them are explained in detail in the Appendix B.1, where an overview of the 
different sources is also provided. The first group of variables comprises the 
typical variables used in the aid allocation literature. GDP per capita is used 
to indicate recipient need. In addition, a measure for population is included 
since, ceteris paribus, larger countries require more support. For recipient 
merit, a combined measure of the Freedom House indicators for political 
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rights and civil liberties (with higher values indicating greater freedom) as 
well as an indicator of government stability is used. For donor interest, donor 
exports, foreign direct investment and UN voting in line with the United 
States have been included.  
The second group of variables pertains to the measurement of 
mitigation efficiency. In particular, a new variable representing marginal 
abatement cost (MAC) has been used. MAC curves are a straightforward way 
to measure emission reduction opportunities with the metric of economic cost 
for mitigation. To reiterate information presented in chapter 3, the MACs are 
costs associated with the last unit (marginal unit) of emission abatement for 
different amounts of emission reduction. It is expected that a lower marginal 
abatement cost will provide a good orientation to donors who would ideally 
want to reduce maximum amount of emissions at given costs. The MAC 
measure developed by Murty (2016) is used. However, the variable suffers 
from the problem that it does not vary across time. Therefore, other measures 
to proxy for mitigation efficiency was used. These are electricity production 
from coal sources (% total) and CO2 emissions per unit of production as direct 
measures of the scope for emission reductions. In addition, variables related to 
the CDM are considered. These are namely the Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) issued to projects in a given country (relative to CERs issued in all 
countries during the relevant year), a variable averaging this ratio across all 
years (to avoid noise related to the strong annual variation in these data), a 
dummy for the existence of a so-called ‘designated national authority’ (DNA) 
that enables developing countries to benefit from the CDM and thereby 
signals the countries’ own interest in hosting corresponding emission reduction 
projects. When using the CER variables, a control for the period in which the 
Kyoto Protocol was operational (from 2005 onwards) was introduced because 
CDM projects could not be registered before this date. 
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The third group of variables relates to special adaptation needs that 
may help to increase the precision of the estimation of general needs in the 
case of adaptation aid (for a detailed analysis of the determinants of 
adaptation aid allocation, see Betzold & Weiler, 2018). While other measures 
were considered,1 only a single variable, namely the share of land under 5m of 
elevation was included. This is because these other measures are either almost 
identical to the variable used or are strongly related to GDP per capita 
thereby creating problems of multicollinearity. 
Lastly, a control for other ODA (including all other types of aid except 
mitigation aid) is introduced. If mitigation aid is driven more towards better-
off countries than other ODA, this should become evident through a 
significantly positive coefficient of GDP per capita, and significantly positive 
donor interest variables. 
4.4.1 Estimation Strategy 
The estimation strategy closely follows the established standard 
approach in the aid allocation literature. A panel estimation method for a 
simple two-dimensional panel across recipients and years has been used. 
Donors are considered jointly in this chapter, since the intention here is not to 
compare individual donors but rather to understand aggregate donor behavior. 
The censored nature of the dependent variable is taken into account by the 
1 First, the percentage of the population living below 5m of sea level (World Bank, 2015), 
which, reflects the exposure of recipient countries to sea level rise was considered. Second, 
vulnerability component (to assess adaptation needs) of the ND-Gain country index (ND-ECI 
Notre Dame’s Environmental Change Initiative, 2015), which measures a country's exposure, 
sensitivity and ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and has the 
advantage of varying over time was also considered. Third, measures of the relevance of 
agriculture for the economy as agriculture is more easily affected by climate change than 
other sectors of production could also have been used. Related indicators are available from 
the World Bank’s (2015) World Development Indicators. 
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use of a Tobit model. Using a maximum likelihood approach, the Tobit model 
estimates the probability of receiving aid and the amount of aid received in 
the same step. This circumvents the problem of sample selection bias inherent 
in Probit models which, estimates both in two separate steps. The Tobit 
model, therefore, estimates the maximum likelihood function combining two 
parts simultaneously where the first part refers to the classical regression for 
the non-censored observations and the second part, to the probability of an 
observation being censored. A Tobit model can be easily combined with a 
random effects specification. Using recipient fixed effects would have been a 
relevant alternative, but this might have created an incidental parameters 
problem due to the short length of panel. This is because the maximum 
likelihood estimator (MLE) in nonlinear panel data models with fixed effects is 
known to be biased and inconsistent for smaller lengths of panel data (Greene, 
2004). In addition, some of the relevant variation this analysis wishes to 
measure is cross-country and could not be assessed in the presence of recipient 
fixed effects (see also Dreher et al. 2011). However, year fixed effects are 
systematically included. They are essential as both climate aid and GDP per 
capita show a significant upward trend over the years, which would lead to a 
spurious correlation if year fixed effects were omitted. The equation to be 
estimated in a Tobit model with year fixed effects can be expressed as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = max{0,  𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡}  (1) 
where, 𝜀𝑖~Ν(0, 𝜎
2 ), i stands for recipient, t for year, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is mitigation aid
commitments per capita,  𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables, while 𝛽 is 
the vector of associated parameters, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a normally distributed error term 
and 𝛿𝑡  is the year fixed effects. For the values of 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 >0, the allocation 
equation is estimated. 
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With Tobit models, the question always arises whether to present 
coefficients or marginal effects for the observed outcome variable. Coefficients 
can be interpreted as the marginal effects with respect to the underlying 
latent variable, which is unobserved when aid commitments are zero. This is a 
useful interpretation of the latent variable as the donors’ willingness to spend 
(which can also be negative). This willingness is precisely what this analysis 
aims to focus on when assessing donor motives. Therefore, estimated 
coefficients are presented. 
4.4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 4-1 shows the results for the estimations relating to mitigation aid 
allocation. Model 1 includes only the variables of the standard aid allocation 
model. GDP per capita is negatively related to the allocation of mitigation aid 
just as it usually is in the standard model. An increase in GDP per capita by 
1% leads to a decrease of mitigation aid by equally 1%. An increase of the 
population by 1% leads to an increase in mitigation aid by about 3.5%. In the 
standard aid allocation framework, this would be interpreted as a clear donor 
orientation at recipient needs.  
The recipient merit variables are equally significant and point in the 
usual direction: Countries with better governance and political stability obtain 
more mitigation aid. In addition, there is some evidence for donor interest 
with aid being positively related to donor exports and to UN voting 
alignment. The effect of the latter is unexpectedly strong: A 10-percentage 
point increase in voting alignment leads to a doubling of aid. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is insignificant. Otherwise all outcomes resemble those of a 
typical aid allocation regression based on mixed donor motives combining the 
considerations of need, merit and interest. 
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However, as we deal with mitigation aid, donors interested in the 
effective use of their resources should not care so much for the poverty of the 
recipient, but about how efficiently this recipient would produce maximum 
emission reductions. This efficiency was expected to be positively correlated 
with GDP per capita and also with typical donor interest indicators such as 
exports and FDI. Therefore – as long as the specific mitigation efficiency 
variables are not included as controls – donor interest variables should have a 
greater positive effect than for other aid, and the effect of GDP per capita 
should be positive rather than negative.  
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Tab. 4-1: Determinants of mitigation aid 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
M itiga-
tion aid 
(log) 
GDP pc (log) -1.01* 0.29 -0.535 -0.20 -0.33 0.31 0.32 
(0.57) (0.51) (0.663) (0.64) (0.63) (0.68) (0.68) 
Population (log) 3.48*** 2.55*** 2.601*** 2.19*** 2.30*** 2.43*** 2.55*** 
(0.35) (0.37) (0.455) (0.41) (0.43) (0.45) (0.50) 
Bilateral ODA (log) 1.21*** 1.012** 0.81* 1.05** 0.79* 0.77* 
(0.38) (0.444) (0.48) (0.42) (0.45) (0.46) 
Civil liberties and 
political rights 
1.27*** 1.23*** 1.406*** 1.03*** 1.20*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 
(0.35) (0.30) (0.347) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
Political stability 1.34* 1.26** 1.240* 0.87 0.98 0.96 1.03 
(0.70) (0.61) (0.675) (0.66) (0.65) (0.66) (0.67) 
Exports (log) 0.17* 0.18** 0.18** 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.13 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
FDI 0.00 -0.00 0.0944 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.10 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
UN voting with USA 10.33*** 7.94*** 5.790* 4.64 5.16* 5.63* 5.69* 
(2.83) (2.67) (2.96) (3.10) (2.85) (3.05) (3.05) 
DNA dummy 4.35*** 3.37*** 3.44*** 3.47*** 
(1.00) (0.95) (0.99) (0.99) 
MAC (log) -0.42 
(0.33) 
Electricity from coal 0.03* 0.05** 0.05** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Kyoto operational 7.46*** 7.42*** 
(1.70) (1.70) 
CERs -2.64 
(5.21) 
CO2 emissions per GDP -0.09 0.04 
(2.57) (2.57) 
CO2 emissions pc -0.27 -0.28 
(0.17) (0.17) 
CERs (mean) -7.44 
(10.85) 
Log likelihood -3995.9 -3953.9 -2667.5 -2202.2 -2660.5 -2410.0 -2409.9 
Observations 1,443 1,408 888 721 888 809 809 
Number of left censored 
observations 
473 438 198 131 198 188 188 
Number of uncensored 
observations 
970 970 690 590 690 621 621 
Number of recipients  134 134 85 67 85 85 85 
Standard errors in parentheses; constant and year fixed effects included, but not shown. Note that 
differences between regression 2 and 5 are not driven by the reduction in the number of observations, 
see regression 3. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the presence of the local co-benefits, the negative coefficient of GDP 
per capita does not exclude that donors also care for mitigation efficiency. 
What should be observed in this case is a coefficient that is at least less 
negative than for other development assistance. To analyze the difference with 
respect to other aid, the Model 1 is re-estimated including a further control for 
other ODA (Model 2) to see if mitigation aid is driven more towards better-off 
countries than other ODA.  
Only very limited evidence was found for this. Mitigation aid seems to 
closely follow other aid in its allocation. Controlling for other aid, the 
coefficient of GDP per capita is not significant any more suggesting that 
mitigation aid is neither more nor less directed into poor countries than any 
other type of aid. However, exports and also UN voting alignment remain 
clearly significant. Within the traditional framework of aid allocation this 
would be interpreted as mitigation aid being somehow more strongly driven 
by donor interests than other aid.  
Whether this interpretation is correct or not is assessed by adding 
specific indicators for mitigation effectiveness in the following equations. In 
Model 3, the dummy for the existence of a designated national authority in 
the recipient country is added. As explained above, this DNA had to be set up 
by all countries that intended to participate in the generation and trade of 
CERs. More importantly, the measure for MAC was also introduced. What 
can be observed from the result is that the existence of a DNA leads to an 
increase in mitigation aid by a factor of 4.4. The results for the MAC are not 
significant.  However, a loss in significance of exports is observed indicating 
that there might have been a reduction in donor interest once controls for 
mitigation efficiency are introduced. Unfortunately, this reduction of 
significance in the export variable is driven by the loss of observations. 
84 
Moreover, the MAC variable does not vary across time. Therefore, in the next 
models, other variables reflecting mitigation efficiency of recipients have been 
used. For instance, the percentage of electricity produced from coal was 
included in addition to the DNA dummy. Both are positively and significantly 
related to mitigation aid. Having a DNA leads to an increase in mitigation aid 
by a factor of almost 3.5, and an additional percentage point of electricity 
produced from coal leads to a rise in mitigation aid by 3%. The consistently 
positive and substantive effect of having a DNA can be explained by the fact 
that a government will incur the cost of setting up and running a DNA only if 
it perceives that the country can offer attractive opportunities for the CDM. 
The existence of a DNA can therefore, be interpreted as a signal of efficient 
mitigation options. DNAs may also directly support the identification of 
efficient mitigation projects in the respective countries, which can then be 
funded either through the carbon market or through more traditional aid 
(Figueres 2004: 11).  
The additional mitigation-related variables considered in Models 4 and 
5 do not turn out to be significant, except for the control variable for the 
Kyoto Protocol being operational. This is also the case if when these variables 
are introduced individually, and instead of the two variables discussed above 
(not shown). As the generation of CERs could have provided a rather easy 
orientation for donors to figure out where efficiency would be high – almost as 
easy and, in fact, more informative than the mere existence of a DNA – the 
results suggest that donors have not fully started allocating their mitigation 
aid on the basis of cost-effectiveness.  
Yet, to some extent, they have, and this is enough to explain the 
previous result for export-related donor interests. The inclusion of the 
mitigation-related variables in Models 3-5 leads to a drop in the coefficient of 
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donor exports by about one third, and this coefficient is no more significant. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the traditional aid 
allocation model led to a misinterpretation of the initial equation: Once 
appropriate controls for mitigation efficiency are included, mitigation aid does 
not appear to be driven by donors’ export interests any more. Regarding 
donor interest, only the coefficient on voting alignment still remains high and 
significant. It is outside the scope of this study to explain why the relationship 
with UN voting is so much stronger for mitigation aid than for other aid.  
Next, a more direct comparison of mitigation aid, adaptation aid and 
general aid is presented. Table 4-2 first replicates Model 1 from the previous 
table, and then uses exactly the same set of traditional aid allocation variables 
for an estimation of adaptation aid (Model 2) and general ODA (Model 3). 
Models 4 and 5 are again for mitigation and adaptation aid, but they add 
some specific variables. In the case of Model 4, these are exactly the variables 
from the third regression of the previous table. (However, Model 4 does not 
include other ODA as a control, since the contrast between mitigation aid and 
general ODA in Table 4-2 is possible directly through the comparison across 
equations). In Model 5 the percentage of the land area with an elevation of 
5m or less above sea level, as a special indicator for adaptation needs is 
included. 
In line with the previous results, the comparison of the standard model 
for mitigation aid and the standard model for general ODA shows that the 
effect of GDP per capita is virtually identical. Differences appear in the 
stronger role of recipient merit and donor interest. However, as before, the 
significance of donor exports disappears when the special variables for 
mitigation efficiency are taken into account. Moreover, the coefficient of GDP 
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per capita drops substantially for mitigation aid when the special mitigation-
related variables are added in Equation 4, i.e., the positive correlation 
between aid and poverty becomes stronger. It should be noted, however, that 
the latter is primarily driven by the different set of observations as the 
number of observations drops substantially when adding the additional 
controls. 
Adaptation aid also shows a stronger recipient merit orientation than 
overall aid, but primarily, there is a striking difference in the effect of GDP 
per capita – with a coefficient more than three times as high in absolute terms 
as for mitigation aid (which makes sense when considering that mitigation 
efficiency is not positively related to poverty), but also for overall aid (which 
makes less sense since both should, in principle, be equally poverty oriented). 
This does not change when adding the additional indicator for adaptation 
needs in Equation 5. These results suggest that for adaptation aid, donors 
take recipient need much more seriously than for general aid. At the same 
time, there is no whatsoever indication of an effect of donor interest. FDI is 
significant, but not in the direction in line with a donor interest orientation: 
The greater the FDI inflows, the lower adaptation aid. If anything, this 
provides additional evidence for the role of recipient need. Generally, the 
results for adaptation aid are in line with those by Betzold & Weiler (2018) 
who focus on this particular topic. 
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Tab. 4-2:  Comparing aid types 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
M itigation 
aid (log) 
Adaptation 
aid (log) 
Bilateral 
ODA 
(log) 
M itigatio
n aid (log) 
Adaptation 
aid (log) 
GDP pc (log) -1.01* -3.66*** -0.93*** -2.02*** -3.68*** 
(0.57) (0.72) (0.27) (0.73) (0.71) 
Population (log) 3.48*** 2.21*** 0.85*** 3.41*** 2.50*** 
(0.35) (0.45) (0.15) (0.48) (0.47) 
Civil liberties and 
political rights 
1.27*** 1.23** 0.14 1.25*** 1.18** 
(0.35) (0.49) (0.14) (0.41) (0.48) 
Political stability 1.34* 1.26 0.32 1.27 1.25 
(0.70) (1.10) (0.24) (0.79) (1.09) 
Exports (log) 0.17* 0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.09 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) 
FDI 0.00 -0.07* -0.00 0.07 -0.07* 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) 
UN voting with USA 10.33*** 0.51 0.94 6.94** 0.28 
(2.83) (4.13) (0.88) (3.18) (4.09) 
DNA dummy 2.47** 
(1.01) 
Electricity from coal 0.04* 
(0.02) 
Land area<5m 0.09* 
(0.05) 
Log likelihood -3995.96 -1218.08 -3627.56 -2699.10 -1216.25 
Observations 1443 395 1443 921 395 
Number of left censored 
observations 
473 85 35 231 85 
Number of uncensored 
observations 
970 310 1408 690 310 
Number of recipient 
countries 
134 132 134 85 132 
Standard errors in parentheses; constant and year fixed effects included, but not shown. Here, the 
drop in the sample size in Regression 4 makes up for most of the difference with Regression 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
However, the available data for adaptation aid cover only four years. 
Some of the insignificant results may thus be driven by the relatively small 
number of observations and / or by a generally stronger need-orientation in 
recent years. 
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Table 4-3 confirms this suspicion. It replicates Table 4-2 but with all 
time-series starting only in 2010. Exports lose significance throughout, and the 
negative relationship between GDP per capita and aid flows is stronger than 
before for mitigation aid and total ODA. Yet, the absolute value of the 
coefficient for GDP per capita is still substantially higher for adaptation aid. 
When comparing mitigation and adaptation aid once mitigation specific 
efficiency variables are controlled for, there is no apparent difference with 
respect to recipient merit and donor interest, apart from the surprisingly 
strong and robust effect of UN voting alignment for mitigation aid. The main 
effect remains in the role of GDP per capita. This difference is in line with the 
different character of the two goods: mitigation as a global public good for 
which the neediness of the project location should only matter with respect to 
local co-benefits, and adaptation as a private or local public good where the 
neediness of the location directly drives the relevance and the efficiency of the 
intervention.  
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Tab. 4-3:  Comparing aid types, restricted samples: 2010 – 2013 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the empirical problems that the traditional 
aid allocation literature faces when aid addresses climate change mitigation. 
Mitigation of climate change is non-excludable and therefore, drives a wedge 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
M itigation 
aid (log) 
Adaptation 
aid (log) 
Bilateral 
ODA 
(log) 
M itigatio
n aid (log) 
Adaptation 
aid (log) 
GDP pc (log) -1.90*** -3.66*** -1.69*** -2.21*** -3.68*** 
(0.65) (0.72) (0.39) (0.85) (0.71) 
Population (log) 2.37*** 2.21*** 0.90*** 2.24*** 2.50*** 
(0.41) (0.45) (0.24) (0.56) (0.47) 
Civil liberties and 
political rights 
1.49*** 1.23** 0.17 1.56*** 1.18** 
(0.44) (0.49) (0.24) (0.50) (0.48) 
Political stability 0.64 1.26 -0.08 -0.75 1.25 
(1.00) (1.10) (0.54) (1.10) (1.09) 
Exports (log) 0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.00 0.09 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11) 
FDI (% GDP) -0.09*** -0.07* -0.01 0.06 -0.07* 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.10) (0.04) 
UN voting with USA 1.65 0.51 0.25 -1.27 0.29 
(3.62) (4.13) (1.63) (4.20) (4.09) 
DNA dummy 4.14** 
(1.97) 
Electricity from coal 0.06** 
(0.03) 
Land area<5m 0.09* 
(0.05) 
Log likelihood -1227.76 -1218.08 -1028.88 -772.52 -1216.25 
Observations 395 395 395 252 395 
Number of left censored 
observations 
65 85 14 34 85 
Number of uncensored 
observations 
330 310 381 218 310 
Number of recipient 
countries 
132 132 132 84 132 
Standard errors in parentheses; constant and year fixed effects included, but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
90 
between the location where the project is implemented, and the location where 
the benefits arise. Hence, to be effective, mitigation aid should not flow to 
places with the greatest needs, but to places where these needs can be served 
best through an efficient provision of this global public good. This creates a 
fundamental conceptual problem for the aid allocation literature and the 
related effort to hold donors accountable for their motives and, eventually, for 
the effectiveness of their aid. Donors allocating their aid in line with criteria 
suggesting the efficiency of mitigation projects will be wrongly accused of 
allocating aid in their own interest, specifically with respect to donor exports 
(which are positively correlated to the criteria of efficient mitigation). The 
misunderstanding is based on an omitted variable bias that disappears when 
variables accounting for mitigation efficiency are included in the model. This 
analysis finds that donors do not very clearly differentiate their mitigation 
related aid allocation criteria from the criteria for general ODA leading to 
reduced allocation efficiency.  
Since this chapter is based on aggregate aid flows from donors, it is not 
possible to distinguish between individual donors. It is quite probable that 
some donors are more efficient than others. Such nuances between individual 
donors are hidden in this analysis with aggregate aid flows. Therefore, in the 
next chapter, individual efficiency of donors allocating mitigation aid is 
empirically investigated using a 3-dimensional panel model with the added 
donor dimension. The focus there is only on mitigation aid rather than 
adaptation aid since it is addressing a global public good and therefore, not 
following the normally assumed objectives of development aid. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1: Variable description and sources 
Categories Variable Definition M ean 
Std. 
Dev. 
M in M ax Source 
Mitigation aid (log) 
Log of climate change related ODA for the primary purpose of 
mitigation (2012 constant prices, USD millions) 
14.00 10.12 0.00 28.71 OECD (2015) 
Aid 
commitments 
Adaptation aid (log) 
Log of climate change related ODA for the primary purpose of 
adaptation (2012 constant prices, USD millions) 
4.54 8.75 0.00 26.59 OECD (2015) 
Bilateral ODA (log) 
Bilateral ODA, total commitments. When this variable is used as 
a control in the estimations for mitigation and adaptation aid, the 
aid flows in the specific areas (for mitigation or adaptation 
respectively) are subtracted. 
5.65 1.44 -0.75 10.05 OECD (2015) 
Recipient GDP pc (log) Log of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2011 international $) 8.51 1.02 6.20 10.77 World Bank (2015) 
need Population (log) Log of total population of the recipient countries 15.48 2.14 9.89 21.02 World Bank (2015) 
Recipient 
merit 
Civil liberties & 
political rights 
Average of Freedom House index of civil liberties and political 
rights, reversed scale (7= greatest freedom) 
4.26 1.71 1.00 7.00 
Quality of Government 
Institute (2015) 
Political stability 
estimate 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood that a government will be 
overthrown by unconstitutional and/or violent means  
-0.33 0.92 -3.18 1.54 
Quality of Government 
Institute (2015) 
Donor 
interest 
Exports (log) 
Exports made by donors to the recipient countries (values in '000 
USD)  
10.73 6.58 0.00 20.35 OECD (2015) 
FDI inward Net inflows of foreign direct investment to the recipient county 6.07 16.22 -82.93 366.36 World Bank (2015) 
UN voting with USA 
Measurement of whether a recipient country votes in agreement 
with the United States on important UN votes 
0.38 0.18 0.00 1.00 Kilby (2011) 
Mitigation 
efficiency 
Electricity from coal 
Electricity produced in recipient countries from coal sources (% of 
total electricity produced) 
13.21 25.43 0.00 100.00 World Bank (2015) 
DNA dummy 
 Dummy for whether a country has a designated national 
authority (DNA) - which is the organization granted responsibility 
to authorize and approve participation in CDM projects 
0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 UNFCCC (2015) 
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Categories Variable Definition M ean 
Std. 
Dev. 
M in M ax Source 
CERs 
Author's calculation of the proportion of the recipient country's 
certified emission reductions in relation to the total number of 
certified emission reductions generated in that year 
0.01 0.07 0.00 0.80 CDM pipeline (2015) 
CERs (mean) 
Author's calculation of the mean of the proportion of the recipient 
country's certified emission reductions in relation to the total 
number of certified emission reductions generated in that year 
0.01 0.05 0.00 0.40 CDM pipeline (2015) 
CO2 emissions per 
GDP 
CO2 emissions (kg per PPP $ of GDP) 0.30 0.26 0.04 1.94 World Bank (2015) 
CO2 emissions pc CO2 emissions per capita (in metric tons) 2.90 4.30 0.03 38.34 World Bank (2015) 
Kyoto operational Dummy for year≥2005 when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
needs 
Land area<5m 
Land area below 5m as the percentage of total land in the 
recipient countries, where the elevation is 5 meters or less. 
7.04 15.91 0.00 100.00 World Bank (2015) 
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Chapter 5 
Misinterpreted or Careless: How
Do Individual Donors Allocate 
Their Mitigation Aid?
This chapter follows closely from the previous chapter where aggregate 
donors’ climate aid allocation was analyzed. The results indicated that 
overall, donors have not yet adjusted their aid allocation decisions to cater to 
efficient allocation. However, it is possible that some donors are more efficient 
than others. Understanding individual donors’ efficiency is not feasible in the 
two-dimensional setting used in the previous chapter. Therefore, in this 
chapter a three-dimensional panel model has been used to further investigate 
individual donors’ decisions. This analysis will shed light on which donors are 
efficient but misinterpreted and which ones are simply careless in their 
allocation.  
So far, the literature comparing actual donor types has been somewhat 
limited.  A few studies focus on donor types that explain the differences in aid 
policies of different donors such as the European Commission or the United 
States (Tsoutsoplides, 1991, Schraeder, et al., 1998, Fleck & Kilby, 2001; 
Fleck & Kilby, 2006; Fleck & Kilby, 2010). Berthélemy & Tichit, (2004), and 
Berthélemy, (2006) were two of the first few empirical studies which 
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investigate determinants of aid allocation taking into consideration the donor-
recipient pair specific characteristics in the form of a three-dimensional panel 
analysis. They find that typically poorer countries receive from aid but donors 
such as France, Japan, and the United States are egoistic and export oriented 
while the Nordic donors are more altruistic in their allocation behavior. There 
have been also studies comparing the allocation behavior of the ‘old’ OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and the ‘new’ non-DAC 
donors (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2011b) revealing that the new donors 
are less poverty oriented than the old ones. Some other studies have, for 
instance, looked at donor political ideology and how this impacts aid flows 
(Tingley, 2010, Brech & Potrafke, 2014; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & 
Schmaljohann, 2015b). Focusing particularly on environmental aid from U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. foundations, and a 
multilateral donor, the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), Lewis (2003) finds 
that donors allocate more aid to countries with which they already had 
relations, democratic countries and those with unexploited natural resources.  
There has also been significant research on aggregate donor behavior, 
which has already been discussed in detail in chapter 4, and is therefore, not 
presented here. However, from the literature review, it is evident that no 
studies have tried to understand individual donors’ decisions for the case of 
climate change. In addition, none of the studies have demonstrated how 
donors run a risk of being misinterpreted in the traditional aid allocation 
framework unless mitigation efficiency is controlled for. The chapter is based 
on joint work with Katharina Michaelowa and Paula Castro (Bagchi et al., 
2016). 
5.1 Empirical Approach 
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Each donor may follow different objectives through their allocation of 
mitigation aid. The varieties of motives that impede efficient allocation were 
already discussed in sufficient detail in chapter 3 and in the literature review 
section of chapter 4. Referring to the argument already made in the previous 
chapter, emerging economies usually have higher income and growth and are 
interesting markets for donor exports and FDI: hence aid flows to these 
countries would be understood as interest oriented and donors can be 
misinterpreted in the traditional framework of the aid allocation literature. 
Similarly, donors may not care so much about allocation efficiency of 
mitigation aid and simply allocate it the way they do other development aid, 
i.e. on the basis of need (indicated by poverty of the recipient). Therefore, in 
this chapter, the aim is to uncover exactly which individual donor belongs to 
which typology based on their motivation. Two types of donors are analyzed 
here: 
M isinterpreted donors – These donors who seem to be motivated by donor 
interest, i.e. selfishness, will initially exhibit a positive correlation between 
mitigation aid and donor interest variables, which will change once controls 
for mitigation efficiency is introduced.  
Careless donors - These donors do not differentiate their aid allocation 
depending on the purpose and may not have spent much effort in considering 
where mitigation aid would be most cost-effective. Their aid allocation should, 
hence, follow very similar criteria no matter whether we look at mitigation, 
adaptation, or overall aid. Careless donors may either be driven by need of 
the recipient (i.e. they do not care about efficient allocation of mitigation aid 
and prefers a poverty-based allocation) or be selfish, (i.e. controlling for 
mitigation efficiency does not change the positive correlation between 
mitigation aid and donor interest variables).  
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The findings from this empirical analysis can then be compared to the 
donors discussed in chapter 3 to understand whether donors who claim to 
allocate their mitigation aid on the basis of existing cost-effectiveness criteria 
are also the same ones that are efficient but misinterpreted in this analysis. 
5.1.1 Data 
The data used are similar to the data used in the previous chapter. The 
difference here is that the panel data has three dimensions instead of two, i.e. 
the donor dimension has been added to recipient and year. For the dependent 
variable, OECD/DAC data on official development assistance (ODA) for 
mitigation aid are used. Again, commitments rather than disbursement are 
used. Since the data structure was different here, compared to the previous 
chapter, some new explanatory variables (notably for mitigation efficiency) 
and a slightly modified econometric approach have been used in this analysis.  
The first group of explanatory variables pertaining to the traditional 
framework is the same as used in chapter 4 with one change. Since the donor 
dimension has been added to this panel, the variable measuring UN voting 
interest now represents each individual donor instead of just the United 
States, as in the previous analysis. Other variables used are the same as 
before. These are GDP per capita, population, combined measure of political 
rights and civil liberties, political stability and exports from donors to 
recipients. 
For measures relating to mitigation efficiency, similar to the approach 
adopted in chapter 4, a variable representing marginal abatement cost (MAC) 
has been used. As mentioned before, the variable suffers from the problem 
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that it does not vary across time. Therefore, other measures to proxy for 
mitigation efficiency were used. These were energy use (in kg of oil 
equivalent), absolute CO2 emissions and a variable reflecting certified emission 
reductions (CERs) related to CDM projects in a country in a given year was 
also added. Also similar to the variables used in chapter 4, electricity 
production from coal sources (% of total electricity produced), dummy for the 
existence of designated national authority’ (DNA) and a dummy for the 
Kyoto Protocol was also included. 
5.1.2 Estimation Strategy 
The estimation strategy is similar to that in the previous chapter but with 
some modifications. Here, panel estimation methods for a three-dimensional 
Tobit model with donor X recipient X year dimension were used. A few 
different steps were followed to determine the efficiency of each donor. In a 
first step, some models with all the donors were estimated with donor and 
year fixed effects. On the basis of these models, in the next step, an 
interaction term with donor dummies and the export term were created. 
Then, the export elasticities of each individual donor before and after 
controlling for mitigation efficiency were estimated using the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) approach. A SUR system comprises of several 
individual equations that are associated with each other owing to linkages 
between their disturbances (Moon and Perron, 2006). That is, although the 
equations may not be linked structurally, they can be linked statistically 
through the jointness of the distribution of the error terms, which can be 
explained by the structure of the SUR model and the covariance matrix of the 
associated disturbances. The SUR model therefore, can be used to test cross-
model hypotheses in cases where the individual equations are actually related 
to each other but on the surface might not seem to be. 
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After the model estimations, Wald tests are performed to compare the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction terms and to see whether indeed a 
reduction can be observed in the size and significance after controlling for 
mitigation efficiency. When we observe that the difference between the two 
coefficient estimates of the interaction term before and after controlling for 
mitigation efficiency is positive and significant, the donors are classified as 
misinterpreted, while the rest is grouped as careless. This should give an idea 
of which donors are truly efficient in their allocation but misinterpreted owing 
to an omitted variable bias, while which ones are actually careless in their 
allocation. These donors were then compared to the ones in chapter 3, to see if 
donor rhetoric indeed matches their actions, i.e. donors who claim to use the 
cost-effectiveness indicator are actually using it.  
The dependent variable–mitigation aid commitments–is censored at 
zero since countries do not receive aid from all individual donors in each year. 
Therefore, similar to the econometric approach in chapter 4, the censored 
nature of the dependent variable was taken into account by the use of a Tobit 
model. As already discussed in chapter 4, recipient fixed effects with the Tobit 
model would have been likely biased due to the small number of observations 
per recipient creating the incidental parameters problem. Furthermore, 
variation across recipients is also theoretically more important than within 
recipients especially for those variables that change comparatively slowly over 
time (Bermeo, 2017).  Such variation cannot be assessed if we included 
recipient-specific fixed effects. 
It was also possible to use dyad (donor recipient) fixed effects and year 
fixed effects given that we have three dimensions. However, if fixed effects 
were included all the three dimensions, Tobit estimates produced would very 
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likely, be biased due to the short time panel. Therefore, here also a Tobit with 
a random effects specification is used. Several other studies have also used this 
approach (see, for example, Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Nunnenkamp & 
Thiele, 2006). However, year and donor fixed effects are systematically 
included. Year fixed effects are essential as both mitigation aid and GDP per 
capita show a significant upward trend over the years, which would lead to a 
spurious correlation if omitted. Donor fixed effects ensures that any 
unobservable differences between the donors do not affect our estimation 
results.  
The coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects with respect 
to the underlying latent variable, which is unobserved when aid commitments 
are zero. Keeping with the logic discussed in the previous chapter, the 
coefficients rather than the marginal effects are presented. 
5.1.3 Empirical Results 
Average aid allocation behavior  
Table 5-1 shows the results for our estimations with respect to the allocation 
of mitigation aid. Model 1 is based on Equation (2) but excludes ODA. As we 
deal with aid for mitigation, donors most interested in the effective use of 
their resources should not care so much for the poverty of the recipient, but 
about how efficiently this recipient would produce the public good. As long as 
mitigation efficiency was not controlled for, mitigation aid and GDP per 
capita as well as donor interest variables would have a positive correlation. 
Conforming to the findings in the two-dimensional panel in the previous 
chapter, here also a negative effect was observed. Here too, the negative 
coefficient of GDP per capita does not exclude that donors also care for 
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mitigation efficiency given the associated co-benefits. Moreover, as the findings 
revealed in the chapter 3, donors may also try to efficient by allocating aid to 
their partner countries that may be poor, owing to existing relationships or be 
inefficient due to their aid policies prioritizing poor countries.  
Models with other controls were also estimated. For instance, in Model 
2 a further control for ODA was added and the results show that the 
coefficient of GDP per capita is not significant anymore suggesting that 
mitigation aid is neither more nor less directed into poor countries than any 
other type of aid. However, exports and also UN voting alignment remain 
clearly significant. Within the traditional framework of aid allocation this 
would be interpreted as mitigation aid being somehow more strongly driven 
by donor interests than other aid. Specific indicators for mitigation 
effectiveness were then added to assess whether this interpretation is correct 
in Models 3 and 4. A reduction in the significance as well as size of the export 
coefficient in Model 3 is observed. In Model 4, the export coefficient 
completely loses its significance while the UN voting variable becomes much 
less significant and smaller in size than before. To check whether these results 
are driven by a loss of observations, Model 2 is re-estimated with the same 
sample size as Model 4 and it can be seen that the exports coefficient remain 
significant in the smaller subsample (see Model 3). So, the reduction in the 
significance of exports in Model 4 is not entirely driven by the reduction in 
sample size. The reduction in the significance of UN voting, however, is driven 
by the loss of observations. Once mitigation efficiency concerns are controlled 
for, mitigation aid does not appear to be driven by donors’ export interests 
any more. 
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Tab. 5-1:  Average aid allocation behavior of all donors (year FE – donor FE) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables M odel 
M 1
M odel 
M 2
M odel 
M 3
M odel 
M 4
M odel 
M 5 GDP per capita (log) -1.929*** 0.125 0.236 0.435 0.793** 
(0.00) (0.55) (0.41) (0.62) (0.02) 
Population (log) 3.820*** 2.513*** 2.175*** 2.901*** 2.592*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Other ODA (log) 3.546*** 3.647*** 3.588*** 3.688*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political stability 2.443*** 2.710*** 2.525*** 2.388*** 2.183*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Civil liberties and political 
rights
1.079*** 0.971*** 0.501*** 0.305* 0.794*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) 
Exports (log) 0.477*** 0.264*** 0.112** 0.108 0.128* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) 
Agreement in the UN 8.916*** 6.115*** 9.762*** 6.089* -0.083 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.98) 
Kyoto operational 13.823*** 13.509*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
DNA dummy 3.889*** 4.152*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
CERs (log) 0.314*** 0.275*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
MAC (log) 0.322*** 0.467** 
(0.00) (0.02) 
Energy use (in kg of oil 
equivalent) (log)
-1.765** 
(0.02) 
CO2 emissions (in kt) (log) 0.834 
(0.21) 
Electricity from coal (% of 
total)
0.028** 
(0.02) 
Constant -95.388*** -89.659*** -86.185*** -75.376*** 100.337**
* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 38,208 38,208 21,336 17,064 17,064 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of uncensored 
observations 3216 3216 2439 1756 1756 
Number of left censored 
observations 34992 34992 18897 15308 15308 
Log likelihood -19185 -18567 -13402 -9729 -9770 
Notes: Tobit models used for estimation 
P-value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note that difference between equation 2 
and 4 not driven by reduction in sample size since model 5 (estimated with a reduced sample size 
still shows exports to be significant). 
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Comparison between individual donors  
Estimating these individual models presented in table 5-1 was the first step on 
the basis of which SUR models were estimated. As discussed in the empirical 
section, some donors may be more driven by efficiency concerns than others. 
Furthermore, when donors are actually efficient, they may be misinterpreted 
as being selfish. This makes it necessary to test for differences between 
individual donors to understand which donors are actually misinterpreted to 
be selfish and which ones are actually careless in their allocation. To do this, 
following Berthélemy (2006), the analysis focuses on the export coefficient as 
an important indicator of donor interest. A new explanatory variable is 
introduced deﬁned by interacting a dummy for each donor with the export 
variable in equation 2 and 4. The aim is to test whether an interaction term 
with the export coefficient for every donor is significantly different from zero 
before and after controlling for mitigation efficiency. Tobit regressions are 
then estimated with the interaction term between exports and donor dummies 
in model 2 (no mitigation efficiency controls) and model 4 (with efficiency 
controls) from the previous table. Donor and year fixed effects are included.  
After estimating each of these equations and storing the estimation 
results, STATA’s suest command was used to examine cross-model hypothesis 
after which the test command was used to perform Wald tests. Therefore, 
once the SUR models are estimated, Wald tests were then performed on this 
interaction term to understand whether it is significantly different from zero. 
The results are presented in table 5-2 below. The overall result indicates that 
there are some differences between the individual donors. Based on the 
findings, classifications of donors exhibiting similar aid allocation behavior 
were made. Column 1 in table 5-2 presents the coefficient of the interaction 
term before controlling for mitigation efficiency and column 2, after. Column 3 
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presents the difference in the magnitude of the two coefficients presented in 
column 1 and 2 along with its significance level. Based on the findings in 
column 2 and 3, the donors are classified (in decreasing order of magnitude of 
the difference between the aforementioned interaction terms before and after 
controlling for mitigation efficiency) as follows: 
Misinterpreted donors – If the values calculated in column 3 are positive and 
significant, donors classified as misinterpreted. This means that for these 
donors, before we control for mitigation efficiency, donors initially seemed to 
be export oriented. After introducing mitigation efficiency related controls, 
this interaction term then becomes loses significance completely or becomes 
negatively significant. Take the case of Austria. The estimations for Austria 
reflect a positive interaction term with donor exports before controlling for 
mitigation efficiency and a negative interaction term after controlling for 
mitigation. Furthermore, the significance level of this difference in the 
interaction term is also high (see column 4). However, for some donors such as 
Denmark and France, a reduction in the coefficient of the interaction term is 
observed, after introducing the controls for mitigation efficiency. The results 
for France, match Berthelemy’s (2006) finding that it is an egoistic and self-
interested donor but in this case, it is misinterpreted to be overly selfish. The 
results for Denmark are in contrast to his findings, because here some 
evidence of selfishness can be observed while in his analysis, Denmark, being a 
Nordic donor was classified as being altruistic. 
Careless donors - Careless donors can be classified in two types. First, they 
can be export oriented and not care about efficiency. Second, they can be 
need-oriented but also not export oriented, indicated by their lack of 
significance of the interaction term before controlling for mitigation efficiency 
(in column 1) and after controlling for it (in column 2). This is clear for the 
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case of donors such as Canada or Ireland where the interaction term is not 
even significant, both before and after controlling for mitigation efficiency.  
Conforming to the findings in the previous chapter, in this analysis also 
we see that there is significant variation among the efficiency levels of donors. 
Only by appropriately controlling for mitigation efficiency, this 
misinterpretation can be reduced. Some parallels from this analysis can be 
drawn to the findings of the existing literature and those in chapter 3.  
Nordic donors are traditionally considered be altruistic and not driven 
by their selfish interests. In this analysis, Nordic donors such as Denmark was 
found to be overly misinterpreted, indicating that controlling for mitigation 
efficiency leads to the prevention of misinterpretation but does not preclude 
that selfish interests still exist for them. Finland, is also found to be careless. 
Secondly, contrasting with existing literature which finds donors like Japan, 
Germany, Belgium, to be driven by selfish interests (see Berthélemy 2006), 
this analysis actually finds them to be misinterpreted. France, similar to the 
case of Denmark, was found to be overly misinterpreted to be selfish rather 
than careless. Some donors like Australia are driven more by selfish interests 
rather than efficiency.  
Some donors who said that they allocate their mitigation aid on the 
basis of cost-effectiveness and have publicly available criteria are mostly the 
ones that are indeed revealed as misinterpreted in this analysis. For example, 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan all have well defined criteria in 
terms of effectiveness of mitigation aid. An exception is Switzerland, which 
also claims to allocate its aid on the basis of effectiveness but is found to be 
careless here. Donors like Australia as identified as selfish in previous 
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literature and says that they do not have any separate criteria for allocating 
their mitigation aid, is also found to be careless in their allocation. Many 
donors for whom no publicly available allocation criteria with respect to 
mitigation aid were found in chapter 3—such as Canada, Ireland, Poland, 
Finland, Portugal—are the ones which are shown to be indeed careless in their 
allocation. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 3, countries like Canada 
anyway claims that their climate aid allocation focuses on small island states 
or poor countries in Africa and this is clearly reflected in the quantitative 
analysis. These countries, due to their low abatement potential are not the 
most efficient location for mitigation. Clearly, considerations other than 
efficiency drive their allocation decisions regarding mitigation aid. 
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Tab. 5-2: Comparing export elasticities for individual donors 
Donor 
(1) 
Before efficiency 
control 
(2) 
After 
efficiency 
control 
(3) 
Difference in 
coefficients 
(4) 
Donor 
characteristic 
Austria 0.42** -0.40* 0.81*** Misinterpreted 
Luxembourg -0.17 -0.92** 0.75*** Misinterpreted 
Netherlands 1.05** 0.39 0.66*** Misinterpreted 
Denmark 1.31*** 0.66** 0.65*** Misinterpreted 
Belgium 0.46* -0.08 0.54*** Misinterpreted 
Norway 0.36** -0.17 0.53*** Misinterpreted 
France 0.84*** 0.53** 0.32** Misinterpreted 
Sweden 0.83*** 0.40 0.40*** Misinterpreted 
Spain 0.60*** 0.21 0.40*** Misinterpreted 
Germany 0.31** 0.13 0.17* Misinterpreted 
Japan 0.36*** 0.20 0.16* Misinterpreted 
Canada 0.24 0.1 0.14 Careless 
Ireland 0.19 0.05 0.15 Careless 
Italy 0.43** 0.38 0.05 Careless 
Greece -0.052*** 0.18 -0.7* Careless 
Korea -0.54*** 0.04 -0.58*** Careless 
Australia -0.24 0.25 -0.48*** Careless 
Poland 1.82* 2.12 -0.3 Careless 
Switzerland 0.83*** 1.13*** -0.3 Careless 
Finland -0.37 -0.21 -0.16 Careless 
Portugal 0.28 1.77** -0.15 Careless 
Note: Three donors could not be estimated owing to collinearity issues, Tobit models with 
donor-year fixed effects used in the estimations. P-value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
Donors allocating their aid in line with criteria suggesting the efficiency of 
mitigation projects will be wrongly accused of allocating aid in their own 
interest, specifically with respect to donor exports (which are positively 
correlated to the criteria of efficient mitigation). The misunderstanding is 
based on an omitted variable bias that disappears when variables accounting 
for mitigation efficiency are included in the model. Furthermore, the 
elasticities of individual donors, before and after controlling for mitigation 
efficiency, was also tested. Using seemingly unrelated regressions, which 
donors are misinterpreted when they are actually being efficient and which 
ones are careless in their allocation was established. No analysis has so far, 
studied individual donors’ efficiency in allocation of mitigation aid and related 
misinterpretation concerns. 
The findings from chapters 3 – 5, shows that overall donors often have 
considerations that are often not in line with the expectation that climate aid 
be allocated on the basis of efficiency consideration.  Most bilateral donors do 
not even have transparent/publicly available targeting criteria for their aid 
allocation. Some donors continue to allocate their aid the way they do other 
development aid. However, the analysis also shows that donors are sometimes 
selfish which is why it is important to understand whether climate aid is used 
to promote the donors’ strategic objectives, in the international climate 
change negotiations. Again, the conceptual difference between mitigation aid 
(addressing a global public good) and adaptation aid (addressing a local 
public good) becomes relevant and the reason why they may be used 
differently in the negotiations. Using a novel dataset on climate change 
negotiation behavior, such considerations are explored in the next chapter. 
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Appendix C 
Variable description and sources 
Categories Variable Definition M ea
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
M in M ax Source 
Aid 
commitments 
Mitigation 
aid (log) 
Log of climate change related 
ODA for the primary purpose 
of mitigation (2012 constant 
prices, USD millions) 
0.96 3.44 0 21.68 OECD 
(2015) 
Recipient need 
GDP pc (log) Log of GDP per capita (PPP, 
constant 2011 international $) 
8.54 1.01 6.19 10.79 World Bank 
(2015) 
Population 
(log) 
Log of total population of the 
recipient countries 
15.11 2.54 7.08 21.02 World Bank 
(2015) 
Recipient merit 
Civil liberties 
& political 
rights 
Average of Freedom House 
index of civil liberties and 
political rights, reversed scale 
(7= greatest freedom) in 
recipient countries 
4.19 1.81 1 7 Freedom 
House 
(2016) 
Political 
stability 
estimate 
Measures perceptions of the 
likelihood that a government 
will be overthrown by 
unconstitutional and/or violent 
means in recipient countries 
-0.33 0.94 -3.32 1.54 Worldwide 
governance 
indicator 
(2015) 
Donor interest 
Exports (log) Exports made by donors to the 
recipient countries (values in 
'000 USD)  
10.73 6.53 0 18.9 OECD 
(2015) 
UN voting 
with donors 
Measurement of whether a 
recipient country votes in 
agreement with the donors on 
UN votes 
0.74 0.16 0 1 Kilby (2011) 
Mitigation 
efficiency 
Marginal 
abatement 
costs (log) 
Cost of reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions measured in USD 
per ton of Carbon 
6.15 2.33 0 8.81 Murty 
(2016) 
Kyoto 
operational 
Dummy for year≥2005 when 
the Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force 
0.75 0.43 0 1 Own 
calculation 
CERs (log) Author's calculation of total 
certified emission reductions 
received by the recipient in 
that year 
0.83 2.23 0 12.4 CDM 
pipeline 
(2016) 
DNA dummy  Dummy for whether a country 
has a designated national 
authority (DNA) - which is the 
organization granted 
responsibility to authorize and 
approve participation in CDM 
projects 
0.53 0.49 0 1 UNFCCC 
(2015) 
Energy use 
(in kg of oil 
equivalent) 
(log) 
Energy use refers to use of 
primary energy before 
transformation to other end-
use fuels in the recipient 
countries 
22.76 2.04 15.89 28.73 World Bank 
(2015) 
CO2 
emissions 
(log) 
CO2 emissions (in kilo tons) in 
the recipient countries in a 
given year 
8.59 2.4 3.69 16.01 World Bank 
(2015) 
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Chapter 6 
Buying support in international 
negotiations: The strategic use of 
climate aid
This chapter explores whether climate aid is used strategically to influence the 
climate change negotiations held at the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. First, it looks at 
whether it is the access to climate aid or changes in its amount that affect 
recipients’ statements in favor of the donors. Second, it tries to understand 
which type of aid is used to elicit support from the recipient. Based on the 
conceptual difference between mitigation and adaptation discussed in chapter 
2, one can expect that aid for both can have distinct strategic advantages. 
Differences between mitigation aid, catering to a global public good, and 
adaptation aid, addressing a local public good, can lead to dissimilarities in 
the way each type of aid is used. The anticipation is that mitigation aid is less 
suitable for strategic use (to bribe or reward recipients in exchange of support 
in the negotiations) since recipients will reap only a small part of the benefits. 
Lastly, this chapter studies whether donors are trying to avoid negative 
statements or to promote positive ones. The work is based on joint research 
with Katharina Michaelowa and Paula Castro (see Bagchi et al., 2017). 
6.1 Introduction 
The strategic allocation of development aid is well documented in the existing 
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literature on UN voting. Through the strategic use of aid, donor countries 
induce aid recipient countries to vote in line with their positions on important 
issues discussed at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Dreher et 
al., 2008) or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Kuziemko & 
Werker, 2006). This literature has so far been limited to international 
organizations in which decision-making is based on majority voting. However, 
consensus rather than majority voting is the most common decision-making 
rule in international politics (McKibben 2013, 416). Even in organizations like 
UNGA that also use majority voting, most decisions are taken by consensus 
(Häge and Hug 2016). In this chapter, it is argued that using aid or more 
specifically, climate aid strategically should be relevant in the context of 
international climate change negotiations, to ensure support or avoid 
opposition even when there are no formal votes. Motives can range from 
pushing forward a certain agenda, to avoiding public criticism that may put 
the donor’s government in a negative light in the international media and 
influence national constituents.  
Since decisions in the climate change negotiations are taken by 
consensus formal votes play a less important role than positional statements 
within the negotiations. A new dataset by Castro (2017) describing 
negotiation behavior under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is used to assess statements of support and 
opposition towards other parties’ positions, rather than voting. At regular 
meetings of the UNFCCC bodies, country delegates negotiate a wide variety 
of climate-related issues ranging from implementation and monitoring of the 
performance of existing measures and agreements, to the preparation of new 
agreements relating to mitigation, adaptation, the provision of financial and 
technical support, among others. Based on the summaries of these negotiation 
meetings published in the Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENBs), instances in 
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which one country agrees with or opposes the positions expressed by its peers, 
as well as the negotiation issue to which this support or opposition relates, is 
recorded.  
On this basis, attempts are made to identify the role of aid as a 
strategic tool in a country’s negotiation strategy.2 Does access to climate aid 
affect a recipient’s behavior towards the donors? If yes, are donors trying to 
avoid negative statements or to promote positive ones? To understand this, it 
is also important to see whether this any aid, or only such funding that is 
directly related to the area under negotiation aid for the adaptation to or the 
mitigation of global climate change?  
This chapter contributes significantly to the existing climate aid 
literature. It is one of the first studies to combine the climate negotiations 
perspective with that of climate finance to show how the former can be 
influenced in a setting of consensus-type decision-making using a novel dataset 
on negotiation behavior. Secondly, this chapter makes a first attempt to 
create an empirical measurement of support of donors using the best and 
perhaps only dataset on negotiation behavior available, which can have 
several important implications for researchers working on the topic of climate 
finance as well as for climate negotiators and policymakers. Thirdly, so far, 
there has been a lacuna on the systematic research on the use of  
6.2 Literature Review 
To understand the climate negotiations context, it is important to draw the 
2 While the chapter focuses specifically on the use of aid to influence multilateral negotiation 
processes, this does not mean to exclude other strategies that may be used by parties to 
influence a negotiation, such as the provision of expert information, offering other kinds of 
material promises and threats, use of blaming and shaming, bundling of issues into package 
deals to allow for logrolling, forming coalitions, gaining support from non-state actors, etc.   
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theory from the existing negotiations literature where several concepts can 
help us understand how or why aid could be used strategically to encourage 
specific negotiation behavior. Threats and promises are well-known 
negotiation tactics (Hovi, 1998; Odell, 2000; Odell, 2002; Dür & Mateo, 2010; 
Bailer, 2012). This implies that the threat to withdraw aid and to reward with 
aid can also be an important negotiation tactic. However, this part of the 
literature does not focus specifically on the role of aid, and discussions 
generally remain at the level of a comparison of different types of negotiation 
tactics and strategies and an analysis of the reasons behind the choice of 
negotiation tactics and strategies.  
The promise to provide aid in exchange of support in a multilateral 
negotiation can also be considered as an example of issue-linkage. Issue-linkage 
is usually characterized as a way to enhance the chances of cooperation by 
allowing parties to change the structure of payoffs in the negotiation game, 
e.g., by expanding the opportunities to punish non-cooperation (Oye, 1985;
Barrett, 1997). 3  Alternatively, aid provision—particularly aid for purposes 
that are specific to the issues under negotiation—can be regarded as a side-
payment or transfer that is also usually introduced in multilateral agreements 
as a way to reduce heterogeneity across parties and thus encourage broader 
participation (Carraro & Siniscalco, 1993; Chen, 1997). Issue-linkage and side 
payments are useful strategies in long-term negotiation processes that are best 
characterized as repeated games (Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1985; Wagner, 2001). In 
this context, the body of work that argues that decision-making rules are 
important for negotiators’ choice of bargaining strategies is particularly 
relevant for this chapter. McKibben (2013), for example, argues that while 
under majority voting states need to form coalitions in order to be able to 
3 A common example of issue linkage cited in the literature is the introduction of trade 
sanctions as a way to encourage compliance with multilateral environmental agreements. 
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delay or block an agreement, under the consensus rule each individual state 
has veto power. For this reason, she hypothesizes that in negotiations 
governed by consensus it is more likely that states will seek to extract 
concessions from their peers. Applied to this analysis, under the consensus rule 
used in the UNFCCC negotiations, it can be expected that recipients use their 
veto power to leverage more aid in exchange for being more supportive 
towards the donors.  
The relevant negotiations and game-theoretic literature also examines 
the contribution of these (and other) bargaining strategies to the overall 
outcome of the negotiations—the likelihood to achieve full cooperation—and 
to compliance and enforcement problems (see, in addition to the above, 
Hopmann, 1995;  Wagner, 1999; Underdal, 2012). However, the literature has, 
so far, not fully addressed the question of how effective they are in influencing 
individual partner countries’ negotiation behavior towards preference 
alignment with a donor within a multilateral setting. Existing research rather 
looks generally at which forms of bargaining may be conducive to drawing 
other negotiators on one’s side (Sebenius, 1992; Money, 1998; Wagner, 1999). 
In addition, Weiler (2012) looks at how the choice of negotiation strategies 
affects parties’ individual success at the negotiations. 
In contrast, the literature on UN voting explicitly focuses on the use of 
development aid in multilateral decision-making. Rai (1980) delineates the 
possible causal channels, namely the use of aid as a means to either 
incentivize (ex ante), or to reward or punish (ex post) voting alignment (or 
the lack thereof) with the donor at the General Assembly. In the 1990s, the 
general effect of aid on UNGA voting is rejected based on econometric 
analysis (Sexton & Decker, 1992), but reconfirmed for “important votes”, i.e. 
votes on topics of actual relevance to the donor (Wang, 1999). 
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Simultaneously, several authors explore the reversely causal channel of voting 
alignment leading to more aid. This field of research has grown ever more 
quickly in the 2000s, with authors further trying to disentangle reward and 
punishment from inducement (Derouen & Heo, 2004) and examining the 
UNSC and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights rather than just 
UNGA voting (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2009; Lebovic & 
Voeten, 2009; Bueno De Mesquita & Smith, 2012; Hwang, Sanford, & Lee, 
2015). Recent studies also increasingly look beyond the US at a broader set of 
donor countries (Pincin, 2012; Lim & Vreeland, 2013; Bueno de Mesquita & 
Smith, 2016), and at the influence that such donors may exert on multilateral 
agencies (like the IMF, the World Bank and regional development banks) to 
mobilize their funding for vote buying purposes (Barro & Lee, 2005; Kilby, 
2006; Reynaud & Vauday, 2009; Dreher & Sturm, 2012). Conceptually, there 
has also been a discussion on how to disentangle the effect of vote alignment 
when preferences are aligned anyway, from the effect of alignment when initial 
preferences are truly opposing (Andersen, Harr, & Tarp, 2006; Kilby, 2011; 
Carter & Stone, 2015). Finally, some studies consider the effect of this type of 
strategic aid on development outcomes (Stone, 2004; Dreher, Eichenauer, & 
Gehring, 2013; Kilby & Dreher, 2010). 
A thorough review of the literature shows that no study till date has 
analyzed the impact of aid being used strategically in the context of the 
climate change negotiations and this chapter aims to do precisely that. 
However, there are several caveats to consider: 
Making statements within an international negotiation process is 
conceptually different from voting. It allows for a more nuanced expression of 
preferences than just a yes- or a no-vote. Moreover, even if a country is in 
clear agreement or disagreement with another party’s statement, it will not 
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necessarily see any need to express this within the plenary. Such a lack of 
expression is different from an abstention in a vote (Ehlermann & Ehring, 
2005: 67). The country in question may simply rely on others to make the 
relevant point or feel that it has not (yet) sufficiently familiarized itself with 
the specific topic under discussion to form a clear opinion. It may also use 
diplomatic language in a way that is identifiable as disagreement only by 
those directly involved, or it may support a position not because it is 
convinced by its actual content, but because it believes that such support will 
delay the negotiation process. 
Statements within international negotiation processes usually have no 
immediate effect on the overall outcome of the negotiation process. 
Statements can be used strategically to obtain a better starting position in the 
following round of negotiations (e.g., by initially exaggerating ones’ demands 
or positions), and they can be revised at any time.4 For this reason, swaying 
such statements—which would be considered ‘cheap talk’ or ‘bluffing’—may 
not appear important enough to donors to attempt any influence through aid 
within international negotiations. From this perspective, statements in 
negotiation processes could resemble the votes qualified as “unimportant” in 
the UN voting literature and, just as the latter, not show any significant 
relationship to development aid. 
Lastly, other than at the UN, negotiators from industrialized countries 
typically represent their country only in a very specific thematic area and 
within an ex-ante defined mandate, and their authority may not go beyond 
4  For a study analyzing such strategically adopted extreme positions, see Schneider and 
Cederman (1994). A broader discussion on the difference between actors’ preferences and 
their strategically adopted positions can be found in Frieden (1999) and Morrow (1999). On 
the dynamics of making and withdrawing proposals in the climate change negotiations, see 
Yamin and Depledge (2004: 440). 
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that (Skovgaard & Gallant, 2015; see also Groen & Niemann, 2010, for the 
specific case of the EU delegation to the UNFCCC). For industrialized 
country negotiators this implies that they may not have control over overall 
aid and can commit funding only in their specific field. Similarly, negotiators 
from developing countries may not be overly interested in general 
development aid but prefer funding over which they will have more direct 
authority. The distinction between different types of aid that could be 
relevant as a strategic tool hence appears even more important in the context 
of international negotiations than in the context of UN voting. 
In sum, the expected mechanisms relating aid and negotiation support 
may not be fully identical to those discussed in the literature review, and it is 
not a priori clear, to what extent a relationship between aid and negotiation 
support will be found at all. In the following section, the possible mechanisms 
will be clarified and illustrated with some of the ample anecdotal evidence and 
suggestive statements by negotiators from the UNFCCC. 
6.3 Conceptual Framework 
If statements in the framework of international negotiations are generally not 
binding, and usually do not directly lead to any outcome, why would anyone 
care about support or criticism in this context at all? The following arguments 
may be relevant in this context: 
First, media often intensively report about international negotiations. 
In addition, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), business lobbies and 
other interest groups closely observe the negotiation process (Betzold, 2013; 
Böhmelt et al., 2014). At the UNFCCC, these groups directly attend most of 
the meetings. Under such conditions, whatever is said does not remain behind 
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closed doors. It is thus expected that support or opposition by other parties to 
affect the reputation of the national delegation or even of the government as a 
whole through information that spread to peers outside the negotiation 
process and to the domestic public. Most countries prefer to be seen as ‘deal 
makers’ rather than as obstructive laggards or ‘deal breakers’. Criticism is 
hence perceived as ‘shaming and blaming’ while praise is perceived as a sign 
of successful international diplomacy.  
Conrad’s discussion of the Chinese problem with the international 
media blaming the country for the failure of the UNFCCC’s summit in 
Copenhagen represents an illustrative example:  
“China’s negotiating style during the final hours of Copenhagen has 
captivated media observers around the world […]. The state of 
negotiations posed an imminent risk of Premier Wen Jiabao being 
associated with a political failure. [… Eventually] the team around Wen 
Jiabao was primarily concerned with limiting the damage and insulating 
the Prime Minister from the foreseeable failure of the summit.” (Conrad, 
2012: 444). 
Second, changing positions, unless well explained, can appear 
inconsistent and be considered as a sign for incompetence, weakness or 
opportunism. A frequent and/or drastic change will be caught by the media, 
which may imply reputational cost for the delegation at least with respect to 
particular audiences.  
Third, while they are non-binding, statements given at any time of the 
negotiations pave the way for the (dis) agreement on which the negotiations 
will end: Initial support for any proposition in the negotiations can lead to 
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social pressure on other parties to follow suit. Thus, achieving support at any 
point within the negotiations leads to path dependencies that increase the 
chance of an agreement on this point in the future. Similar dynamics can 
occur in the context of initial criticism: Criticism by one country may trigger 
criticism by others. These dynamics make each individual statement more 
relevant than it may appear at first glance. 
Finally, under the type of consensus-based decision-making procedure 
that is typical of the UNFCCC and many other arenas of international 
negotiation, any individual party has a de facto veto power over any decision 
(Steinberg, 2002; Yamin & Depledge, 2004: 443; Ehlermann & Ehring, 2005: 
65). 5  It therefore becomes essential to convince all parties to support an 
emerging consensus. Hence convincing each individual country becomes very 
important—more important than in UNGA voting where a few opposing 
views cannot block the decisions. This in turn suggests that donors may resort 
to all means at their disposition—including threats and promises related to 
aid—to convince recipient countries to support their positions. 
On the basis of these arguments, this analysis expects parties to care 
about support and opposition in the negotiations. While the political benefits 
and costs may be less pronounced than if there had been a direct vote, it is 
still expected that they will be sufficiently pronounced to induce action by 
parties trying to obtain the former, and to avoid the latter. Development aid 
can be a useful tool in this respect. 
Development aid may be related to support or opposition in the 
5Note that there are a few exceptions to this rule as “consensus” does not necessarily require 
unanimity, but just a general sense that the parties in the room will not challenge the 
decision—which has at times been interpreted in a rather peculiar way in international 
negotiations, as discussed by Michaelowa, Michaelowa and Bagchi (2016). 
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negotiations in different ways. On the one hand, aid can generally elicit 
support for the donor by fostering mutual understanding and trust through 
the experience of fruitful collaboration. This collaboration and exchange may 
lead to the natural development of common principles and ideas, so that 
positions become more aligned. This can generate ties between certain donors 
and recipients, especially in the long run. This analysis does not consider this 
as a strategic use of aid because the alignment of preferences and the 
potentially resulting support in the climate negotiations are then more of a 
by-product than the central objective of the engagement in aid. Aid allows the 
donor to increase its soft power, but this need not even be intentional, 
particularly not in the context of a rather specific issue-area such as climate 
change. 
On the other hand, climate aid can be used strategically to buy support 
in the negotiations. This support buying can happen individually (vote buying 
by individual donors), as illustrated by the following example of Japan prior 
to the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol:  
“In Japan, ministers are distributing funds with an eye on diplomatic 
aims. The government’s Cool Earth Partnership announced last year, 
includes US$10 billion for climate projects in developing countries. After 
interviewing government officials, Friends of the Earth Japan concluded 
that the scheme was designed in part to buy support for Japan’s position 
at Kyoto protocol negotiations, where the country is pushing for India 
and China to do more to limit emissions. Ministers are currently 
considering partnership projects in some of the world’s poorest nations, 
such as Burkina Faso and Bangladesh.”6  
6 New Scientist, 13 January 2009 (https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16406-comment-
climate-aid-is-tantamount-to-bribery/). 
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However, votes might also be bought by the group of developed 
countries as a whole, e.g., when mechanisms for the financing of poor 
countries are directly built into the text of the agreement under discussion in 
order to elicit their overall consent, and to make them swallow those parts of 
the agreement they would otherwise oppose.7 Referring to the “Copenhagen 
Accord” as discussed in Chapter 2 already, as a minimalistic substitute for the 
much broader agreement initially intended, the promise of 100 billion 
USD/year in climate finance figured in the document. In this context, some 
vulnerable developing country delegates explicitly voiced the allegation of a 
bribe that industrialized countries were using to obtain consensus on an 
inacceptable document, simply to mask their failure. Dimitrov reports a 
number of related statements, notably the following statement by the 
Sudanese ambassador:  
“[The Copenhagen Accord] is murderous. It condemns and turns Africa 
into a furnace because 2 degrees Celsius results in 3.5 degrees 
[temperature rise in Africa] according to IPCC. [...] The promise of 100 
billion US dollars would not bribe us to destroy the continent.” (Dimitrov, 
2010: 811)  
While these examples suggest that aid is provided (or at least 
promised) ex ante, other accounts suggest that aid may also be provided ex 
post as a reward or be withdrawn as a punishment. This follows the tit-for-tat 
or reciprocating strategy suggested by Axelrod (1984) as a way to encourage 
cooperation in repeated negotiations, and is also in line with UN voting 
literature where evidence has been found for both. While this suggests that 
there may be a reverse causality issue (does aid cause support, or does support 
7 For the theory on such broad transfers, see Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Chen (1997). 
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cause aid?), the distinction is not substantially meaningful for this analysis. 
Firstly, as in the tit-for-tat game, these multilateral negotiations typically 
consist of several rounds that stretch over many days, allowing for 
reciprocating strategies: today’s reward for yesterday’s support in turn 
constitutes an incentive for further support tomorrow. In addition, an ex-post 
reward or punishment may well be anticipated, which is then substantively 
equivalent to an initial promise. Aid commitments are not much more than 
promises anyway, since subsequent disbursements cannot be fully taken for 
granted. The same argument can be made for threats of withdrawal. The 
media reported some anecdotal evidence related to such threats:  
“The US State Department is denying climate change assistance to 
countries opposing the Copenhagen accord”8  
“It was made very clear by the EU, UK, France and the US that if they 
did not back them then they would suffer.”9  
This clearly suggests a strategic use of development aid to obtain 
support. As far as possible, attempts are made here to empirically disentangle 
this strategic use of aid for support in the climate negotiations. Along with 
multiple fixed effects, several types of aid with be distinguished between and 
how they can be used differently based on the donor’s strategic need. First, 
the analysis approaches the problem from a Yes/No perspective: Is it the 
access to aid or changes in its amount that affect recipients’ statements in 
favor of the donors? This leads to the first two hypotheses: 
8 The Guardian, 9 April 2010 (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/09/us-
climate-aid). 
9African diplomat, cited by The Guardian, 11 April 2010 
(http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/11/climate-aid-threats-copenhagen-
accord). 
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H1: Recipients, which receive any aid, tend to support donors more in 
the negotiations. 
H2: Recipients that receive a positive amount of aid exhibit higher 
support for donors in the negotiations. 
Once the Yes/No question is answered, it is important to understand 
which type of aid is used to elicit support from the recipient. General aid, i.e. 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a whole, can a priori be used in 
both ways. It is the basis of bilateral cooperation between donor and recipient 
governments, and can generate long-term partnerships between countries. As 
argued above, while such partnerships can be beneficial in a concrete 
negotiation context, they are not built up with this specific objective, and the 
related funding can hence not be considered as strategic for support in these 
negotiations. However, as highlighted in the UN voting literature, general 
ODA can also be used as an incentive, threat or reward, and in principle, this 
is also true for the specific context of the climate negotiations. To the extent 
that ODA is valuable to the recipient, its promise represents the famous 
‘carrot’, and the threat of its withdrawal the corresponding ‘stick’.  
Yet, the negotiators on both sides are different from the diplomats that 
represent their countries in the UN General Assembly or the UNSC. In the 
climate negotiations, the typical negotiator is a specialized staff from an 
environmental agency or ministry, and even if the heads of state are 
frequently flown in at the end of the negotiations for the final speech, the 
more specialized staff is de facto responsible to negotiate the deal (Skovgaard 
& Gallant, 2015). As mentioned above, these negotiators may not have the 
authority over general ODA. On the donor side, they would need to enter 
complex negotiations with other parts of their own government in order to 
induce a change in overall aid. They can however, more easily, promise 
specific climate aid, which falls in their area of responsibility. On the recipient 
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side, there may also be a greater demand for climate-specific funding, because 
other funding will be channeled into government budgets that are not under 
the control of the agencies represented in the negotiations. Assuming that 
recipients’ delegates have a strong interest in the size of their own budget, 
which affects their standing within the domestic government, they will hence 
prefer specific climate funding to general ODA. In such a setting, it is 
expected climate aid rather than development aid in general, is used for 
strategic purposes within the UNFCCC negotiations.  
As already discussed in the previous chapters, within climate aid, 
adaptation aid caters to a local public good while mitigation aid caters to a 
global public good. If developing country negotiators do not only care about 
boosting their budget, adaptation aid should be preferable to them based on 
the reasoning discussed in Chapter 2. Since adaptation directly addresses the 
needs of their domestic population in terms of preventing the local effects of 
droughts, floods, heat waves or other climate-related events, such aid 
generates exclusive benefits for the recipients. In contrast, mitigation, which 
addresses a global public good, generates benefits that are globally non-
excludable by definition. In other words, there is no particular local benefit of 
a mitigation activity implemented locally as compared to the same activity 
implemented elsewhere.10 This leads to a set of nested hypotheses, from broad 
to specific: 
H3: Aid is used to buy support (or avoid opposition) in the 
negotiations. 
H3a: Climate aid, rather than general aid, is used to buy support (or 
10 In reality, the line cannot be drawn so sharply because most mitigation projects also bring 
about some local co-benefits such as infrastructural development or job creation, but for a 
given amount of aid, the directly locally relevant effect will still be higher for adaptation aid 
than for mitigation aid. 
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avoid opposition) in the negotiations. 
H3b: Adaptation aid, rather than mitigation aid, is used to buy support 
(or avoid opposition) in the negotiations. 
Last and most importantly, it is necessary to understand whether donors use 
aid to elicit support from the recipients or use it to suppress criticism from 
them. It is not a-priori clear which direction this would go. Whichever way it 
goes, it would ultimately justify the support-buying hypothesis, albeit the 
causal mechanisms will be different. Therefore, this study hypothesizes the 
following: 
H4: Aid is used to reward positive statements made by recipients in 
favor of the donors. 
6.4 Data and Empirical Methods 
6.4.1 Data 
The dataset used in this analysis is similar to that used in chapter 5. It is still 
in the three-dimensional panel form with dyadic information for donor-
recipient pairs over the years 2002-2013. Keeping this three dimensional 
structure was important since we wanted to be able to match our negotiations 
data (which is in a dyadic form with donor recipient dimensions) with that of 
the climate aid data (also in a dyadic form with donor and recipient 
dimensions). Again, the donors included in the analysis are the traditional 
members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as far as 
they correspond to parties to the UNFCCC. The only difference in this 
dataset is that since EU donors typically speak with one voice in the climate 
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negotiations, they are considered as a single donor here. Information referring 
to the EU is correspondingly aggregated across all EU members. Overall the 
dataset hence includes the following ten donors: Australia, Canada, the EU, 
Iceland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United 
States. Similarly, all 149 DAC aid recipients are included that have 
simultaneously been parties to the UNFCCC.  
The dependent variable is coded from a new dataset on negotiation 
behavior (Castro, 2017). The data covers all regular meetings of the UNFCCC 
bodies across the different areas under discussion. Coding is based on the 
summaries of these negotiation meetings as published by the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in its Earth Negotiations 
Bulletins (ENBs) (IISD, 2000-2013) (see appendix for information on checks 
on inter-coder reliability). Each issue of the ENB records a full day of 
negotiations covering discussions on all the items and topics on the agenda for 
that day. Using the ENBs for coding negotiation behavior has several 
advantages but also some limitations. The main advantage is the availability 
of a long time series of consistent data. Despite not being full transcripts, the 
ENBs are the most complete and regular reports of the climate change 
negotiations and are written by trained reporters in an objective way and in a 
consistent language over the years. In addition, there is an effort to keep them 
neutral and independent from any political side. However, they present 
summarized versions of the discussions, and it is very difficult to ascertain 
what is not reported. Specific statements are attributed to countries only for 
those negotiation meetings that are open to observers. Whenever the ENBs 
cover closed meetings, the statements are not attributed to particular parties. 
The dataset thus excludes most informal meetings in which very controversial 
or very detailed issues are discussed. Despite this, it is expected that open 
meetings—in which those informal discussions are frequently reviewed and 
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recapitulated—will still reflect the main patterns of support and opposition 
between donors and recipients.   
The negotiation behavior dataset codes how countries interact with 
each other in the negotiations as reported by the ENBs. It enables the 
distinction between supportive statements (speaking on behalf of, supporting, 
or agreeing with one another) on the one hand and opposing statements 
(delaying, opposing or criticizing others’ positions or statements) on the other. 
For example, volume 12, issue 493 of the ENB, from 6th December 2010, 
reports: “VIETNAM, PERU and BENIN stressed that the Kyoto Protocol is 
the cornerstone of the regime to address climate change. […] JAPAN said 
since not all major emitters are part of the Kyoto Protocol, a second 
commitment period is neither fair nor effective.” This unit of text is coded as 
an agreement between Vietnam, Peru and Benin (with separate observations 
for each of the possible dyads), and as opposition by Japan against these three 
countries. Further coding examples can be found in the Appendix D, which 
includes a summary of the data’s codebook. 
This coding scheme is applied to all negotiations during the period of 
analysis, so that there is a variable recording all instances in which each 
country expresses support or opposition towards any of the other countries 
participating in the discussions. In this context, it is important to know only 
about recipients’ reactions to donor statements, the observations on exchanges 
among donors or among recipients alone, as well as donors’ reactions to 
recipients, are dropped. Overall, a total of 3158 statements in which recipients 
criticize or support any donor over the years 2002-2013 are found. Descriptive 
statistics of this data are available in Appendix 6.11 The most straightforward 
11 The negotiations encompass interactions not only between individual countries, but also 
between country groups or coalitions such as the group of Least Developed Countries, the 
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way to compute measures for support (‘Supportive statements’) and 
opposition (‘Critical statements’) is then simply to add up the respective 
number of statements by each recipient with respect to each donor across the 
different negotiation meetings in any given year.  
This simple aggregation of supportive and opposing statements hides a 
more nuanced range of relationships reflected in the sub-categories mentioned 
in brackets above. Within the supportive statements, there is one extreme 
case of countries actively coordinating their positions so that one of them is 
able to ‘speak on behalf’ of the others; then the case of countries directly 
expressing ‘support’ for one of their peers; and finally the cases in which 
countries simply ‘agree’ with what someone else already said. Within the 
opposing statements, one extreme is the case in which a country openly 
‘criticizes’ another’s positions, actions or statements, followed by a country 
simply expressing an ‘opposing’ position, and finally a country seeking to 
‘delay’ the discussion of someone else’s proposal. 
If countries consider the reputational costs and benefits of support and 
opposition in the negotiations, the above-mentioned differences in the sub-
categories should be relevant to them. Open criticism, for instance, will much 
more easily attract the attention of the media than a mild statement of 
disagreement. Therefore, weights are assigned to the different sub-categories 
before building the sum. In addition, a measure representing supportive and 
opposing statements is created, by subtracting the weighted sum of the latter 
from the sum of the former. This leads to a ‘Support index’, which takes into 
account both the frequency and the degree of the support and ranges from -18 
(strong and frequent opposition) to 20 (strong and frequent support): 
African Group, the EU or the G77. For this analysis, we exclude all observations in which 
such coalitions speak, except for the case of the EU as a donor.  
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Support indexijt = 3·speaking on behalfijt + 3·supportijt + 2·agreementijt 
–1·delayijt – 2·oppositionijt – 3·criticismijt,
(1)
here, each of the variables speaking on behalfijt etc. measures the frequency of 
the respective type of statement for each donor i, recipient j, and year t. 
As an example: In 2010, China opposed the EU eight times, but also 
agreed with the EU once. The Support index for this particular year and dyad 
is hence coded as: 
Support indexEU, China, 2010 =3·0 + 3·0 + 2·1 – 1·0 – 2·8 – 3·0 = –14 
To ensure that the findings are robust to the weights described above, 
a non-weighted index is also built as an overall measure of support and 
criticism, which ranges from -9 (frequent opposition) to 10 (frequent support): 
Unweighted support indexijt = speaking on behalfijt + supportijt + 
agreementijt– delayijt – oppositionijt – criticismijt 
(2) 
In order to put these values into perspective, how many times each 
country (donor or recipient) is reported by the ENBs to speak in each year 
(‘Interventions donor’ and ‘Interventions recipient’), even when this 
participation does not entail supporting or criticizing another party, is coded. 
This is to be able to control for the fact that some countries simply 
participate in the debate more often than others do, which may be related to 
the size of their delegation, the delegates’ language proficiency and the like. 
As an alternative measure of donors’ and recipients’ level of activity in the 
negotiations, the total number of (supportive and opposing) interactions for 
each dyad and year (‘Dyadic interventions’) are also counted. 
129 
The explanatory variables are bilateral ODA commitments (in millions 
of constant 2014 USD) for each donor-recipient dyad and year as reported by 
OECD (2016). Total aid commitments as well as climate aid commitments 
based on the ‘Rio markers’ that separately identify mitigation and adaptation 
aid have been used. The Rio markers include two types of variables, 
depending on whether adaptation or mitigation are the main objective of the 
respective aid activity (‘Adaptation principal’, ‘Mitigation principal’) or only 
one relevant objective among others (‘Adaptation significant’, ‘Mitigation 
significant’). For this analysis, aggregate measures of total adaptation and 
total mitigation aid was created.  
To reduce the effect of outliers, both the dependent variables and the 
aid variables are used in natural logarithms. To avoid the creation of missing 
adding a constant rescales values for values smaller or equal to zero the 
numbers. To allow for a more flexible functional form, square terms for all 
variables reflecting the level of negotiation activity by recipients, donors or 
dyads are introduced. For details on these transformations, see table D5 in the 
appendix.    
In addition, a number of controls were used, such as the ‘Trade 
relationship’ between the donor and the recipient (UN Comtrade 2016), the 
absolute difference between the donor’s and the recipient’s level of democracy 
(‘Democracy’) (Quality of Government Institute 2016), Voeten’s (2013) voting 
similarity index, i.e., the share of aligned UN votes between donor and 
recipient (‘UN alignment’), recipients’ vulnerability to climate change 
(‘Vulnerability’) as measured by the ND-GAIN vulnerability index, (ND-ECI 
2015) and the natural logarithm of the recipients’ ‘GDP per capita’, PPP 
(constant 2011 international $) (World Bank 2016). All variable definitions 
and basic descriptive statistics are presented in the appendix in table D5. 
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6.4.2 Methodological Approach 
In the first step, the aim was to provide information on whether it is primarily 
the amount of aid received or just the mere possibility to receive aid at all 
that influences recipients’ support for donors at the negotiations, separate 
models with a dummy for any positive aid flow (‘Dummy (Aid)’) on the one 
hand, and on the other hand regressions restricted to dyads with positive aid 
flows are estimated. 
The next step was to assess which type of aid is used in the 
negotiations, i.e. whether it is ODA or climate aid, which is used specifically. 
Since the data are in the form of a three-dimensional panel, it is possible to 
use dyad fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. This controls for all time 
invariant donor and recipient characteristics as well as for characteristics that 
vary only over time and not across dyads. The year fixed effects capture the 
influence of individual years such as, for instance, the year 2009 with the 
Copenhagen summit, but also general trends over time. The dyad fixed effects 
capture the influence of all unobservable or otherwise omitted variables that 
are specific to the donor and/or the recipient. The latter substantially reduce 
the potential sources of endogeneity. Dyad fixed effects notably control for 
long-term relationships between a donor and a recipient, based, e.g., on 
common culture and language, or on prior development cooperation. If aid is 
positively significant in this type of model, the effect cannot be explained by 
the natural alignment of preferences between long-term development partners, 
and therefore suggests that aid is used strategically. To control for unobserved 
time-variant country characteristics (Bai 2009, p.1232), interacted fixed effects 
were used. Specifically, the following types of fixed effects were used to show 
how the results change with the inclusion of different types of fixed effects: (i) 
the interaction of recipient and year fixed effects, and (ii) the interaction of 
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donor and year fixed effects. This can capture differing reactions to period-
specific shocks (such as the Copenhagen failure) or to more gradual shifts over 
time (such as the phasing in of new negotiation topics that may influence 
existing alliances). Moreover, an assessment of whether the postulated 
strategic use of aid and the related negotiation behavior of the recipients can 
always be observed immediately is made. In other words, is the aid used 
strategically within a one year, given the fast pace and constantly evolving 
nature of the negotiations? Further placebo regressions are estimated using 1- 
and 2-year lags and 1-year leads of the aid variables.  
In the last step, an attempt was made to understand which type of 
behavior led to more aid. Therefore, alternative dependent variables reflecting 
supportive statements ln(Supportive statements) and critical statements 
ln(Critical statements), were used. Looking at them separately might be 
relevant since it could be that support and criticism are influenced by aid in 
different ways. The two variables are left-censored as less than zero 
statements cannot be made. This suggests the use of a Tobit model. However, 
dyad fixed effects are not compatible with this approach because their 
consistent estimation requires a large number of periods, while we only have 
5 years for adaptation aid and 11 years for mitigation aid. Therefore, a 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) model was used. The advantage 
of using this model was that it allows us to address the left-censoring at zero 
while providing more flexibility in terms of adding fixed effects.12   
Given the three-dimensional nature of the panel dataset, special care 
also needs to be given to clustering. It is clearly insufficient to cluster at the 
recipient-donor dyad level, as this would imply that any observations for the 
same donor but different recipients or for the same recipient, but different 
12 While PPML has been more frequently used to estimate gravity models in international 
trade, some recent applications can be found in the aid allocation literature, too (see Dreher, 
Gehring, and Klasen 2015).  
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donors should be uncorrelated. For a sufficiently large sample across all 
dimensions, multi-way clustering would be ideal, as suggested by Cameron, 
Gelbach and Miller (2011). However, given that there are only ten donors in 
the sample, multi-way (as well as simple donor-level) clustering does not lead 
to a consistent estimation of the variance-covariance matrix. For the main 
specifications only, clusters at the recipient level are included but in the 
robustness checks regressions with multi-way clustering at the recipient and 
donor levels are estimated despite the aforementioned methodological 
concerns.13 
6.5 Empirical Results 
Table 6-1 and 6-2 present the first results based on panel regressions exploring 
the empirical question of whether it is the access to aid or changes in its 
amount that affect recipients’ statements in favor of the donors. While the 
results for switches between aid and no aid are significant for both adaptation 
and mitigation aid (see Table 6-1), they are fully insignificant when looking 
merely at the amount of aid (see Table 6-2). The switches from no climate aid 
to some climate aid leads to much greater relative changes than any additions 
or reductions once aid is provided to a country. Furthermore, only 47 and 28 
recipients received mitigation or adaptation aid, respectively, out of our total 
sample of 129 developing countries. In table 6-2 where the impact of changes 
to amount of aid on support is measured, the sample size in Table 6-2 is 
reduced from an earlier 5110 to just 198 for adaptation aid, and from 15330 to 
550 for mitigation aid. Since this may obviously also affect the significance 
13 The panel models using clustering are implemented with the user-written command reghdfe 
in Stata (Correia 2017). 
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level, the results based on strictly positive aid values need to be interpreted 
with some caution. Overall, the results are not surprising. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are only partially 
significant. Apparently, the dyad fixed effects already capture most of the 
relevant effects. Notably, in the regressions on adaptation aid most controls 
are insignificant. This may be related to the substantially smaller sample in 
this case (the same occurs when we take a comparable sample for general and 
mitigation aid). One frequently significant variable is Interventions recipient. 
Both recipients who often criticize and recipients who often voice agreement 
(i.e., the recipients at both ends of the Support index scale) are doing so to 
some extent, just because they are generally very active.  
In addition, voting alignment in the UN General Assembly is positively 
significant in some regressions indicating that positional closeness and/or 
mutual understanding between nations is correlated across different policy 
areas. Furthermore, highly vulnerable countries tend to support the donors 
more strongly and to voice less opposition. This may be due to the fact that 
some Western countries, and notably the EU, have been seen as rather 
progressive actors during the last decade. Finally, recipients’ GDP per capita 
is negatively significant, suggesting that the greatest disagreement occurs 
between developed and emerging economies, which should primarily capture 
the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) that have built 
their own negotiation group and have become increasingly assertive over time 
during the period of observation. 
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Tab. 6-1: Regressions showing the relationship between access to aid and 
support 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: 
Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Dummy (Aid) 0.0011 0.0359** 0.0497*** -0.0021 0.0638*** 
(0.54) (0.03) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0029*** -0.0006 0.0035*** 0.0026*** 
(0.92) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.01) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.24) (0.47) (0.20) (0.49) (0.41) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.73) (0.57) (0.55) (0.77) (0.42) 
Trade relationship 0.0021 0.0050 0.0026 0.0042 0.0047 
(0.59) (0.48) (0.56) (0.51) (0.49) 
Democracy -0.0003 0.0015 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0014 
(0.82) (0.60) (0.89) (0.75) (0.62) 
UN voting 0.0192*** -0.0031 0.0158*** -0.0054 -0.0056 
(0.00) (0.71) (0.01) (0.54) (0.50) 
Vulnerability 0.2446* 0.5294 0.2546* 0.5262 0.5420 
(0.08) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) (0.23) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0367** -0.0548 -0.0390** -0.0536 -0.0561 
(0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.18) (0.17) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Number of clusters  129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.110 0.070 0.103 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Tab. 6-2: Regressions showing changes in aid amounts and support 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0002 0.0090 -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0027 
(0.65) (0.35) (0.98) (0.15) (0.73) 
Interventions recipient 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0039*** 0.0038*** -0.0022 
(0.67) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.72) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00002*** -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0001 
(0.00) (0.35) (0.36) (0.00) (0.31) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0023* 0.0002 -0.0004 
(0.46) (0.23) (0.08) (0.30) (0.82) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.54) (0.69) (0.16) (0.54) (0.51) 
Trade relationship 0.0029 0.4652 0.4631 0.0047 0.8590 
(0.51) (0.51) (0.45) (0.52) (0.16) 
Democracy 0.0002 0.1191 -0.0066 0.0000 0.1602** 
(0.88) (0.19) (0.82) (1.00) (0.05) 
UN voting 0.0228*** 0.2176 0.1350 -0.0097 -0.0628 
(0.00) (0.61) (0.29) (0.33) (0.82) 
Vulnerability 0.2321 3.3746 1.0496 0.5878 2.9885 
(0.16) (0.61) (0.61) (0.31) (0.63) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0409* 1.2201 -0.3129* -0.0645 1.1135 
(0.06) (0.30) (0.07) (0.23) (0.29) 
Observations 10890 198 550 3677 213 
Number of clusters  128 28 47 122 28 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.135 0.074 0.153 0.063 0.105 
Note: In this table, the sample is limited to observations with strictly positive values of aid (Aid 
>0). Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 6-3 shows only the coefficient of the aid variables (logged) in 
response to the different combinations of fixed effects (note that the same set 
of control variables used in tables 6-1 and 6-2 have been used but not 
reported).  
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Tab. 6-3: Coefficients of aid by types of fixed effects included in the model 
Dependent variable : ln 
(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Model includes:  
- Dyad & year FE 0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
(0.62) (0.03) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) 
- Donor & year FE 0.0004** 0.0025* 0.0028*** 0.0003 0.0036*** 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.32) (0.00) 
- Recipient & year FE 0.0001 0.0020 0.0025*** -0.0001 0.0028*** 
(0.30) (0.10) (0.01) (0.67) (0.01) 
- Year FE 0.0003** 0.0024* 0.0028*** 0.0003 0.0035*** 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.27) (0.00) 
- Dyad FE &interactive 0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
  recipient x year FE (0.63) (0.03) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) 
- Dyad FE & interactive 0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
  donor x year FE (0.66) (0.03) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Note: Table shows results for the main explanatory variable ln(Aid) in separate regressions with 
different fixed effects. Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.
The results are consistent with H3 that posits that climate-change 
related aid, rather than general ODA, is strategically used in the negotiations. 
Contrary to expectations, there is no evidence for a greater effect of 
adaptation aid as compared to mitigation aid (H3b). In contrast, mitigation 
aid has a similar effect. It seems that the co-benefits of development projects 
in the area of mitigation have been attractive enough to make this type of aid 
interesting for recipients.  
With the inclusion of fixed effects, it was expected that dyad fixed 
effects were crucial to distinguish long-term commonalities or friendship 
between donor and recipient from the short-term strategic use of aid in the 
negotiations. If aid also affects negotiation support by building up long-term 
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friendly relationships between donor and recipient, a stronger positive 
coefficient in regressions without the dyad fixed effects, and possibly a 
positively significant effect for general aid as well should have been found. 
This is indeed the case: the coefficient of total ODA multiplies by 3 and 4 and 
becomes significant in the regression using only year fixed effects and, in the 
regression, using a combination of year and donor fixed effects, at least for the 
full sample (Column 1). There is no increase, however, for the coefficients of 
mitigation and adaptation aid in these regressions. This suggests that overall 
aid may be effective by generally building friendship between countries, while 
adaptation and mitigation aid affect negotiation behavior of recipients only in 
the short run, i.e., through their strategic use in a given negotiation round. 
The last two rows of Table 6-3 further confirm the existence of such a 
short-term strategic relationship between climate aid and negotiation support. 
They include the strictest possible form of control for unobservables by 
including not only dyad fixed effects, but also country X year fixed effects in 
the regression models. These results are also robust to modifications of the 
estimation model presented in the appendix. For example, see table D6 using 
parsimonious regressions that only include Interventions donor and 
Interventions recipient and their squares along with the dyad and year fixed 
effects. Table D7 shows the results for multi-way clustering. As compared to 
table 6-3, the coefficients remain identical (as they should), and mitigation aid 
remains strongly significant. Only adaptation aid is no more significant at 
conventional levels. Generally, the effect of adaptation aid appears somewhat 
less robust than the effect of mitigation aid, possibly due to the short time 
series. Lastly, a plausibility check of the contemporaneous nature of the 
strategic interaction between donors and recipients was carried out by running 
placebo regressions for different lags and leads of the aid variables (Table D8). 
In the full sample, none of the aid coefficients is significant. In the reduced 
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sample, two out of nine coefficients become significant, but small in value 
terms and with an unexpected sign. This leads to the understanding that 
these results are spurious and that overall, this exercise confirms that the 
strategic interaction happens within a given year. 
Lastly, when differentiating between the relationship of aid and 
supportive statements on the one side, and aid and critical statements on the 
other side, some unexpected results are obtained. Table 6-4 presents the 
corresponding estimations for the full sample using PPML. 
139 
Tab. 6-4: Separate regressions for positive and negative statements 
Dependent 
variables: 
(1) 
ln(Supportiv
e 
statements) 
(2) 
ln(Supporti
ve 
statements) 
(3) 
ln(Supportiv
e 
statements) 
(4) 
ln(Critical 
statements
) 
(5) 
ln(Critica
l 
statemen
ts) 
(6) 
ln(Critical 
statements
) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Adaptatio
n aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0465*** 0.1288*** 0.1257*** 0.0324* 0.1165*** 0.0928*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions 
recipient 
0.0349*** 0.0907*** 0.0240*** 0.0431*** 0.1102*** 0.0363*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions 
recipient2 
-0.0001*** -0.0008*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0010*** -0.0002*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Interventions donor 0.0072*** 0.0276*** 0.0064*** 0.0090*** 0.0169*** 0.0093*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001** -0.00001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Trade relationship 0.5457 0.3935 0.8761 -0.0527 -18.7236** 0.2111 
(0.72) (0.86) (0.54) (0.98) (0.03) (0.90) 
Democracy 0.0928 -0.1812 0.0829 0.0922 -0.4286 0.0775 
(0.59) (0.64) (0.57) (0.62) (0.19) (0.66) 
UN voting 1.8114*** -0.2575 0.8268 0.2424 -0.5625 -0.3392 
(0.00) (0.76) (0.20) (0.66) (0.35) (0.58) 
Vulnerability 11.0274 42.9437 13.5080 -16.7096 -24.6765 -13.8888 
(0.28) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.31) 
ln(GDP per capita) -2.4741*** -4.4723 -2.4997*** 0.6521 5.0933* 0.4415 
(0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.52) (0.10) (0.66) 
Observations 15340 5120 15340 15340 5120 15340 
Number of clusters 130 130 130 130 130 130 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation used to account for censoring on the 
dependent variable. Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
All aid coefficients are positive and significant. As shown in regressions 
2 and 3 the elasticity of supportive statements with respect to both 
adaptation and mitigation aid is 0.13. Regarding critical statements, the 
elasticities for mitigation and adaptation aid are similarly high. What is even 
more unexpected, however, is that the sign of the coefficients is positive rather 
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than negative. Hence, a greater number of critical statements are associated 
with more, rather than less aid—quite the opposite of what the discussed 
theory suggests. The most plausible explanation is that we are dealing with 
yet another type of the short-term reverse causality. Interpreted in this way, 
one could imagine that donors try to appease highly critical opponents by 
giving them aid. If this interpretation were correct, what we observe would 
again reflect support buying, albeit not in the way it was postulated in the 
first place. Further research (outside the scope of this thesis) on this 
particular finding is needed. 
The overall picture obtained suggests a situation in which donors use 
aid as an effective tool to solicit recipient support and avoid criticism in the 
negotiations, and/or in which recipients use support and criticism as strategies 
to obtain higher aid. It is not possible to distinguish between the two 
potential directions of the strategic interaction, but in any case, they both 
provide evidence for the support-buying hypothesis. Support buying may 
include cases in which the promise of aid is directly built into an international 
agreement such as the promise of the 100 billion USD in the context of the 
Copenhagen Accord. As expected, the effects found are much stronger and 
much more robust for climate aid than for general ODA. However, as opposed 
to initial expectations, the strategic use of mitigation aid appears to be at 
least as important—if not more important—than the use of adaptation aid. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Based on a novel dataset on member country interactions in the UNFCCC 
negotiations, whether aid can buy support in international negotiation 
processes is examined. In this context, special attention has been given to the 
differences in the way adaptation and mitigation aid can be used strategically 
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in the negotiations on account of both addressing two different types of goods 
– one at a local level, another at a global.
The theoretical arguments follow the reasoning in the context of UN 
voting where “vote buying” is an academically long-established phenomenon. 
While aid may also increase a donor’s soft power and induce long-term 
positive relationships that eventually lead to closer alignment in international 
negotiations, the focus here is on short-term strategic interests and related, 
“support buying”. The three-dimensional panel analysis with donor-recipient 
dyad fixed effects, year fixed effects and clustering at the recipient level 
reveals that aid can indeed buy support, but that donors tend to use climate-
related aid, rather than general ODA, for this purpose. The argument is based 
on the fact that there is both greater demand for and greater supply of this 
type of financial support, whose allocation is under the direct responsibility of 
the delegates who are experts in a very specific field (here: international 
climate policy). The results reflect a significant and robust relationship 
between climate-related aid and negotiation support. Contrary to 
expectations, no evidence of greater use of adaptation aid for strategic 
purposes rather than mitigation aid was found. There may also be some 
lobbying by domestic private entrepreneurs who want make profits out of 
mitigation project implementation. In addition, awareness of adaptation as a 
climate-related aid category has only emerged in very recent years. Given that 
adaptation is closely related to the resilience of the local population and 
infrastructure—its ability to react to shocks such as heat waves, droughts or 
floods—it is often difficult to disentangle it from more general development 
aid (Buchner et l. 2011, 30; Pickering et al. 2015, 151). Also budgets for 
mitigation aid are larger than those for adaptation aid.  
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Finally, the fact that most debates in the climate change negotiations 
framework do not directly lead to a decision, the individual statements are 
taken seriously in the preparation of the final consensus—so seriously that 
donors are ready to pay for this, both bilaterally and as part of the common 
agreement being negotiated.  
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Appendix D 
D.1 Relational Data between Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Extract from the codebook for dataset 
D.1.1 General dataset description 
This dataset contains dyadic data on how parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) react to other parties’ oral 
interventions during the negotiations. It is based on hand coding of summaries 
of the negotiations under the UNFCCC and covers all meetings of the official 
UNFCCC bodies reported in the Earth Negotiation Bulletins (ENBs) between 
February 1995 (11th Session of the INC in New York) and December 2013 
(COP19 in Warsaw). The data covers not only the annual meetings of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, but also meetings of the 
permanent subsidiary bodies to the Convention (in charge of implementing its 
provisions and of providing scientific and technological guidance) and of ad-
hoc negotiation groups established on a temporary basis to debate new 
agreements. It also covers meetings of specific technical workshops convened 
in order to inform the negotiation process. 
The UNFCCC meetings are usually summarized through daily ENB 
reports published by the International Institute of Sustainable Development, 
and can be downloaded from http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/. The ENBs have been 
chosen as the data source since they are seen as a detailed, consistent and 
objective source of information by many negotiators and observers in the 
climate talks, and because there are no publicly available official transcripts of 
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the negotiations. 
The dataset was created for the SNSF-funded research project 
Negotiating Aid between 2013 and 2015. The dataset contains relational data 
between parties to the UNFCCC, which have been obtained by coding how 
parties to the UNFCCC react to other parties’ interventions: the observations 
in the dataset describe which countries speak on behalf of, support, agree 
with, delay, oppose, or criticize other countries’ statements or positions as 
reported in the ENBs. The observations also contain information regarding 
the topic or issue area and the negotiation meeting in which the respective 
statement was made.  
Four coders contributed to the data collection. A sample of ten ENB 
reports, covering the whole period from the 1990s until the 2010s was 
independently coded by all coders at the beginning of the process, in order to 
validate the codebook and ensure that the results were consistent. The 
findings, and eventual differences across the coders, were subsequently 
discussed to ensure that all have the same understanding of how to interpret 
the coding rules. Along the main coding process, other ENB issues at random 
were double-coded to ensure that coding still remained consistent over time, 
and to allow for testing of inter-coder reliability. Inter-coder reliability was 
tested using Cohen’s kappa. For the main variable, coding the types of dyadic 
interactions between pairs of countries, Kappa between pairs of coders ranged 
from 0.77 to 0.98, which indicates substantial to almost perfect reliability.14 
More information about the dataset can be found in Castro (2017).  
14 Landis, J.R. and Koch, G.G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics 33(1): 159-174. 
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D.1.2 Variable description 
Country 1 : Country (or country group) that says something on behalf of, 
states something with, agrees with, supports, delays the proposal of, opposes 
to or criticizes Country 2 . For the purpose of this article, only DAC recipient 
countries have been kept in the Country 1 sample. 
Country 2 : Country (or country group) whose position or statement is being 
supported, agreed with, criticized, etc. by Country 1 . For the purpose of this 
article, only DAC donor countries have been kept in the Country 2 sample. 
Relation : The type of reaction of Country 1 to a statement/position by 
Country 2 : speaking on behalf of, support, agreement, delaying proposal, 
opposition, or criticism. Detailed descriptions of the individual types of 
relations can be found in section D.3 below.  
Conference: Place and year of meeting of the UNFCCC bodies (includes not 
only COP meetings, but also meetings of its subsidiary bodies). 
Topic: Issue area to which the statements by Country 1 and Country 2 
refer: Mitigation, adaptation, finance, etc. This information has not been used 
for this article. 
Comment: Usually quotes the text that shows the coded relationship (in 
quotation marks). May also include comments regarding the coding.  
ENB Nr : Number of the Earth Negotiation Bulletin from which the 
relationship was coded. 
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ENB_obs : Observation ID within the respective ENB Nr . This variable 
consists of the 3-digit ENB issue number followed by an observation counter 
within that ENB.  
D.1.3 Description of coded relationships 
On behalf of : when Country 1 speaks on behalf of or for Country 2. In 
this case, it is clear that Country 1 and Country 2 (and probably together 
with a larger group of parties) has previously coordinated a common position, 
which is being presented by Country 1 for the whole group. On behalf of is 
not coded when a member of an established coalition (such as the EU or the 
G77) speaks on behalf of this coalition (e.g., “Grenada, on behalf of AOSIS…” 
is coded simply as a statement by AOSIS). In this case, the membership of 
these coalitions is already fixed, and it is clear that if the coalition makes a 
statement, all of its members have already agreed to this position.  
Example: 
- “PANAMA, also speaking for Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Guatemala, 
Peru, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, stressed the importance of 
making progress on REDD (…)” (ENB No. 462).  
Support: is used when the text explicitly says that Country 2 (or its 
statement) was supported by Country 1, even when this support is expressed 
in different sentences. 
Example: 
- “He (the EU) said additional effort should be made to reduce 
uncertainty in GWPs but that parties should use them if they wish. 
Japan supported the GWP position (…). Australia (…) also supported 
continued use of GWPs.” (ENB No. 2).  
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Agreement: when several countries are reported to hold the same position on 
an issue. This may be a text like “several parties, including Country 1, 
Country 2 and Country 3, proposed …”. Agreement may be coded also when 
two different sentences refer to the same position being held by different 
countries, even though the relationship (agreeing with each other) is not 
explicitly written.  
Example: 
- “The EU, the US and CANADA stressed the need to ensure 
consistency with the capacity building aspects of other discussions on 
technology transfer and adaptation.” (ENB No. 145).  
Delaying proposal: when Country 1 proposes that Country 2’s idea or 
proposal be discussed at a later time.   
Examples: 
- “The EU recognized Kazakhstan’s aspiration to join Annex B, while 
highlighting the need to comply with legal requirements relating to 
Annex B amendments. She supported deferring the issue to COP/MOP 
6.” (ENB No. 452). 
- “TOGO, supported by MALAYSIA, proposed adjourning until numbers 
were proposed” (ENB No. 74). 
Opposition : when the text reports Country 1 opposing the statement or 
position expressed by Country 2. This has also been coded when the word 
“opposition” is not explicitly mentioned, but it is clear from the statements 
that they oppose each other. 
Examples: 
- “The G-77/CHINA supported this approach while the US, CANADA 
and JAPAN opposed it” (ENB No. 347). 
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- “MEXICO underscored its commitment to mechanisms and processes 
that increase the participation of observers. (…) NIGERIA noted that 
although participation of stakeholders has been positive, the UNFCCC 
is an intergovernmental process.” (ENB No. 489). 
Criticism : when Country 1 directly criticizes Country 2 or its position / 
statement. 
Examples: 
- “He [the EU] said some developed countries, particularly the US, have 
not included binding measures in their proposals and emphasized the 
EU’s conviction that P&Ms should be included to fully encompass the 
Berlin Mandate and Geneva Declaration.” (ENB No. 42). 
“The MALDIVES lamented that reliance on the phrase “form should follow 
function” [used by China] is slowing down the negotiations” (ENB No. 494). 
D.2 Descriptive statistics of supportive and opposing statements 
by recipients towards donors 
Table D1: Types of interactions between donors and recipients 
Interaction No. of 
statements 
Percentage 
of total 
Supportive 1711 54.18 
   Agreement 1586 50.22 
   Support 88 2.79 
   On behalf of 37 1.17 
Opposing 1447 45.82 
   Opposition 1423 45.06 
   Criticism 24 0.76 
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Table D2: Ten most active aid recipients 
Recipient No. of 
statements 
Percentage 
of total 
Saudi Arabia 313 9.91 
China 304 9.63 
Brazil 280 8.87 
India 206 6.52 
South Africa 123 3.89 
Tuvalu 115 3.64 
Colombia 113 3.58 
Bolivia 111 3.51 
Mexico 89 2.82 
Argentina 88 2.79 
Table D3: Ten most supportive aid recipients 
Recipient No. of 
supportive 
statements 
Total No. of 
statements 
Supportive 
statements as 
% of country’s 
statements 
Costa Rica 53 53 1.00 
Kazakhstan 19 19 1.00 
Samoa 14 14 1.00 
Papua New 
Guinea 39 41 0.95 
Guyana 15 16 0.94 
Chile 58 62 0.94 
Uruguay 14 15 0.93 
Mexico 82 89 0.92 
Indonesia 37 41 0.90 
Panama 22 25 0.88 
Note: Table based only on recipients with 10 or more interactions (54 out of 97 actively 
speaking recipients in dataset) 
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Table D4: Ten least supportive aid recipients 
Recipient No. of 
supportive 
statements 
Total No. of 
statements 
Supportive 
statements as 
% of country’s 
statements 
Oman 1 24 0.04 
Sudan 1 16 0.06 
Nicaragua 1 12 0.08 
Libya 1 10 0.10 
Jamaica 2 12 0.17 
Algeria 7 35 0.20 
Venezuela 15 73 0.21 
Zambia 3 13 0.23 
Bolivia 33 111 0.30 
Cuba 11 35 0.31 
Note: Table based only on recipients with 10 or more interactions (54 out of 97 actively 
speaking recipients in dataset) 
Figure D1: Evolution of supportive and opposing statements over 
time 
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Table D5: Variable Description and Data Source 
Variable Definition Observation
s 
M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Source 
Dependent variables 
Support index Sum of statements a recipient makes referring to a specific donor, by 
year, whereby each statement is weighted by the degree of support, 
from -3 (criticism) to +3 (support or speaking on behalf). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. As it 
includes negative numbers (-18 being the lowest), we add 19 before 
taking logs. 
20860 0.036 1.065 -18 20 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Unweighted support 
index 
Unweighted sum of supportive and opposing statements a recipient 
makes referring to a specific donor, by year. 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. As it 
includes negative numbers (-9 being the lowest), we add 10 before 
taking logs. 
20860 0.015 0.520 -9 10 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Supportive 
statements 
(Unweighted) sum of positive statements where a recipient agrees 
with, speaks on behalf of or supports a donor, by year. 
In some regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before 
creating the log, +1 was added to avoid zeroes. 
20860 0.096 0.469 0 12 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Critical statements (Unweighted) sum of negative statements where a recipient delays, 
opposes or criticizes a donor, by year. 
In some regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before 
creating the log, +1 was added to avoid zeroes. 
20860 0.080 0.520 0 15 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Main explanatory variables 
Total aid Bilateral ODA commitments made by donors to recipients (2014 
constant prices, USD millions). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before 
creating the log, we rescale it into US dollars and add +1 to avoid the 
zeroes. 
20860 54.851 259.594 0 11534.75 OECD (2016b) 
Total aid dummy Indicator for whether any bilateral ODA commitment was made by 
the respective donor to the respective recipient (1) or not (0), by year.  
20860 0.692 0.462 0 1 OECD (2016b) 
Adaptation aid Climate change related bilateral ODA commitments for adaptation 
(both as main and significant purpose; 2014 constant prices, USD 
millions). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before 
5960 1.086 14.564 0 744.583 OECD (2016a) 
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Variable Definition Observation
s 
M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Source 
creating the log, we rescale it into US dollars and add +1 to avoid the 
zeroes. 
Adaptation aid 
dummy 
Indicator for whether any bilateral ODA commitment for adaptation 
was made by the respective donor to the respective recipient (1) or 
not (0), by year.   
5960 0.057 0.232 0 1 OECD (2016a) 
Mitigation aid Climate change related bilateral ODA commitments for mitigation of 
greenhouse gases (both as main and significant purpose; 2014 constant 
prices, USD millions). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before 
creating the log, we rescale it into US dollars and add +1 to avoid the 
zeroes. 
17880 2.063 41.238 0 2625.284 OECD (2016a) 
Mitigation aid 
dummy 
Indicator for whether any bilateral ODA commitment for mitigation 
was made by the respective donor to the respective recipient (1) or 
not (0), by year.   
17880 0.040 0.195 0 1 OECD (2016a) 
Control variables 
Interventions donor Overall number of oral interventions made by a donor during the 
UNFCCC negotiations, by year. In most regressions we use a squared 
version of this variable. 
20860 59.043 66.442 0 407 own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013) 
Interventions 
recipient 
Overall number of oral interventions made by a recipient during the 
UNFCCC negotiations, by year. In most regressions we use a squared 
version of this variable. 
20860 3.737 11.744 0 188 own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013) 
Dyadic 
interventions 
Total number of positional statements made by a recipient referring 
to a specific donor, by year. In most regressions we use a squared 
version of this variable. 
20860 0.176 0.843 0 27 own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013) 
Trade relationship The value of dyadic trade between the donor and the recipient 
(imports + exports, in constant 2011 USD) as a fraction of the 
recipient’s GDP.  
19540 0.063 0.791 0 63.84 United Nations 
(2016) 
Imports Bilateral imports by the donor from the recipient (millions constant 
2011 USD). We use a logged version of this variable, in which we 
rescale it to US dollars and add +1 before taking logs to avoid losing 
the zeroes. 
20860 1570.892 13604.07 0 444389.6 United Nations 
(2016) 
Exports Bilateral exports from the donor to the recipient (millions constant 
2011 USD). We use a logged version of this variable, in which we 
rescale it to US dollars and add +1 before taking logs to avoid losing 
20860 1059.594 7356.925 0 218822.8 United Nations 
(2016) 
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Variable Definition Observation
s 
M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax Source 
the zeroes. 
Democracy Absolute difference between the donor’s and the recipient’s level of 
democracy, measured as the average between the Freedom House civil 
liberties and the Freedom House political rights indices (rescaled so 
that higher values mean higher civil liberties or political rights).   
20220 2.761 1.805 0 6 Freedom House 
(2015), obtained 
from QoG (2015) 
UN voting Voting similarity index (0-1) equal to (total number of votes where 
both states agree)/(total number of joint votes). It includes all votes 
and not only important votes. 
19485 0.717 0.218 0 1 Voeten (2013) 
Vulnerability Recipient vulnerability measured by the ND-GAIN index that 
captures a country's exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the 
negative impact of climate change.  
16560 -0.023 0.169 -0.989 0.174 ND-ECI (2015) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2011 USD) of the recipient countries. We 
use a logged version of this variable. 
19340 8142.559 8235.965 492.607 48963.45 World Bank (2016) 
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Table D6: Buying support at the UNFCCC, parsimonious model 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0000 0.0024** 0.0033*** -0.0004 0.0039*** 
(0.85) (0.03) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient 0.0003 0.0032*** -0.0004 0.0036*** 0.0030*** 
(0.66) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00002*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33) (0.28) 
Interventions donor2 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.88) (0.43) (0.38) (0.62) (0.34) 
Observations 20860 5960 17880 5960 5960 
Number of clusters 149 149 149 149 149 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.084 0.079 0.101 0.070 0.095 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table D7: Regressions with multi-way clustering 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0001 0.0026 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
(0.70) (0.15) (0.00) (0.14) (0.01) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0030** -0.0006 0.0035** 0.0026** 
(0.93) (0.02) (0.44) (0.02) (0.02) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001* -0.0001*** -0.00001* -0.0001** -0.0001*** 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.26) (0.56) (0.27) (0.51) (0.60) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.81) (0.61) (0.53) (0.76) (0.54) 
Trade relationship 0.0021 0.0050 0.0026 0.0043 0.0046 
(0.73) (0.50) (0.68) (0.53) (0.51) 
Democracy -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0012 
(0.83) (0.70) (0.88) (0.81) (0.72) 
UN voting 0.0192** -0.0033 0.0157** -0.0056 -0.0055 
(0.02) (0.85) (0.05) (0.78) (0.75) 
Vulnerability 0.2445 0.5252 0.2550 0.5277 0.5440 
(0.13) (0.29) (0.11) (0.27) (0.27) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0367* -0.0548 -0.0392* -0.0544 -0.0561 
(0.06) (0.23) (0.05) (0.22) (0.22) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 
(recipients) 
129 129 129 129 129 
Number of clusters (donors) 10 10 10 10 10 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.108 0.071 0.100 
Note: Clustering at recipient and donor level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table D8: M ain results of regressions with lags and leads of aid  
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid), 1-year lag -0.0000 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0005** -0.0000 
(0.78) (0.28) (0.93) (0.05) (0.93) 
Observations 15330 3800 14090 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 129 127 129 129 129 
ln(Aid), 2-year lag 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0006 
(0.21) (0.89) (0.91) (0.21) (0.36) 
Observations 15330 2520 12830 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 129 126 129 129 129 
ln(Aid), 1-year lead 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0015* 
(0.33) (0.12) (0.54) (0.71) (0.08) 
Observations 14070 5140 14070 3850 3850 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 
Note: Table shows results for the main explanatory variable (aid) in separate regressions using 
different lags and leads. The effect of control variables (same set as those shown in Table 1) is 
not reported. All regressions with year and dyad fixed effects, and clustering at recipient level. P-
values in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion
This dissertation brings to the forefront the need for a conceptual rethinking 
of climate aid allocation. Over the years, several debates ranging from how to 
define climate aid, to ensuring that it is truly additional to what donors are 
providing anyway as development aid has been discussed in the literature. 
However, so far, none of the studies have incorporated the consideration that 
within climate aid, mitigation aid addresses a global public good while 
adaptation aid, a local public good. This consideration ultimately has 
important implications for how climate aid should be allocated as well as for 
its strategic use within the international climate negotiations. 
Chapter 2 presented an empirical overview of the relevance of climate 
aid and a discussion on the climate finance architecture. Then it clarified the 
conceptual underpinnings of the word climate aid and the problems associated 
with this instrument of dealing with climate change. It elaborated more on the 
theoretical issue of addressing the global public good, mitigation and a local 
public good, adaptation with the same instrument. This chapter explained the 
importance of having separate criteria for allocating mitigation aid and 
adaptation aid. Since the latter is a global public good, it does not matter 
where the greenhouse emission reductions take place. The effect of one ton of 
greenhouse gas emission will be the same irrespective of whether it takes place 
in a rich country like Switzerland or a poor country like Mali. By definition, 
no country can be excluded from reaping the benefits of such mitigation. 
Therefore, an efficient donor should choose a location, which maximizes the 
amount of emission reductions at given cost to allocate their mitigation aid. 
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Since poverty is negatively correlated with emissions, efficient mitigation 
locations often happen to be emerging economies rather than poor countries. 
Adaptation aid, however, is needed mainly by poor, vulnerable countries 
which are more affected by the onslaught of climate change and do not have 
sufficient resources to deal with it. In other words, aid for mitigation and 
adaptation should target different locations in order to be efficiently spent.  
In chapter 3, the empirical question relating to whether donors are 
aware of the separate criteria for mitigation and adaptation was explored. 
Furthermore, this chapter shed light on if donors do have separate criteria, 
whether they face certain impediments that reduce their efficiency in 
allocation of such climate aid. Using semi-structured expert interviews and 
secondary sources, the findings of this chapter revealed that most bilateral 
donors did not have publicly available criteria for mitigation aid allocation. 
Those which did have, focused either on efficiency in terms of greenhouse 
gases reduced at given cost or effectiveness measured by the amount of 
greenhouse gases reduced or avoided annually. However, despite having 
established efficiency criteria for mitigation aid, proper allocation of mitigation 
aid can be hampered for various reasons. This chapter identified such reasons 
and tried to understand to what extent they led to reduction in allocation 
efficiency. The most important factors that were identified included conflicts 
between different ministries, donors’ own strategic priorities in terms of 
promoting their business interests and leveraging climate finance as well as 
their choice of partner countries. In addition, public expectations also 
influenced donors’ aid allocation.  
Identification of the donors was not possible in this analysis, since the 
interviewed donors’ requested to be anonymous. More importantly, it was 
necessary to investigate whether donors who claim to use the cost-effectiveness 
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criteria to choose where to allocate mitigation aid, actually use it and whether 
there are differences in the drivers of adaptation and mitigation aid. 
Therefore, in the next two chapters, a quantitative analysis of the donors’ 
climate aid allocation decisions has been carried out. 
Chapter 4 and 5 adopted a quantitative approach to understand the 
determinants of climate aid allocation. This approach allowed the comparison 
with the information gathered from the interviews in the previous chapter.  
Chapter 4 used panel data with variation over recipient and year 
dimensions to model whether the determinants of mitigation and adaptation 
aid were indeed different. In other words, did mitigation aid target more 
efficient mitigation locations and adaptation aid, poor countries? An 
important issue, not considered so far within the aid allocation literature was 
that if donors target places with high mitigation potential they would have to 
allocate their aid to emerging economies. Therefore, donors’ efficiency may be 
misinterpreted as being selfish, i.e. donors are considered to be allocating 
mitigation aid to emerging economies for selfish reasons specifically with 
respect to donor exports (which are positively correlated to the criteria of 
efficient mitigation). To prevent such a misinterpretation, it was necessary to 
introduce controls for efficient location of mitigation aid. The 
misunderstanding is based on an omitted variable bias that disappears when 
variables accounting for mitigation efficiency are included in the model. In 
conclusion, the overall analysis revealed that donors do not differentiate 
between these two types of climate aid, i.e. mitigation aid and adaptation aid 
leading to lower efficiency in allocation. The quantitative findings largely 
conform to those from the previous chapter, where it was revealed that donors 
despite being aware of the efficiency criteria for mitigation aid were often 
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prevented from allocating their aid efficiently owing to barriers emanating 
from their own economies.  
Chapter 5 presented a more fine-grained econometric analysis for 
individual donors. The previous chapter showed that overall; donors have not 
yet adjusted their climate aid allocation to efficient allocation. But in that 
analysis, donors were aggregated which could have hidden more nuanced 
information regarding each donor. It was possible that some donors are more 
efficient than the rest. Moreover, when these donors are efficient, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, they will be considered to be selfish in the current 
framework of the aid allocation literature. To be able to assess the efficiency 
of individual donors, each donor’s allocation decisions were scrutinized using a 
three dimensional panel with an added donor dimension and seemingly 
unrelated regressions revealing which donor was misinterpreted as being selfish 
and which ones, simply careless in their allocation. 
To be able to assess the efficiency of individual donors a three-
dimensional panel analysis with the donor dimension was conducted. An 
interaction term with the export term (reflecting donors’ selfish interests) and 
dummies for each donor was introduced in the models estimating mitigation 
aid allocation with and without controlling for mitigation efficiency. Using 
seemingly unrelated regressions, Wald tests on the interaction term revealed 
whether donors are misinterpreted or simply careless. Donors were labeled as 
misinterpreted if the Wald tests revealed that the interaction term is 
significantly different from zero and the difference between the interaction 
terms before and after controlling for mitigation efficiency is positive, careless 
otherwise. 
In chapter 6 of the thesis, the strategic role of climate aid in the 
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international climate negotiations at the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was studied. Again, given the 
separate roles of adaptation aid, which addresses problems at a local level 
while mitigation aid, at a global level, led to the expectation that each type of 
aid is used differently in the negotiations. The latter may be less appropriate 
as a reward since each recipient will only enjoy a small part of the benefits. 
The underlying motivation of studying the multilateral setting of the UN 
negotiations is that financial incentives offered to developing countries can be 
used as a means to solicit the support (or thwart criticisms) of developing 
countries in the negotiations. Therefore, this chapter assessed whether 
countries that receive climate aid from donors react by expressing increased 
support and/or reduced opposition towards the donors. The study used linear 
regressions on a three-dimensional panel dataset with donor-recipient dyads 
that allows us to differentiate between long-term partnerships and the 
strategic use of aid for the purpose of the negotiations. The results indicate 
that indeed, countries that get any aid from donors tend to support them 
more in the negotiations. Moreover, aid can be used to buy support in the 
climate negotiations, but that this opportunity tends to be limited to 
mitigation and adaptation aid, rather than general aid. This argument is 
justified on the basis that there are greater demand and supply of these 
specific forms of climate aid and the responsibility for its allocation is with the 
delegates participating in the climate negotiations. Surprisingly, the study also 
finds that aid is used to buy support of the countries and also prevent 
criticism. This finding calls for further research. 
This thesis offers two important insights. Firstly, chapter 4 and 5 point 
towards an important but relevant issue: there are no homogeneous controls 
for the efficient location of projects for global public goods like climate change 
mitigation. Aid for global public goods does not follow the logic of the 
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traditional aid allocation literature. One could argue that as a consequence, 
the aid allocation literature should simply become more disaggregated. 
However, one might also ask whether financing global public goods should at 
all be accounted for as aid (see also Kaul 2014). Aid was initially conceived as 
a contribution that should benefit a specific recipient, not the world as a 
whole. If aid focuses on the provision of global public goods, apart from 
certain co-benefits, recipients should also have only very limited incentives to 
accept such aid. There are some global public goods that are more efficiently 
provided in developed rather than in developing countries. Will their provision 
be accounted for as development aid when they are (ineffectively) produced in 
developing countries instead? Should the definition of development aid 
perhaps rather depend on who benefits most than on where the project is 
implemented? Or should the funding for global public goods generally not be 
considered as aid, but come out of a separate budget (as widely requested for 
climate finance, notably by developing countries)? These questions highlight 
the challenges that arise for the statistical registration of development 
assistance at the level of the OECD/DAC. Meeting these challenges in an 
appropriate way will represent an important contribution to donor 
accountability and the effective allocation of finance in the age of global 
public goods. Secondly, the relevance of the study conducted in chapter 6 
extends beyond the context of the UNFCCC. The analogy between aid and 
negotiation support on the one hand, and aid and UNGA or UNSC voting 
alignment on the other hand shows that the strategic use of aid goes beyond 
what has been established in the aid literature so far. This should not only 
hold for the UNFCCC, but also for other similar international negotiations 
such as in the realm of the World Trade Organization. This analysis also feeds 
into the broader debate on donor motivations for foreign aid. In this context, 
the results suggest yet another component of donor interest beyond the 
commercial and geopolitical interests considered in the aid allocation literature 
163 
so far. 
The contributions of the research work undertaken have implications 
beyond the climate change regime. Firstly, it analyses the determinants of 
climate aid allocation in light of the global public goods consideration. 
Overlooking this aspect might lead to misinterpretation of donor motives and 
points out the inherent theoretical as well as methodological weaknesses in the 
current development finance allocation literature. This has consequences not 
only for climate aid but also for any type of development assistance 
addressing global public goods. Secondly, the while the role of aid has been 
studied in the context of UN voting, no study to the best of my knowledge, 
has studied the role of climate aid in the international climate negotiations, 
where decisions are not taken on the basis of voting but rather on the basis of 
consensus of all countries.
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